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***Opsis* and Exemplarity in the Hannibalic War:**

**Narrators, Intertext, and Tradition in Polybius and Livy**

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***Opsis* and Exemplarity in the Hannibalic War:  
Narrators, Intertext, and Tradition in Polybius and Livy**

by

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*uxori parentibus canibusque*

*sine quibus non*

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This dissertation analyzes how Livy's internal narrators mediate between his and his predecessors' texts. Chapter One surveys the theoretical frameworks lying behind the project to show how Livy uses narrators as part of his intertextual approach to writing history. Chapters Two through Four explore the relationship between *opsis*, exemplarity, and the historiographic methods of Livy and Polybius. Chapter Two argues that Livy integrates comments made by the Polybian external narrator into Hannibal's speeches, thereby allowing Hannibal to speak with a Polybian voice throughout the Third Decade. While Hannibal in the *Histories* uses language modelled on Polybius' methods of *opsis* and autopsy, Livy's Hannibal actually speaks with Polybius' own words. Hannibal's referential speeches in the *AUC* create an intertextual relationship that identifies Hannibal as a *modello-esemplare* to Polybius' *Histories*. Chapter Three analyzes the presentation of Scipio in both works. Scipio in the *Histories* speaks with a focus on Polybian language and methodology. In the *AUC*, however, Scipio uses exemplarity to guide the actions of his internal audience, incorporating language in his speeches that mirrors Livy's own methodology. He also shows his superior ability to use exemplarity by presenting a more

compelling interpretation of the Regulus *exemplum* in his debate with Fabius about the proposed invasion of Africa.

Chapter Four combines the analyses from the previous two chapters to argue that the portrayals of Hannibal and Scipio allow the two internal narrators to stage a competition on behalf of the authors whose approaches each represents. As Hannibal and Scipio face off at Zama, their speeches and interactions represent a battle of authorial reference as they stand as analogues for the methodologies of Polybius and Livy, respectively. As Scipio triumphs over Hannibal in the battle, the Roman victory represents a victory for Livy's exemplary method of historiography over Polybius' reliance on pragmatic decision-making based on *opsis* and autopsy. Chapter Five surveys how acts of internal narration integrate aspects of the texts of Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias. The integration of source texts into acts of internal narration shows Livy giving a voice to the Greco-Roman historiographic tradition throughout the Third Decade.



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## Introduction

In Euripides' *Hecuba*, Talthybius, as he so often does, enters the stage as a messenger to deliver the news of Polyxena's death.<sup>1</sup> His messenger-speech includes several quotes from the meeting of the Greek army that led to Polyxena's sacrifice. Among these are two quotes from Polyxena herself. In the first (ll. 546-52), she gives herself up for death and, after an attempted intervention by the assembled body of soldiers, Talthybius then gives her final words addressed to her killer, Neoptolemus:

...καὶ καθεῖσα πρὸς γαῖαν γόνυ  
ἔλεξε πάντων τλημονέστατον λόγον·  
Ἴδού, τόδ', εἰ μὲν στέρνον, ὃ νειανία,  
παίειν προθυμῇ, παῖσον, εἰ δ' ὑπ' αὐχένα  
χρήζεις πάρεστι λαιμὸς εὐτρεπῆς ὄδε. (561-565)

...and she dropped to the ground on her knee  
and said her most stout-hearted words of all:  
“Behold, here it is, young man, if it is my breast  
that you are so eager to strike, then strike! But if it is my  
throat that you want, here is my neck ready for your blow.”<sup>2</sup>

Polyxena's bold speeches causes only a momentary hesitation on Neoptolemus' part before he cuts her throat (566-67). The soldiers, who had earlier opposed her death, step forward to prepare her pyre and some scatter leaves over her corpse (τὴν θανοῦσαν ἐκ χερῶν / φύλλοις ἔβαλλον; 573-74). The falling leaves likely reference the famous simile of *Iliad* 6 where Glaucus tells Diomedes, “as the generations of leaves fall, so, too, do

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<sup>1</sup> Talthybius serves a similar role in *Trojan Women*, where he mediates between the conquered Trojans and their Greek captors. On Euripidean messenger-speeches: de Jong 1991. For a summary of the position of the messenger-speech in Greek tragedy more broadly: Halleran 2008: 173-75 and on the episodic nature of tragedy: Aichelé 1971.

<sup>2</sup> English translations given throughout this dissertation are those of the author.

men” (οἷη περ φύλλων γενεὴ τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν; *Il.* 6.146). The deaths of the Trojan youths and the subsequent loss of the potential for future generations of Trojans is a major theme for the play and for Euripides’ *Trojan Women* as well. An allusion to Glaucus’ famous line heightens the dramatic tension felt for Hecuba as she ponders the loss of so many of her children in such a short time.

The intertext to Glaucus’ simile can also draw upon the rich tradition of the line in subsequent Greek literature. However, the episodes’ intratextual and dramatic qualities are far more intriguing. While Polyxena does claim (*Il.* 342-78) to advance toward her death willingly before the character leaves the stage for the last time, upon first hearing that she would die, she had earlier described her death by comparing it to a wretched, mewling calf (205-08). Talthybius’ report of Polyxena’s final speech then allows her to rewrite her own valuation of her death: she is no longer a pitiable victim, but willing, brave, and resolute in accepting her demise. The dramatic convention of the “three-actor rule” necessitates the three speaking actors to fulfill multiple roles within the play.<sup>3</sup> For Euripides’ *Hecuba*, the most straightforward division of the roles involves the actor who played Polyxena doubling as Talthybius.<sup>4</sup> When Talthybius reports Polyxena’s final words, the actor playing him could modulate his speech to evoke the voice used earlier for Polyxena. For the external audience of the play, Talthybius’ report of her death does

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<sup>3</sup> On the three-actor rule and three-actor scenes: e.g. Ashby 1995 and Halleran 2008: 172-73.

<sup>4</sup> One actor likely plays the following roles in the tragedy: Polyxena, Talthybius, the maidservant, and Polymestor; another: Polydorus, Odysseus, and Agamemnon. The protagonist likely only played the lead role of Hecuba. Cohen 2015 describes this division of roles and the effect that this ancient convention had on a recent performance put on at Randolph College. Dudek 2011 review the performance and discusses the meaningful theatrical effects brought on by the actors’ doubling of roles.

more than simply record her last words. Her voice resonates in the quote recounting her final moments.

This dissertation examines how Livy incorporates the voices of the historiographic tradition into his *Ab Urbe Condita* (*AUC*) in a similar fashion. Through the combined lenses of narratology and intertextuality, I argue that Livy integrates characteristics of his source texts, and at times their exact words, into acts of internal narration in the Third Decade. As Livy incorporates and recontextualizes previously existing accounts of the Hannibalic war within his text, he creates intertextual relationships to his predecessors' works that enable him to assert his authority over the historiographic tradition and allow the voices of his predecessors' texts to speak within the multiple layers of his narrative. This argument also allows for a more critical understanding of Livy's reception of the Roman historical and historiographic past. This project thus evokes a more nuanced appreciation of Livy's use of his sources and a deeper understanding of the narratological complexities of the *AUC*. Through these two separate but related strands, this dissertation opens avenues for subsequent research in the field of Roman historiography by advocating a less reductive relationship between Livy and his sources, by setting an example for further narratological research on the *AUC* and its predecessors, and by demonstrating a richer textual tradition at the heart of Livy's narrative.

The relationship between Livy and his sources has long been at the heart of the scholarly discussion about the *AUC*. The practitioners of *Quellenforschung* dismissed the author's work as a poor compilation of his sources. The resulting analyses fragmented

Livy's work into a collection of episodes copied wholesale from earlier Latin authors or (usually badly) translated from his Greek predecessors.<sup>5</sup> These *Quellenforscher* operated under the premise that at any given time Livy works from a single source, which he largely transcribes without remark or analysis. As a result, *Quellenforschung* leaves no room for a perception of Livy as a critical historian or even as a literary author. A separate but simultaneous trend of scholarship isolated and evaluated individual episodes (or *Einzel Erzählungen*) of the *AUC* and found them to be highly polished literary narratives.<sup>6</sup> While Witte's episode-analysis demonstrated that Livy was capable of literary artistry, he failed to tackle the larger issues of *Quellenforschung* directly, leaving open the question of Livy's relationship to his sources outside contained narratives. Burck's work subsequently showed how these smaller episodes fit into the larger rhetorical and thematic architecture of books or entire decades of the *AUC*, but he largely examined portions of Livy's narrative for which there were direct comparisons available between the *AUC* and surviving texts (e.g. Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus). Early Livian scholarship was therefore divided into two disparate and seemingly antithetical opinions: while the *Quellenforscher* were disregarding Livy as a mindless transcriber, the "Rhetorical-Thematic" school was simultaneously hailing him as a literary artist.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> e.g. Nissen 1863 and Klotz [1941] 1964.

<sup>6</sup> e.g. Witte 1910 and Burck 1964.

<sup>7</sup> Chaplin and Kraus 2009: 1-4 provides a succinct introduction to these two trends and their effect on early Livian scholarship.

Subsequent work on the *AUC* favored the perceived historicity of the “more critical” histories of his predecessors—especially Polybius—over the text of Livy, who was therefore labeled as a mendacious and, consequentially, useless historian, best known for his “howlers,” the points at which he provided completely incongruous representations of the past.<sup>8</sup> Luce’s influential work on Livy’s compositional methods combated the long-entrenched criticisms of Livy as mindless copyist and uncritical historian and subsequently opened the door for the more recent treatments of the *AUC* as a literary and historiographic work.<sup>9</sup> Luce argues that Livy consulted various texts in preparation for the composition of each pentad or decade in order to lay out the overall architecture of each narrative section before composing his account largely from his recollection of these sources.<sup>10</sup> Luce’s analysis largely closed the door on *Quellenforschung* and opened up new avenues of research for Livy as a literary historian.<sup>11</sup>

In recent decades, scholars have analyzed the *AUC* using a variety of literary theories and focusing on a number of themes that have allowed Livian scholarship to move beyond the questions of historicity and the strictures of *Quellenforschung*. Levene, for instance, surveys Livy’s use of religion within the *AUC* and, more recently, he demonstrates the larger unity of the third decade and argues that moralism is at the heart

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<sup>8</sup> For the term “howlers” and this type of analysis of Livy’s work: Walsh 1958 and 1961.

<sup>9</sup> Luce 1977.

<sup>10</sup> Luce 1977: 185-229.

<sup>11</sup> Detractors still remain, however: against recent historiographical analysis and its effect on modern historians: e.g. Lendon in Feldherr 2009: 41-61.

of Livy's construction of causation within the decade.<sup>12</sup> Jaeger examines both the physical and literary aspects of monumentality within the *AUC* and Feldherr argues that the visual quality of Livy's narrative produces the same effect on the external audience of the *AUC* that the spectacles recounted had on his internal audiences.<sup>13</sup> Exemplarity has become a common theme in recent Livian scholarship. Chaplin and Roller have convincingly shown that exemplarity is the key heuristic tool employed by Livy.<sup>14</sup> Much of Chaplin's argument examines the exemplary qualities of Livy's speeches and Haimson Lushkov has expanded upon this idea to demonstrate that speeches and debates about magistracy also serve as a form of *exemplum* within the *AUC*.<sup>15</sup> In addition to Luce's more literary approach to Livy, these new analyses also largely follow Wiseman's and Woodman's rhetorically themed school of literary historiography.<sup>16</sup>

While Wiseman, Woodman, and others have greatly advanced scholars' understanding of the nature of historiographic oratory and the rhetorical quality of the works of ancient historians, they often treat speeches within these texts as standalone set pieces apart from the main narrative or they do not nuance the language of these internal speakers vis-à-vis its relation to that of the primary narrator. The application of the methods of narratology to Livy's speeches and his relationship to his predecessors sheds further light on the role that internal narrators play in ancient historiographic works and

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<sup>12</sup> Levene 1993 and 2010, respectively.

<sup>13</sup> Jaeger 1997 and Feldherr 1998.

<sup>14</sup> Chaplin 2000 and 2014 and Roller 2004, 2009, and 2011.

<sup>15</sup> Haimson Lushkov 2015.

<sup>16</sup> e.g. Wiseman 1979 and Woodman 1988.



also demonstrates how other types of secondary narration provide a means through which scholars can examine Livy's engagement with his source texts.

Narratological theory seeks to explain and analyze texts that are considered largely narrative; that is, those that aim to convey a story over time through the voice of a narrator. Genette's analysis of Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu* was influential in the development of narratological theory, while Bal's work provides a succinct introduction to its central tenets.<sup>17</sup> Narratology analyzes the account of a "narrator," or narrative agent, at three distinct levels: the text, story, and fabula.<sup>18</sup> While the narratee, the audience or recipient of the account, only directly interacts with the "text," these three levels are revealed through narratological analysis as distinct from one another and each is composed of its own characteristics.<sup>19</sup> At the textual level, the narrator orders and constructs the story and employs focalizing agents in order to color the perception of the fabula, thereby providing meaning and guiding the narratee toward an interpretation of the text. The historiographic genre is well suited for narratological analysis as it ostensibly claims to relate the historical past as the fabula at the heart of its narrative and in that its generic tradition calls for elements of secondary narration through its use of deliberative and battlefield speeches.<sup>20</sup> These internal, secondary narrators provide

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<sup>17</sup> Genette [1972] 1980 and Bal [1985] 2009. In following Genette and Bal for my analysis, I have chosen to follow a school within the larger set of theories employed by narratologists that I feel best matches my approach to Livy's *AUC*. For an introduction to four of narratology's major trends (Rhetorical, Feminist, Mind-Oriented, and Antimimetic): Herman et al. 2012.

<sup>18</sup> On these three levels and how I see them functioning within the *AUC*, cf. Chapter 1, Part 2 below.

<sup>19</sup> I have defined "narratee" here with what I consider to be the simplest and most direct meaning of the term. For a discussion of the topic, with relevant bibliography, Bal [1985] 2009: 68 and 73.

<sup>20</sup> On the narratological use of speeches in historiography: de Jong 2004: 8-9.

embedded texts through which the primary narrator can construct and convey meaning to the narratee through the lens of a different speaker or from the perspective of a separate focalizer.

While narratology was developed to analyze fictional texts,<sup>21</sup> there are a number of reasons to support its applicability to an analysis of Livy's narrative: Hayden White argues that even modern historical works generally share many features in common with fictional narratives, much like their ancient historiographical counterparts.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, narratology has been widely applied to Greek literature and, more specifically, de Jong has examined the intricate structures and complex organization revealed by a narratological analysis of Herodotus' *Histories*.<sup>23</sup> Despite the forays made into this theoretical framework by students of Greek historiography, scholars have made little use of it for studies of the *AUC*. For instance, work on Livy's chronological organization has not often been done from an explicitly narratological point of view but rather more generally by evaluating the overall "shape" or structure of his narrative.<sup>24</sup> Pausch, however, has incorporated several features of narratology, including focalization, narrative sequence and anticipation, and pacing, in his analysis of how Livy engages his readers and sustains their interest throughout the text by communicating directly to that

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<sup>21</sup> e.g. Genette 1991 and Cohn 1999.

<sup>22</sup> Hayden White 1978 and 1987; cf. also Feeney 1993 on the interplay between fact, fiction, and believability in ancient historical narrative.

<sup>23</sup> On Greek literature generally: de Jong et al. 2004. Narratological analysis of Herodotus' *Histories*: de Jong 1999, 2001, and 2002.

<sup>24</sup> e.g. Rich 1997, Levene 2010: 1-81

external audience.<sup>25</sup> Beyond the generic association that Livy shares with Herodotus, the arrangement and tone of Livy's narrative has many parallels with Herodotus' *Histories*, as was recognized among even ancient critics (e.g. Quint. *Inst. Orat.* 10.1.101). While there is room for more work directly comparing these two historians, the similarities between their narratives reinforces the soundness of a narratological approach to Livy's Third Decade.

Since this dissertation explores how the primary narrator of the *AUC* places his work within and among various source texts using acts of secondary narration, Livy's Third Decade offers an ideal situation for this type of analysis: First, Livy constructs this decade as a narrative whole, as Levene has recently demonstrated.<sup>26</sup> Second, whole or at least extended portions of Polybius' parallel narrative of the Hannibalic war are extant.<sup>27</sup> Third, numerous fragments of Livy's Roman historiographic predecessors survive that correspond to the span of the narrative of the Third Decade. The Third Decade of the *AUC* therefore provides the opportunity to examine both the previously existing texts (in various states of survival) and Livy's use of these sources. Additionally, the Third Decade remains underrepresented in modern scholarship, although the episodes found within these books of the *AUC* describe some of the most exciting and pivotal events in the history of the Roman Republic: Hannibal's sack of Saguntum and crossing of the Alps,

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<sup>25</sup> Pausch 2010: 183-209 and 2011. Pausch's discussion of focalization as a means of conveying meaning to Livy's external audience is particularly rich: Pausch 2011: 125-90.

<sup>26</sup> Levene 2010.

<sup>27</sup> Polybius' account of the Hannibalic War comprises the entirety of his third book—which narrates the war up to the crisis that arises in Rome after the disaster at Cannae—and then fragments of the *symploke* from Books Six to Fifteen. Many of the fragments from these books survive in large, extended narratives.

the battles of Trasimene, Cannae, and Zama, the campaigns of Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus, and the political and social turmoil that transpired in Capua, Syracuse, and Rome, to name but a few chief examples. Both Livy (21.1.1-3) and Polybius (1.1.5-2.8) note their enthusiasm for taking up the task of describing the Second Punic War and claim that its impact on history surpasses that of all other periods of the past. Livy's Third Decade, as the longest extended narrative of that war, holds an iconic and pivotal status within the Roman tradition of debate about Hannibal.

Chapter One demonstrates how I use the two major methodological approaches that lie at the heart of my analysis: intertextuality and narratological theory. I survey a series of well-known intertexts in the opening to the Third Decade to develop a richer appreciation of Livy's allusive program. I then compare limited details of the narratives of Nepos, Polybius, and Livy for the fabula of Hannibal's trek across the Alps to demonstrate how the three levels of a narrative (text, story, fabula) work within historiographic texts. I close the chapter with close readings of the speeches of Mago and Varro in reaction to the Battle of Cannae to show how narratology and intertextuality work together for Livy in his most overt type of secondary narration: internal speakers. These speeches demonstrate how Livy incorporates and subsequently caps his predecessor's narratives in the text of the *AUC*.

Chapters Two and Three work together to establish a paradigm for my argument of Livy's methodological approach to integrating his source texts through acts of internal narration. These two chapters focus on two key figures for the Third Decade, Hannibal and Scipio, and on the relationship between Polybius' and Livy's use of these two

generals as internal narrators. Chapter Two comprises a narratological study of the figure of Hannibal in Polybius' and Livy's texts. First, Polybius makes frequent use of Hannibal as an internal narrator in his *Histories* and creates within his speeches a rhetoric that corresponds to the language Polybius uses to describe his own historiographic process centering on *opsis* and autopsy. Building on this argument, the second half of Chapter Two shows how Livy incorporates Polybius' characterizations of Hannibal into his own narrative through Hannibal's role as an internal narrator within the *AUC*. Hannibal speaks with a Polybian voice in the Third Decade and, as such, Livy creates an analogous relationship between Hannibal and Polybius in his narrative. Chapter Three performs a similar analysis of Scipio's role in both historians' texts. For Polybius, Scipio too reflects his own methodological approach. When compared to Polybius' account, however, Livy often removes elements of Polybian *opsis* and replaces them with a focus on exemplarity—a key component of Livy's historiographic methodology—in Scipio's role as an internal narrator.

These two chapters largely focus on several pivotal and well-known episodes in the Hannibalic War: the Carthaginians' trek across the Alps, the Battles in Northern Italy in the opening stages of the war, the opening of Scipio's campaign in Spain, his debate with Fabius over the invasion of Africa, and, finally, the narrative surrounding the Battle of Zama. I concentrate my analysis on these familiar episodes for two reasons: First, each of them has a rich narrative that includes speeches from various characters, detailed descriptions of the behavior of various characters, and often comments made by the external narrator in an effort to explain the significance of these events. Second, the

sections of Polybius' *Histories* corresponding to these episodes survive largely intact.<sup>28</sup> Together, Chapters Two and Three offer a rich case-study of Livian narratological practice, as they analyze the most explicit type of secondary narration (character-bound speeches) and show Livy's direct incorporation of and engagement with the narratological features of a surviving text (Polybius).

Livy's relationship with Polybius has continued to be a contentious topic among scholars. Nissen's Law argues that Livy worked from one main source at a time in the composition of his narrative and that Polybius did not become a major source for Livy until Book 24.<sup>29</sup> Nissen's argument long held sway and most scholars who worked on Livy's use of sources operated under the belief that Polybius came to be an important source for Livy at various later points within the Decade.<sup>30</sup> Tränkle argued that Livy only turns to Polybius' account for his discussion of the Macedonian Wars at the start of Book 31 of the *AUC*, at which point the Greek author becomes his primary source.<sup>31</sup> Tränkle has remained a vital figure on the topic. Levene, however, has recently demonstrated in his analysis of Livy's Third Decade that Polybius' *Histories* were, in fact, a major source for the later author's account of the Hannibalic War, even though Livy refers to him by

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<sup>28</sup> Polyb. 3 survives in full and covers the origins of the war through the end of the Battle of Cannae. Scipio's initial campaigns in Spain survive in the lengthy fragments of Book 10 and Zama in the fragments of Book 15.

<sup>29</sup> Nissen 1863: 83-85. Briscoe 1993: 39 discusses the impact of Nissen on studies of Livy's methods of working with his sources.

<sup>30</sup> e.g., Walsh 1961: 124-32, Treptow 1964: 209, de Sanctis 1968: 168-73. cf. the discussion about the Battle of Zama in Chapter 4, Part 3 below.

<sup>31</sup> Tränkle 1977: 193-241.

name only once in the decade (30.45.5).<sup>32</sup> Levene makes a direct comparison of these two authors in their narratives of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, but his overall conclusion applies to the whole decade in that he demonstrates that the parallels in content are enough to maintain the allusive relationship.<sup>33</sup>

At the heart of my analysis of Livy's and Polybius' portrayals of Hannibal and Scipio is a comparison between *opsis*, a key component of Polybius' historiographic method, and exemplarity, the primary heuristic tool that Livy employs in writing his history. For Polybius, *opsis* and his own autopsy establish his credibility and authority as a historian. His claims to have examined places, inscriptions, and to have interviewed direct eyewitnesses make him a more trustworthy historian than his predecessors (e.g. 3.33.17-18, 3.48.12, 4.2.2, or his well-known attack on Timaeus at 12.25g.1-4). Polybius also infuses his narrative with language oriented toward sight and spectacle so that his *Histories* evoke in the mind of the reader a clear image of the events described in order to accomplish its didactic aims (e.g. 1.1.2-4, 1.4.1-2, 1.35.1-7). In Chapters Two and Three I argue that Polybius creates a similar aura of visual expression within his depictions of Hannibal and Scipio in their campaigns in Italy and Spain, respectively. These two internal narrators use language modeled on Polybius' own historiographic methods and serve roles analogous to the external narrator and historian.

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<sup>32</sup> Levene 2010: esp. Ch. 2, pp. 82-163 on "Sources and Intertexts" generally and pp. 135-63 for his argument that Polybius is a major source for the Third Decade and whose text Livy reworks in his incorporation to a greater degree than he does in the Fourth Decade.

<sup>33</sup> Levene 2010: 126-63 deals with the question of Livy's sources for the third decade at length. On the sole reference to Polybius in the Third Decade, cf. Chapter 4, Part 4, below.

Livy's historiographic method makes ample use of exemplarity. As an external narrator Livy notes how *exempla* are useful as a means of providing instruction for proper moral behavior (*praef.*10-12). Internal narrators, too, make frequent use of exemplary language in their speeches.<sup>34</sup> Livy's method of exemplarity is built upon the ability of the commemoration of valorous acts through speeches and monuments that call for repetition of similar types of behaviors.<sup>35</sup> In the second half of the Third Decade, Scipio takes on a central role as an internal narrator that uses Livian methods of exemplarity.<sup>36</sup> In Chapter Three I explore how Livy integrates into the speeches of Scipio elements drawn from Polybius' text but removes the elements of *opsis* and instead highlights Scipio's use of *exempla*. As such, Livy creates a role for Scipio as an internal narrator that parallels and mirrors his own function and methodology as an external narrator.

Chapters Two and Three combine to establish that within the Third Decade Hannibal and Scipio serve as internal narrators whose language and functions are analogous to those of Polybius and Livy, respectively. Chapter Four picks up this thread and examines the interpretive payoff that this has for each historian's narrative of the Battle of Zama by focusing on the meeting between the two generals and their battlefield exhortations. For Polybius, the Battle of Zama allows him to contrast two aspects of his *opsis*-based approach to historiography, with Hannibal and Polybius each representing one type of visual means of instruction. Livy exploits the relationship between Hannibal as a Polybian narrator and Scipio as a Livian exemplary speaker in the Battle of Zama

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<sup>34</sup> esp. Chaplin 2000.

<sup>35</sup> Roller 2004, 2009, and 2011.

<sup>36</sup> Chaplin 2000: esp. 61-65, 80-85, 90-97, and 121-34.



and has these two generals serve as analogues for the approaches of the historians whom they analogously represent. Scipio's victory at Zama signifies a triumph of Livian historiography over Polybius.

Using Chapters Two through Four as a paradigm for my analysis of Livy's engagement with his predecessors, Chapter Five examines the incorporation into the *AUC* of other narratives of the Roman historiographic tradition. The now fragmentary remains of Livy's Roman predecessors leave open larger questions for their narrative structures or their relationship to the *AUC*. These texts are preserved mainly through literary and lexicographic sources, with only a few culled from the exegetical tradition, and only very rarely do identifiable fragments survive from physical remnants, such as papyrological or epigraphic remains.<sup>37</sup> Badian provides the basic, though reductive, narrative of the development of historiography at Rome up to the Late Republic.<sup>38</sup> His article, while seminal, focuses on the similarities between the surviving bodies of fragments and he thereby posits nearly identical structures for the authors' works and extrapolates very few divergences within this tradition aside from the basic annalist-monograph split. Still, this article has informed much of the work on early Roman historiography. Recent editions of the corpora of the fragmentary historians of Rome have created an atmosphere primed for

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<sup>37</sup> Of the three papyrological fragments catalogued in *FRHist*, two (Anon. 1 [109] F1 = *POxy* 2088 and Anon. 2 [110] F1 = *POxy* 30) are of unidentifiable authorship and the third ([Hadrian (97) F7 = *PFayum* 19) consists of a letter that has been suggested as the possible opening of Hadrian's autobiography. The sole epigraphic fragment (Lutatius [32] F10 = *Inscr.Ital.* 13.2.122-3) comes from a section of the *Fasti Praenestini*. Hoyos 2001 also makes the case that P.Ryl. III 491 is a fragment of Fabius Pictor, but Cornell 2014: 1.167, n. 33 dismisses Hoyos' argument, based on the timing of the events it contains, and claims instead that the fragment likely derives from one of the Pro-Carthaginian sources on the Hannibalic War, Sosylus (*FGrHist* 176) or Silenus (*FGrHist* 175), for instance.

<sup>38</sup> Badian 1966.

work on these authors. Chassignet's Budé volumes of the fragments comprised the first complete edition of the fragmentary corpora since Peter's influential *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*.<sup>39</sup> Chassignet has since been followed by Beck and Walter and now, most recently, Cornell et al., whose monumental edition of *The Fragments of the Roman Historians* provides new insight into the corpora of Livy's Roman predecessors in that Cornell and his co-editors have reorganized and produced new commentary for all of the fragments of these historians.<sup>40</sup> This long-awaited collection allows for a reappraisal of even basic facts maintained about these now fragmentary authors. Chapter Five analyzes the remains of Livy's Roman historiographic predecessors on the Hannibalic War with a focus on Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias, who are Livy's two main sources as explicitly cited within the third decade.<sup>41</sup> For Coelius and Antias, I first examine the fragments of these authors from non-Livian cover texts before comparing them to Livy's citation of their texts or moments where Livy incorporates aspects of their narratives into his own, in much the same way as he did with features of Polybius' *Histories*.<sup>42</sup> This analysis demonstrates that Livy integrates the larger Roman historiographic tradition into the *AUC* and allows the voices of his predecessors to speak through his text.

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<sup>39</sup> Chassignet 1996-2004; Peter 1906 and 1914.

<sup>40</sup> Beck and Walter 2001 and 2004; Cornell et al. 2014.

<sup>41</sup> Livy's citations of Coelius Antipater in the Third Decade: 21.38.6, 21.46.10, 21.47.4, 22.31.8-9, 23.6.8, 26.11.10, 27.27.13, 28.46.14, 29.25.3, 29.27.14, 29.35.2; of Valerius Antias: 25.39.14, 26.49.3, 26.49.5, 28.46.14, 29.35.2, 30.3.6, 30.19.11, 30.29.7).

<sup>42</sup> In separating the Livian and non-Livian fragments of these authors for my analysis, I am following the methodology of Elliot 2013, whose recent work on Ennius' *Annales* in relation to Vergil's *Aeneid*. This will allow me to minimize the potential for circularity in arguing that Livy incorporates these narratives by first establishing what trends are present in the non-Livian fragments.

## Chapter One

### Narrative, Intertext, and Speech in Livy's Third Decade

#### Part 1: The Intertextual Program at the Opening of the Third Decade:

In **parte** operis **mei** licet mihi **praefari**, quod in principio **summae totius** professi **plerique** sunt **rerum scriptores**, bellum **maxime omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint me scripturum**, quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere.<sup>1</sup> (Livy 21.1.1)

I am able **to make a preface** for **just a part** of my work that **most writers of history** have declared in the opening of their **whole account**: that **I will write about the most memorable of all the wars that have ever been fought**, namely, the one which the Carthaginians—with Hannibal as their leader—waged against the Roman people.

Livy begins the Third Decade of the *AUC* with a new preface to set it apart from what has preceded it.<sup>2</sup> Here the narrator lays out the text's topic (the war with Hannibal) and offers a qualification of how that subject compares to the accounts of previous historians.

Beyond the overt competitive nature of these lines, Livy draws intertextual connections with his predecessors by starting his Third Decade with comments relating back to other historiographic texts.

Intertextual approaches to the *AUC* have been in vogue of late.<sup>3</sup> From the preface to several of the opening episodes, Livy opens his account of the Hannibalic War with a series of conspicuous allusions that illustrate the types of complex textual connections of

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<sup>1</sup> For the Latin text of Livy given throughout the dissertation I follow the OCT texts of Walters and Conway (Bks 21-25) and Conway and Johnson (26-30), except where noted.

<sup>2</sup> On this preface and its contribution to the overall narrative structure of the decade, Levene 2010: 9-15.

<sup>3</sup> v. O'Gorman 2009, Levene 2010, 2011, and 2014, Polleichtner 2010, and Haimson Lushkov 2013b, e.g.

which his narrative is capable. Some of these references have been recognized and studied in isolation. I will review these allusions in succession, with a focus on the methodology the historian uses to mark them, in order to demonstrate the kind of allusive program that the historian builds into the opening of his Third Decade. I will explore how Livy's work heightens his audience's awareness of his approach to intertextuality through the employment of increasingly vague—though still recognizable—allusive techniques. Livy's *amplificatio*, a common trope employed by historians at the openings of their works, is here an overt act of one-upmanship: he will write the history of the greatest war ever fought in only a part of his work.<sup>4</sup> Livy makes an anonymous citation to the group of earlier authors: *plerique...rerum scriptores*.<sup>5</sup> This type of reference is a step removed from an explicit, named citation, but it does heighten the audience's awareness of the author's relation to target texts. Of these potential sources, one prior historian in particular stands out: Thucydides.<sup>6</sup> In the preface to his account of the Peloponnesian War, the Greek historian makes the following claim:

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<sup>4</sup> Marincola 1997: 34-43 discusses the larger trend of *amplificatio* or *auxēsis* in the openings of the works of ancient historians.

<sup>5</sup> On the designation "anonymous citation" and other types of historiographic citation and reference, v. Haimson Lushkov 2013b.

<sup>6</sup> For the Thucydidean intertext here, v. also Rodgers 1986: 336; Marincola 1997: 41-2; Polleichtner 2010: 74-77; and Pausch 2011: 144. Levene 2010: p. 9, n. 13 also notes a Sallustian turn of phrase in Livy's *me scripturum*: cf. Sall. *BJ* 5.1: *scripturus sum*. cf. also Levene 1992: 55-6 on Sallust's preface and its break from the convention of *amplificatio*. Thucydides' preface likewise is an amplification of Herodotus': Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησέως ἱστορίας ἀπόδεξις ἦδε, ὥς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι (1.1). "This is the publication of the inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus so that the deeds done by men would not become forgotten in time, and so that the great and marvelous deeds, performed by both Greeks and barbarians, would not be without fame, both other things and, in particular, the cause for which they went to war with one another." Thucydides' μέγαν recalls Herodotus' μεγάλα; his ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους a cap of Herodotus' ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι. Thucydides replaces Herodotus' θωμαστά with ἀξιολογώτατον, pointing to a characteristic difference between the two authors' accounts: while Herodotus recounts the marvelous, Thucydides focuses on events

**Θουκυδίδης** Ἀθηναῖος **ξυνέγραψε** τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ **ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων** (1.1.1)

**Thucydides** of Athens **recorded** the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, how they made war against each other, and taking it up right from the beginning, as he thought that it would be great and the **most worthy of mention of those that have occurred**.

Thucydides' superlative ἀξιολογώτατον is recalled through Livy's *maxime...memorable*.

In each text the war to be discussed is compared through the superlative phrase to those that have occurred in the past (τῶν προγεγενημένων; *omnium...quae unquam gesta sint*).

The authors' presences as recorders of these events are noted in both texts

(Θουκυδίδης...ξυνέγραψε; *mei...praeferi...me scripturum*). While Livy does not name himself, compared to Thucydides' third person, he uses a more vivid first person after the impersonal main verb (*licet*) and as the subject of the indirect statement that follows (after *professi sunt*).<sup>7</sup> Livy also repeats the first person pronoun (*mei...me*), doubling his appearance in the opening lines to the decade, compared to Thucydides' single appearance (Θουκυδίδης). The references found in Livy's *amplificatio* mark Thucydides' *Histories* as the one of the texts which Livy claims to be able to surpass.<sup>8</sup> Thucydides makes his grandstanding claim for his entire work, a practice followed by Livy's other

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worthy of *logos*. Whether Livy purposefully recalls the Herodotean preface with parallel language (μεγάλα, *maxime*; ἐπολέμησαν, *bellum*) or merely through the lens of his Thucydidean *amplificatio*, the all-inclusive nature of Livy's claim props the *AUC* over even Herodotus' *Histories*.

<sup>7</sup> In his general *praefatio*, too, Livy does not mention himself by name, but similarly appears through first person references (*facturus...sim, perscripserim, scio, sciam, ausim, videam, consoler; praef.* 1.1-3). Livy does, however, allude to his birthplace by describing the foundation of Padua (1.1.2-3), but in the preface and elsewhere he breaks from tradition by making no explicit mention of his name and birthplace: Kraus 1994: 1-2.

<sup>8</sup> cf. also Clauss 1997: 173-4.

anonymous predecessors, as indicated by *summae totius*. Livy, however, does so for only a part (*partis*). Through the synecdoche of his replacement of *summae totius* with *partis*, Livy takes a metonymic precedence over the anonymous authors he mentions in his preface.

The connection between Livy and Thucydides is further strengthened as each justifies their grand claims. Livy's intertextual one-upmanship continues in the next section of his preface to the Third Decade:

Nam **neque** ualidiores opibus **ullae** inter se ciuitates gentesque contulerunt arma **neque** his ipsis tantum **unquam** uirium aut roboris fuit. et haud ignotas belli artes inter sese sed expertas primo Punico conferebant bello, et adeo **uaria fortuna belli ancepsque Mars** fuit ut propius periculum fuerint qui uicerunt. (21.1.2)

For **neither** did **any** states and nations that were more powerful in wealth and resources ever bear arms against each other, **nor** was there **ever** such a strength or power as that which these very people had. The arts of war they practiced were not unknown to each other, but were tried and tested in the First Punic War, and the **fortune of the war** was so **varied** and **Mars so fickle** that those who conquered in the end came nearer to ruin.

Livy claims that the strength of Rome and Carthage exceeds all those that had come before, including, logically, Sparta and Athens. In his preface, Thucydides offers the following rationale as proof of his assertion that his account covers events that are worth mention: “He takes as proof of this that both sides were at their peak in terms of all their preparations and resources for this war” (τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ἦσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ; Thuc. *Hist.* 1.1.1). While Thucydides merely states that his two combatant nations were at their own respective peaks, Livy caps his Greek

predecessor's claim. The correlatives *neque...ullae, neque...unquam*, the latter of which recalls *unquam* from a relative clause in the opening sentence of the internal preface, highlight Livy's separation from his predecessors' subjects. As Livy opens the Third Decade with his reference to Thucydides' preface, he subsumes into his own work the traditions of Greek historiography and demonstrates how his subject matter transcends that of his famous predecessor. Livy's use of the anonymous citation to Thucydides, moreover, augments the *amplificatio* of his preface and stands as more than just a generic marker, but as an indication of his intertextual approach to the forthcoming narrative.

Livy's claim also notes how he surpasses Thucydides with an account that features more alternations of fortune for each side (*varia fortuna belli ancepsque Mars*). Two other allusions also stand out: First, Livy mentions *varia fortuna* and *anceps Mars*, concepts that echo Polybius' central emphasis on *Tychē* and the role that history plays in helping people deal with the vicissitudes of human life.<sup>9</sup> While Livy's use of Polybius as early as Book 21 remains a contested point, Levene has recently and convincingly argued that Livy's narrative draws on Polybius' *Histories* for Hannibal's crossing of the Alps and all but the harshest critics of the relationship between Livy and Polybius find some reference to the latter by at least the later parts of the Third Decade.<sup>10</sup> An allusive

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<sup>9</sup> On Polybian *Tychē*, v. esp. *RE* Polybios 1532-43; Pédech 1964: Cap. VII and *passim*; Walbank 1985: 210-23, 2002: 245-57, and 2011; Eckstein 1995: 254-71. Polybius presents the role of fortune in historical events as early as his proem: 1.1.2 and 1.4; for several of his other comments about *Tychē* and history, v. also 1.63.9, 29.21.5-6, 29.27.12, 36.17.2-4, and 38.21.3. For Polybius' comments about the role of history in helping one deal with the vagaries of the human condition, v. 1.1.2 and 1.1.4, e.g. On *Fortuna* in Livy: Levene 1993, esp. 30-33, and Kajanto 1957.

<sup>10</sup> Levene 2010: 135-63. For further discussion of Livy's use of Polybius in the Third Decade, see the Introduction, above. For an argument against the use of Polybius before Book 31: Tränkle 1977: 193-241.

reference to *varia fortuna* within the proem for the Third Decade suggests that Polybius' *Histories* and his approach to *Tychē* should not be absent from the minds of Livy's audience.

Another allusion drawn in the second line of the decade's preface originates from Livy's note that the Romans and Carthaginians became experienced (*expertas*) with each other's arts of war during their previous engagements. This serves, on the one hand, as an allusion to the first two books of Polybius' *Histories*, which narrate the First Punic War in detail. On the other hand, the note of the earlier war is also an intratextual reference to an earlier section of the *AUC*. Books Sixteen to Nineteen, now lost, narrate the events of the First Punic War.<sup>11</sup> As Livy self-referentially looks back to his own text, the implication that the Romans and Carthaginians are well versed in or understand each other's tactics suggests that the audience's engagement with Livy's *AUC* can similarly remove ignorance (*ignotas*) and create better comprehension of the past, thus fulfilling the didactic aims that Livy sets out in his general preface.<sup>12</sup>

After Livy completes his prefatory remarks to the Third Decade, he opens his narrative of the Hannibalic war with a brief flashback relating the famous story of Hannibal's childhood oath. As Livy makes very few striking chronological analepses in

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<sup>11</sup> While these books are, unfortunately, now lost, the *Periochae* for these four books mention the highlights of the First Punic War, beginning with the origin of the Carthaginians (*Origo Carthaginiensium et primordia urbis eorum referuntur: Per. 16.1*), and concluding in the nineteenth book with the treaty between the two states (*petentibus Carthaginiensibus pax data est: Per. 19.25*). For a summary of the issues surrounding the *Periochae* in general, v. Bessone 2015. Begbie 1967, Bingham 1978, and Jal 1984 create different lists of discrepancies between the surviving books and the corresponding *Periochae*, they generally point to more harmony than alteration. On other sources for the *Periochae* and possible intermediaries: Begbie 1967, Bingham, 1978, Hellegouarc'h 1994, and Hose 1994.

<sup>12</sup> On the general preface, Moles 1993.



the *AUC*, the inclusion of one at such an important point in his narrative is striking.<sup>13</sup>

Livy describes the vow as follows:

**Fama est** etiam Hannibalem annorum ferme nouem, pueriliter blandientem patri Hamilcari ut duceretur **in Hispaniam**, cum perfecto Africo bello exercitum eo traiecturus sacrificaret, altaribus admotum **tactis sacris** iure iurando adactum **se cum primum posset hostem fore populo Romano**. (21.1.4)

**There is even a story** that Hannibal, when he was around nine years old, was boyishly coaxing his father, Hamilcar, to take him **to Spain**. After the completion of the African war, when Hamilcar was making a sacrifice as he was about to cross over to Spain, Hannibal was forced to approach the altar, **touch the sacred objects**, and to swear with an oath that **he would be an enemy to the Roman people as soon as he was able**.

Livy opens his account with an Alexandrian footnote: *fama est*.<sup>14</sup> As an impersonal citation, the phrase frames the story and demonstrates Livy's awareness of the larger tradition of accounts or debates about Hannibal's oath: the tradition is the *fama* to which the historian refers. Additionally, the Alexandrian footnote indicates Livy's contention

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<sup>13</sup> On Livy's overall narrative organization in the Third Decade, Levene 2010: 34-63. Levene shows how Livy uses language feigning simultaneity to events that could not be synchronous as a way of tying various elements of his narrative together. Livy's analepses are often very brief summaries or reminders of events that he marks as having significance at that point in his narrative: Levene 2010: 68-70. Some of these minor analepses include: 29.23.3, where the alliance of Hasdrubal and Syphax warrants mention of their first meeting with Scipio (28.18), or 29.6.1, where the recapture of Locri prompts a reminder of when it defected from Rome (24.1). While it is conceivable that Livy also recounted the event in its proper chronological sequence somewhere in Books 16-19, there is no indication of this in the *Periochae* or surviving fragments.

<sup>14</sup> On the Alexandrian footnote, v. esp. Ross 1975: 78; on its use in intertextual and self-referential passages especially, Hinds 1998: 1-5. Moore 2010: 151-59 on uncertain citations like the Alexandrian footnote and how Livy uses them to cast doubt on the authority of tradition. cf. Miles 1995: 38. Haimson Lushkov 2013b, in her typology of practices of historiographic citation, designates the Alexandrian footnote as an impersonal citation, unnamed in a fashion similar to the anonymous citation noted above, but slightly more vague and often indicative of Livy's awareness of an existing tradition or scholarly debate surrounding the topic or event in question, as she notes for his *satis constat* at 1.1.1.

that the story is merely a rumor and not historical fact.<sup>15</sup> Most importantly, however, just as it highlights the presence of a previously existing literary discourse about the oath, the Alexandrian footnote also mobilizes any intertexts that influence the passage.

Two accounts of Hannibal's oath that predate Livy survive: Polybius' *Histories* and Nepos' biography of the Carthaginian general.<sup>16</sup> Each of these authors sets the story within the context of Hannibal's period of exile in the court of King Antiochus after the conclusion of the Second Punic War. Both texts also relate the tale of the oath as an internal narrative text spoken by Hannibal himself. First, Polybius' account of the oath appears as part of his discussion of the origins of the Hannibalic War (3.6-12), as he describes the importance of the personal enmity of the Barcids toward Rome in bringing about the renewed conflict:

ἔφη γάρ, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ **τὴν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον** μέλλοι στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἔτη μὲν ἔχειν ἐννέα, θύοντος δ' αὐτοῦ **τῷ Διὶ** παρεστάναι παρὰ τὸν βωμόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καλλιερήσας κατασπείσαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ποιῆσαι τὰ νομιζόμενα, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τοὺς περὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀποστῆναι κελεῦσαι μικρόν, αὐτὸν δὲ προσκαλεσάμενον ἐρέσθαι φιλοφρόνως εἰ βούλεται συνεξορμᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν. ἀσμένως δὲ κατανεύσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τι καὶ προσαξιώσαντος παιδικῶς, λαβόμενον

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<sup>15</sup> For the use of the Alexandrian footnote as a means of discounting the historical truth behind an account, cf. Lucretius *dRN* 5.395 and 5.412. In both instances Lucretius uses *ut fama est* to discount the reliability of the myth of Deucalion.

<sup>16</sup> On the date of Nepos' *On Foreign Generals*, Stem 2012: 12-14 and 29-30, who dates the composition of the collection to 35-32 BCE. This should certainly predate even the earliest estimates for Livy's composition of the Third Decade, which likely has a *terminus post quem* of 25 BCE or 19 BCE, depending on whether his mention of the subjugation of Spain under Augustus at 28.12.12 refers to the *princeps*' own campaign from 27-25 BCE or Agrippa's in 20-19 BCE. On the dating of the reference as well as that of the First Decade, Luce 1965, esp. 209-10. Haehling 1989 discusses the dating of Livy's texts with internal references at length. On issues of dating and its importance to interpretations of the text, Henderson 1989 and Moles 1993. cf., too, Foucault 1968: 214-19 on these two versions and their potential influence on Livy.

τῆς δεξιᾶς προσαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν καὶ κελεύειν **ἀγόμενον τῶν ἱερῶν** ὁμνύναι **μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις εὐνοήσειν**.<sup>17</sup> (3.11.5-7)

He said that at the time his father was about to make a **military expedition to Spain** with his forces he was nine years old and stood next to the altar as his father was making a sacrifice **to Zeus**. After he obtained favorable omens, he poured a libation to the gods and made the customary rites. He then asked the others at the sacrifice to stand a little farther away and kindly asked Hannibal, whom he called forward, if he wished to accompany him on the campaign. After Hannibal gladly assented and additionally demanded in a childlike fashion, he took hold of his right hand and led him to the altar and ordered him, **after laying his hand on the sacrificial offerings**, to swear **never to be a friend to the Romans**.

Nepos places the narrative of the oath immediately after his introduction and, like Polybius, uses it to demonstrate a familial hatred toward Rome shared by both father and son.<sup>18</sup> He too has Hannibal tell the story, but, unlike Polybius, uses direct speech for the general's recollection of the tale.<sup>19</sup>

'pater meus' inquit 'Hamilcar puerulo me, utpote non amplius nouem annos nato, in Hispaniam imperator proficiscens **Karthagine Ioui optimo maximo** hostias immolauit. quae diuina res dum conficiebatur, quae siuit a me uellemne secum in castra proficisci. id cum libenter accepissem atque ab eo petere coepissem ne dubitaret ducere, tum ille "faciam" inquit, "si mihi fidem quam postulo dederis." simul me ad aram adduxit, apud quam sacrificare instituerat, **eamque ceteris remotis tenentem** iurare iussit **numquam me in amicitia cum Romanis fore.**' (Nep. *Hann.* 2.3-4)

"My father Hamilcar," he says, "when I was a little boy, no more than nine years old, and he was setting out as a commander **from Carthage**

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<sup>17</sup> The Greek text of Polybius used throughout the dissertation is copied from the TLG database and follows the numbering system of Paton, Walbank, and Habicht's Loeb Classical Library volumes.

<sup>18</sup> Though the tale is recounted as a flashback told by Hannibal while in exile, the story of the oath itself is the earliest event narrated in the Carthaginian's life, which also makes its placement at the opening of the *vita* fitting. For a recent discussion of Nepos' *Hannibal* and solutions for some of the problems it has presented to scholars, both for the biographer's corpus as a whole and within the narrative of the life itself, Stem 2012: 23-29 and 40-44.

<sup>19</sup> Nepos' frame for Hannibal recounting the oath while in Antiochus' court is set up in *Hann.* 2.1-3.

into Spain, made a sacrificial offering **to Juppiter Optimus Maximus**. While this divine rite was being completed, he asked me if I wanted to set out to the camp with him. After I had gladly accepted and had begun to ask him not to hesitate to take me, he said: ‘I will, if you make me the promise that I demand.’ So, he led me to the altar where he had made the sacrifice, had everyone else removed, and ordered me to swear, **holding onto the altar, that I would never be a friend to the Romans.**”

Nepos’ and Polybius’ accounts bear striking similarities to one another.<sup>20</sup> Each text provides the frame of Antiochus’ court and a debate about the king’s intentions toward Rome. Each also sets the sacrifice and the oath itself at the point of Hamilcar’s departure for a campaign as Hannibal is nine years old. The sacrifice is made to the chief divinity (τῷ Διὶ/*Ioui optimo maximo*).<sup>21</sup> Most importantly, too, the actual oath taken by the young Carthaginian has the same intention in each version, and both focus on the prohibition (μηδέποτε/*numquam*) on having a friendly disposition (ἐννοήσῃν/*in amicitia...fore*) toward the Romans.

Similarly, there are many parallels between the two predecessors’ accounts and Livy’s. Hannibal is nine years old. Hamilcar performs the sacrifice before setting out on a campaign, though, like Polybius, Livy favors the description of his goal—Spain (*in Hispaniam*/τὴν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον)—over Nepos’ note of the point of departure, Carthage (*Karthagine*). The physical contact that Hannibal makes with the altar or offerings when he swears the oath is present in all three, though in perhaps another note

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<sup>20</sup> To such a degree that I would suggest that Polybius’ *Histories* are a source for the biographer’s account of the episode, as I intend to explore in a forthcoming article on Hannibal’s exile within Nepos’ *vita* of the Carthaginian general.

<sup>21</sup> On the syncretism evident in the sacrifice to the markedly Roman *Ioui optimo maximo*, cf. Stem 2012: 148. Stem notes the template is meant to communicate to his Roman audience that Hannibal swears the oath before his city’s chief deity.

of correction, Livy uses *tactis sacris* to describe the action. While *tactis sacris* is perhaps a direct translation of Polybius' ἁψάμενον τῶν ἱερῶν, the substantive *sacer* can also designate the sacred apparatus or the altar, in a way that ἱερά generally does not. The connotation allows Livy's description to mirror both Polybius' note of contact with the offerings and Nepos' account of the position of the child's hand on the altar (*eam...tenentem...me*). Livy's version of the oath conflates the two previously existing versions through a window reference that makes the connection to Polybius' text visible through a correction of Nepos' account of the oath.<sup>22</sup>

The actual words of the pledge, however, are markedly different between Livy and his predecessors: While Polybius and Nepos describe the oath with the passive prohibition that Hannibal “never be a friend to the Romans” (μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις εὐνοήσεν/ *numquam me in amicitia cum Romanis fore*), Livy's version of the oath suggests a more actively militant and hostile promise made by the young Carthaginian: “to make war on Rome as soon as possible” (*se cum primum posset hostem fore populo Romano*). The change coincides with the aggressive and bellicose portrayal of Hannibal that Livy draws in his account of the attack on Saguntum and the events that provoke Hannibal's war with the Romans (21.5-15).<sup>23</sup> Additionally, Nepos and Polybius both bookend their accounts of the oath within the setting of Hannibal's exile in the east after

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<sup>22</sup> On the term “window reference,” which is the adaptation of a model in such a way that makes the ultimate source of the model visible: Thomas 1986: 188-89.

<sup>23</sup> For instance, Hannibal's decision to attack Saguntum knowing that it will provoke a Roman response (21.5.3), Hanno's speech to the Carthaginian senate that describes the Barcid bloodlust for war with Rome (21.10), or Hannibal's orders that all male Saguntines be executed (21.14.3-4) portray the Carthaginian general in a particularly bellicose light.

being ousted from Carthage. Livy, however, removes these notes of the fallen general's time in the court of Antiochus in his depiction of the oath. This downplays at the early stage of the narrative the hints found in Nepos and Polybius of Hannibal's eventual defeat and instead keeps the focus solely on the war at hand: Hannibal's first chance to wage a campaign against the Romans, as Livy has him swear to do. Lastly, the *fama* alluded to by Livy's Alexandrian footnote is the story that Hannibal relates and, in so doing, controls in both Polybius' and Nepos' versions of the oath. Livy's appropriation of the account with the impersonal citation *fama est* allows him to subsume the Carthaginian's speech act into the *AUC* while altering the actual words of the oath simultaneously asserts Livy's authority over the narrative. This change in turn requires the character of Hannibal within Livy's text to live up to an oath that the traditional literary depiction of the Carthaginian general never made.

Perhaps the best known and most studied allusions in the Third Decade occur shortly after Livy's account of Hannibal's oath. As the historian begins to unfold the narrative of the general's time in Spain early in the third decade, he pauses for a brief digression on the Carthaginian's character. That the character sketch has verbal echoes with Sallust's descriptions of the central figures of his two monographs—Catiline and Jugurtha—is well established.<sup>24</sup> Instead of a thorough survey of this well plowed field, I

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<sup>24</sup> v., e.g., Walsh 1973: 127, in his student commentary *ad loc.* notes that Livy even adopts a more Sallustian style in the character sketch; Ramsey 1984 *ad Sall. BC* 5.3-5; Clauss 1997 details these connections and shows that they extend beyond the opening to other parts of the Third Decade; Rossi 2004: 376-8; Levene 2010: 99-104 discusses more fully the Jugurthan parallels and notes how these connections tie into Livy's treatment and structuring of the Third Decade as a monograph, like Sallust's *BC* and *BJ*, and that these three figures—Hannibal, Catiline, Jugurtha—share a key component in the threat that they pose

will take a brief look at one part of this passage to reveal the nature and function of the allusion to Sallust's *Catiline*. One part of Livy's digression describes Hannibal's physical and mental qualities:

Plurimum audaciae ad pericula capessenda, plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat. Nullo labore aut corpus fatigari aut animus uinci poterat. Caloris ac frigoris patientia par; cibi potionisque desiderio naturali, non uoluptate modus finitus; uigiliarum somnique nec die nec nocte discriminata tempora. (21.4.5-6)

Hannibal was very bold when it came to facing dangers, and was very resourceful when in the midst of those dangers. No hardship was able to fatigue his body or conquer his mind. He was able to withstand heat and cold alike; his eating and drinking habits were set by the requirements of nature, not pleasure. Neither day nor night determined when he was awake or asleep.

Livy's characterization of Hannibal as a super-human able to withstand hardships beyond the ordinary recalls a digressive character sketch employed by Sallust in his monograph on the Catilinarian conspiracy. Sallust describes the qualities of Catiline as follows:

L. Catilina, nobili genere natus, fuit magna vi et animi et corporis, sed ingenio malo pravoque. huic ab adulescentia bella intestina caedes rapinae discordia civilis grata fuere, ibique iuventutem suam exercuit. Corpus patiens inediae algoris vigiliae, supra quam quouquam credibile est. (*BC* 5.1-3)

Lucius Catiline, born from a noble family, had great vigor of both mind and body, but was evil and perverse in nature. From his youth, he took pleasure in civil wars, slaughter, plundering, and political discord, and he kept himself busy at these things in his early adulthood. His body could endure hunger, cold, and want of sleep beyond what would seem believable.

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to Rome. Clauss 1997: 170-72 also notes that some of Catiline's physical qualities, such as his extreme endurance, are also present in Cicero's *Catilinarians*.

Although the thematic parallels between these two passages are easily apparent, there are, perhaps surprisingly, no direct verbal parallels. Livy instead relies on the generic convention of the digressive character sketch, the passage's position at the beginning of the Third Decade, and the comparable qualities of the characters to mobilize the allusions between his text and Sallust's. Nevertheless, a brief comparison of these passages reveals several instances of one-upmanship on Livy's part.<sup>25</sup> While Sallust's Catiline merely has great vigor of mind and body, the mind and body of Livy's Hannibal cannot be conquered by any hardship. Catiline can endure cold, but Hannibal thrives in heat and cold equally. Catiline can cope with some level of sleeplessness, while Hannibal has no need to resort to the circadian rhythms that dictate the lives of lesser humans. In appropriating Sallust's depiction into the *AUC*, Livy draws a lasting connection between Hannibal and Catiline through the intertext.

The three passages I have so far quoted, in the order in which they appear in the text, trace a pattern of allusive engagement. In the first instance, Livy employs an anonymous citation. In the second, he uses the slightly vaguer and impersonal Alexandrian footnote. Lastly, he resorts to unmarked allusion, relying on thematic similarities and a generic topos—historiography's familiar digressive characterization—to activate the reference. Livy thus moves from one of the more explicit types of intertext to the most opaque. Taken as a whole, these three passages reveal the network of intertextuality that is woven into the opening of the Third Decade and provide a

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<sup>25</sup> There are similar allusions to Sallust's Jugurtha in these and other parts of Livy's character sketch: v. Levene 2010: 99-104. Livy combines these two villainous figures into one through his description of Hannibal, another example of how he caps and surpasses Sallust in his account.



representative—and programmatic—sample of how Livy appropriates the historiographic tradition into his text. He not merely copies but also subsumes his predecessors' works into his narrative and ultimately outdoes or corrects them as he proceeds through his subject matter. Importantly, too, these allusions reveal the wealth and range of source material from which Livy draws in his composition of the Third Decade, including—most notably for the subject at hand—Polybius. Livy's referential display in the opening to the Third Decade mirrors the common and well known practice of Latin poets. Catullus and Horace, for example, each make allusive references to their predecessors to establish their place in the poetic tradition.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Horace as the “Roman Alcaeus,” e.g. in Ode 1.1.32, *Lesboum...barbiton*, or in the string of references made throughout the “Parade Odes”: Santirocco 1986, Woodman 2002, Lyne 2006. Catullus, too, makes a catalogue of references to his predecessors in the opening section of Cat. 64: e.g. Thomas 1982. Hubbard 1995 has argued in his analysis of Vergil's *Eclogues* and Theocritus' *Idylls* that bucolic poetry is particularly marked by allusive language that demonstrates the anxiety of influence bucolic poets felt toward their predecessors. cf., too, Lucretius in *dRN* as the Roman Epicurus and Prop. 3.

## Part 2: Narratology and Historical Narrative

I now return to the preface to the Third Decade to examine how narrators and narrative structure function for Livy. Just as the internal preface reveals several facets of Livy's intertextual techniques, as I argued above, it also demonstrates how Livy constructs the identity of his external narrator. The preface displays the strong presence of the narrating persona and makes resolute claims of the significance of the events to be recounted in the ensuing narrative:

In parte operis mei licet mihi praefari, quod in principio summae totius professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores, bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint me scripturum, quod Hannibale duce Carthaginenses cum populo Romano gessere. (Livy 21.1.1)

I am able to make a preface for just a part of my work that most writers of history have declared in the opening of their whole account: that I will write about the most memorable of all the wars that have ever been fought, namely, the one which the Carthaginians—with Hannibal as their leader—waged against the Roman people.

The narrating voice asserts the importance of the events to be recounted before starting the narrative proper: that they represent the most memorable of all those that have occurred. The intertextual qualities, discussed above, are limited to the comparison only with events that have been recorded. Here, however, the narrator claims a greater significance for his account because it surpasses all prior events, not just those that have previously been reported. Livy's comments demonstrate the ability of an external narrator to provide explicit meaning and an external interpretation for a text outside of the story's content. The narrating persona is removed from the acts being described and thereby has an ability to stake a claim to significance that lies outside the events depicted. The

separation between the raw material of the actions reported and the form that the narrative text takes is at the core of narratological theory.

Ancient historical writing aims to construct a narrative of past events and to convey the meaning of those events to the text's audience. Narratological theory seeks to explain the construction of various types of narration and the planes within them to determine how the structure and manner of the narrative provide an interpretation of the events related by the text. Accordingly, scholars have often used certain facets of narratology to examine historiographic texts.<sup>27</sup> The various levels of narrative are a key component to narratological theory and were first explicated by Gérard Genette in his *Figures* series.<sup>28</sup> At the heart of Genette's schematization is the distinction between the *histoire*, the content being narrated, and the *récit* or *discours*, terms that variously describe the manner in which the *histoire* is narrated. Genette further breaks down the planes of a narrative act as follows: *diegesis* refers to any narrative act and the diegetic level is the plane in which the narrative occurs, the level at which the characters complete actions and express thoughts.<sup>29</sup> The extradiegetic plane is the point of narration, containing the narrative's telling and the comments, concerns, and interpretations of the narrator. A third level, alternatively called metadiegetic or hypodiegetic, describes frame narrative, in which an internal narrator recounts a narrative within the story itself. This

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<sup>27</sup> Ankersmit 1983; de Jong 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2004; Rood 2004; Pausch 2010 and 2011, e.g.

<sup>28</sup> Genette *Figures* I-III (1967-70), translated into English in two works: *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method* (1980) and *Figures of Literary Discourse* (1982). Genette's *Figures* lays out these concepts in a thorough analysis of Proust's novel *À la recherche du temps perdu*.

<sup>29</sup> The diegetic level is sometimes also referred to as the intradiegetic level.

level often appears in the many speeches that are found in ancient historical writing and to which we will return to below.

Mieke Bal's *Narratology* simplifies the terminology, and organizes narrative into three levels: the text, the story, and the fabula.<sup>30</sup> Throughout this dissertation I follow her definitions of these terms, which are as follows: the fabula consists of a series of events caused or experienced by actors. The fabula is the raw material of the acts recounted in the narrative, equivalent to Genette's *histoire*. The story is a particular manifestation or inflection of the fabula, the narrator's specific construction and arrangement of the basic tale. The text conveys that story along with other extradiegetic comments and explanations to an addressee. These three levels are concentric: the text, which for the purposes of this dissertation consists of the words on the page as we encounter them, contains within it the story, which, in turn, retains as its core constituent part a particular version of the fabula.

As the narrator constructs the elements of the fabula into a specific story, the presentation of the events effects a particular coloring of that fabula. Potential modifications include: the sequential ordering of the events—a narrator may, for instance, present the events in strict chronological order or relate them in anachronism, using prolepses and analepses to flash forward and back in time. The pace of the narration may change between various manifestations of the fabula or even within a

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<sup>30</sup> The term *fabula*, referring to the raw material of the content of the narrative as it is employed in narratological theory, is originally drawn from Russian formalism, in which it is juxtaposed with the term *syuzhet*, the manner of narration, equivalent to Bal's story and Genette's *discours* or *récit*. For these terms in Russian Formalist literature, v. Viktor Shklovsky 1991 [1925] and Vladimir Propp 1958 [1928].

particular story. The perspective of the narrative or—in other words—its point of focalization may change between one story and the next. Even when two narrative texts present the same or very similar stories, the texts themselves can differ widely in the identity of the narrator, the non-narrative comments made in the text, or the narrator's use of description or embedded narration.

Consider, for example, the fabula of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps. Any narrated version of the fabula includes a set of events and common details that make it recognizable as such (i.e., Hannibal has to lead the Carthaginian army over the Alps and into Italy). As the narrator constructs the fabula into a story, however, there is room for choice and innovation in the manner of the presentation. The following examples drawn from Nepos' *Life of Hannibal*, Polybius' *Histories*, and Livy's Third Decade demonstrate the value of the three diegetic levels within an analysis of historiographic texts.

Nepos' biography of Hannibal takes a different focus and pace when narrating the events of the Second Punic War than the fuller histories of Polybius and Livy.<sup>31</sup> The condensed scope of his biographical narrative allows his entire account of Hannibal's crossing from Spain to Italy to be examined easily:

saltum Pyrenaeum **transiit**. quacumque iter **fecit**, cum omnibus **incolis conflixit**: neminem nisi uictum **dimisit**. ad Alpes posteaquam **uenit**, quae Italiam ab Gallia seiungunt, quas nemo umquam cum exercitu ante eum praeter Herculem Graium transierat (quo facto is hodie saltus Graius appellatur), **Alpicos** conantes prohibere transitu **concidit**, loca **patefecit**, itinera **muniit**, **effecit** ut ea elephantus ornatus ire posset, qua antea unus homo inermis uix poterat repere. hac copias **traduxit** in Italiamque

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<sup>31</sup> While condensed in scope, Nepos' biographies remain capable of serious moral and political thought: Stem 2012. Stem examines how the brief and impressionistic facets of Nepos' narratives are best understood as products of the Late Republican political climate. Nepos emphasizes details for his subjects that highlight the exemplary perspectives of their behavior.

**peruenit. confluxerat** apud Rhodanum cum P. Cornelio Scipione consule eumque **pepulerat.** cum hoc eodem Clastidii apud Padum **decernit** sauciumque inde ac fugatum **dimittit.** tertio idem **Scipio cum collega Tiberio Longo** apud Trebiam aduersus eum uenit. cum his manum conseruit, utrosque profligauit. (Nep. *Hann.* 3.3-4.2)

He **crossed over** the range of the Pyrenees. Wherever he **made** his way, he **fought** with all the **inhabitants**: he **sent away** no one unless they were conquered. After he **came** to the Alps, which divide Italy from Gaul and which no one ever before him had crossed with an army except the Greek Hercules (from which deed the path is today called the “Greek pass”), he **cut down** the **Alpine peoples** that tried to prevent him from crossing. He **opened** places, he **built up** paths, he **made** it such that a fully-equipped elephant could go on a path that before a single unarmed man could scarcely crawl. He **led** his troops by this path and **arrived** in Italy. He **had fought** at the Rhone with P. Cornelius Scipio the Consul and **had driven** him back.<sup>32</sup> He **fights** with this same man at Clastidium on the Po and **sends** him from there wounded and routed. For a third time, that same **Scipio, with his colleague Tiberius Longus**, comes against him at the Trebia. He joined battle with them and crushed them both.

The essential events of the fabula of Hannibal’s crossing and initial engagements in Italy all appear. In simplest terms, the chronological sequence of these events within the fabula is as follows: Hannibal crosses the Pyrenees (F1), fights with Publius Scipio at the Rhone (F2), arrives at the Alps (F3), during the crossing fights with inhabitants (F4), builds up the pathways during crossing (F5), arrives in Italy (F6), engages Publius Scipio at Clastidium (F7), defeats Publius Scipio and Longus at the Trebia (F8). The narrator in Nepos’ text, however, breaks the strict chronology between these events and presents the engagement at the Rhone (F2) in the sixth position, just before he recounts Hannibal’s two other battles with Publius Scipio, at Clastidium (F7) and Trebia (F8).<sup>33</sup> The

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<sup>32</sup> This P. Cornelius Scipio is the father of the famous Scipio “Africanus.” To differentiate between the two, I refer to the father as “Publius Scipio” and the son simply as “Scipio.”

<sup>33</sup> The following sequence appears in Nepos’ text: cross the Pyrenees (F1), arrive at the Alps (F3), during the crossing fight with inhabitants (F4), build up the pathways during crossing (F5), arrive in Italy (F6),

anachronism is marked in the text by the sudden shift in verb tense to the pluperfect (*confluxerat...pepulerat*) to describe the battle at the Rhone, following what had been consistently narrated in the perfect tense up to that point (*transiit, fecit, confligit, dimisit, venit, concidit, patefecit, muniit, effecit, traduxit, pervenit*). The change in tense is further emphasized by the narrator's subsequent shift to the historical present in the sentence following (*decernit, dimittit*). These careful modifications in verb tenses, as well as the natural geographical location of the Rhone when compared to the Po or the Trebia, maintain the logical and chronological position of the engagement on the Rhone within the fabula despite Nepos' manipulation of the order of narration.

As Nepos moves the mention of the battle at the Rhone to a position after Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, he effectively couples the Roman defeat with the subsequent losses that Publius Scipio suffers in Italy at Clastidium and Trebia. This compounds the effect of the Roman losses on the narrative and suggests an interpretation of the fabula that emphasizes Hannibal's victories and Rome's losses in the opening stages of the war. Further, the anachronistic order of narration Nepos employs creates an ascending effect to three successive stages of opposition that Hannibal faces along his path. First, he engages unnamed local peoples (*incolis*) he happens to encounter; second, he cuts down the Alpine tribes (*Alpicos*), whose actions are specifically geared toward preventing his crossing; finally, he defeats Roman troops under the command of the consul Publius Scipio and his colleague Tiberius Longus. The narrator works his way

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fight with Scipio at the Rhone (F2), engage Scipio at Clastidium (F7), defeat Scipio and Longus at the Trebia (F8).

from the most general (*incolis*) to increasingly specific designations for Hannibal's opponents, ending with two forces explicitly described as under the commands of the Roman consuls.

Livy and Polybius, by contrast, each preserve these eight events in the expected chronological sequence.<sup>34</sup> The scope of their narratives of Hannibal's crossing extends far beyond the small scale employed by Nepos.<sup>35</sup> Their pace is slower and they add far more details to the narrative than the more austere biography. While there are noticeable differences between the stories of Livy and Polybius concerning their treatments of the fabula of Hannibal's crossing, here I examine a marked distinction in the narrative texts of these two historians.<sup>36</sup> After Hannibal crosses the Rhone and convenes an assembly to encourage his troops in their coming journey across the Alps, Publius' troops arrive at the mouth of the river. Polybius' description of the event is largely void of narratorial asides:

Λυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἤκον τῶν Νομάδων οἱ προαποσταλέντες ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπὴν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ προτροπάδην πεφευγότες. συμπεσόντες γὰρ οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας στρατοπεδείας τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἵππεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν χρεῖαν ἐξαπεσταλμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποπλίου **τοιαύτην ἐποιήσαντο φιλοτιμίαν** ἀμφοτέροι κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ὥστε τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Κελτῶν εἰς ἑκατὸν ἵππεῖς καὶ τετταράκοντα διαφθαρῆναι, τῶν δὲ Νομάδων ὑπὲρ τοὺς διακοσίους. γενομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι συνεγγίσαντες κατὰ τὸ δίωγμα τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων χάρακι καὶ κατοπτεύσαντες αὐτοὺς ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἠπείγοντο, διασαφίσοντες τῷ στρατηγῷ τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πολεμίων· ἀφικόμενοι δ' εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀνήγγειλαν. (3.45.1-3)

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<sup>34</sup> Hoyos 2006 directly compares details in the two accounts to discover Hannibal's route across the Durance. He notes that while Polybius provides few geographical names, Livy's added topographical details aid in the identification of Hannibal's path into Italy.

<sup>35</sup> Polybius' narrative of these same events totals 40 chapters (3.35-74), while Livy's encompasses 38 (21.22-59).

<sup>36</sup> Hoyos 2006 and Levene 2010: 136-40 both set portions of Polybius' and Livy's narratives side-by-side to compare the details of their accounts of Hannibal's crossing.



After the assembly was broken up, the Numidian advance scouts sent out for reconnaissance came back, the majority of them lost and the rest of them in full retreat. Not far from their own camp they encountered the Roman cavalry who were sent out by Publius for the same purpose and both of them **made such a demonstration of honor** in the skirmish that nearly one hundred and forty of the Roman and Celtic cavalry were killed, but around two hundred of the Numidians died. After that, the Romans drew near in their pursuit to the Carthaginian camp and after they reconnoitered they wheeled about and drove back to explain to the general the arrival of the enemy. They arrived at the camp and reported.

The qualification of the cavalrymen's *philotimia* is the most explicit addition that the narrator makes at the textual level. Instead he allows the events of the fabula to come through in a clear manner at the story level. He offers no direct, suggested interpretation of the fabula through the addition of editorial (i.e., extradiegetic) comments or descriptions. Instead, the details of the event stand for themselves and allow the external audience of the text to draw a range of interpretations from the fabula.

Livy's narrative of the skirmish at the Rhone provides further descriptive details and an explanatory narratorial aside to close the account:

dum elephanti traiciuntur, interim Hannibal Numidas equites quingentos ad castra Romana miserat speculatum ubi et quantae copiae essent et quid pararent. huic alae equitum missi, ut ante dictum est, ab ostio Rhodani trecenti Romanorum equites occurrunt. proelium **atrocius quam pro numero pugnantium** editur; nam praeter multa uulnera caedes etiam **prope par utrimque** fuit, fugaue et pauor Numidarum Romanis **iam admodum fessis** uictoriam dedit. uictores ad centum sexaginta, nec omnes Romani sed pars Gallorum, uicti amplius ducenti ceciderunt. (21.29.1-3)

While the elephants were led across, Hannibal had in the meantime sent five hundred Numidian cavalry to the Roman camp to spy out where it was, how many troops there were, and what they were planning to do. The three hundred horsemen who had been sent out, as was mentioned above, from the mouth of the Rhone came upon this party of cavalry. There followed a battle **more ferocious than is proportionate to the**

**number of combatants**; for, in addition to the many wounds, the casualties were also **almost equal on each side**, and the flight and dread of the Numidians granted victory to the Romans who were **already quite exhausted**. For the victors around one hundred and sixty fell, not all Romans but some of the Gauls as well, and more than two hundred of the losers.

Livy's narrator here provides the same basic details, ordered in the same fashion such that, at the story level, Polybius' and Livy's versions of the events are remarkably similar. Additional extradiegetic descriptions and comments made by the Livian narrator, however, provide for the reading audience a suggested meaning and interpretation for the encounter. Livy describes the ferocity of the battle as surprisingly disproportionate to the size of the forces (*atrocius quam pro numero pugnantium*) and notes that the casualties were nearly equal on both sides (*prope par utrimque*), before providing the estimated total losses later in his account. These casualty figures do present a small change between Livy's and Polybius' accounts at the story level. While Polybius claims that one hundred and forty Romans were lost, Livy asserts that the total was one hundred and sixty. Whether Livy uses Polybius as his main source for the account and, consequently, actively increased the total or is drawing the larger number from another source, the greater casualties in Livy's account supports the interpretation he offers of the event.<sup>37</sup> Additionally, he notes that the Romans were thoroughly exhausted (*iam admodum fessis*) before they were able to find victory. The extra fatigued state of

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<sup>37</sup> On Polybius as a potential source for Livy's Third Decade, cf. Introduction and Part 1 in this chapter, above.

Publius' troops reinforces the idea that the Romans suffered additional casualties in an encounter that is more difficult than the version Polybius describes.

These descriptive qualifications foreground the eventual interpretation of the event with which Livy closes the account:

hoc principium simul omenque belli ut summae rerum prosperum  
euentum, ita haud sane incruentam **ancipitisque** certaminis uictoriam  
Romanis portendit. (21.29.4)

This battle was at the same time the start of the war and an omen that its outcome would be positive at the conclusion, as it portends that the victory for the Romans would certainly not be bloodless and would come after an **uncertain** struggle.

The claim that the battle is a portent of the ensuing war is borne out by the rest of the Decade's narrative, as it is full of reversals of fortune, battles of uncertain outcome, and great losses suffered on each side. Livy's extradiegetic comment in the text therefore prioritizes the interpretation of the event that allows a small skirmish to stand as an analogue for the entire ensuing war. Livy's narratorial aside creates an expectation of Roman success only after a bitter and precipitous struggle for the events of the fabula in the subsequent narrative. Polybius makes no explicit suggestion of the interpretation in his extradiegetic comments and, when compared directly to Livy's account, the details Polybius provides for the battle do not hint at the possible significance. The skirmish at the Rhone between the Numidian scouts and Publius' cavalry only gains the interpretation suggested by Livy through the differences between the two stories and supported by the comments made by Livian external narrator.

Livy's claim that the skirmish's qualities represent the entire war also repeats the sentiments of the opening preface to the decade.<sup>38</sup> After he notes the unprecedented magnitude and scope of the war, and the familiarity of its combatants, Livy's narrator claims that "the fortune of the war was so varied and the fighting so dangerous that those who won were closer to ruin" (*adeo uaria fortuna belli ancepsque Mars fuit ut propius periculum fuerint qui uicerunt*; 21.1.2). The adjective *anceps*, repeated in each of these passages, strengthens the connection shared between the portentous skirmish at the Rhone and the foregrounding description Livy makes in the preface to the decade. Additionally, as I noted above, the focus on uncertainty in the repetition of *anceps* recalls the concept of *Tychē* so prevalent in Polybius' text.<sup>39</sup> Though Livy alludes to Polybian fortune in his summary of the skirmish at the Rhone, he differs from Polybius in the total of Roman losses he lists in his account.

The placement of and explanation provided for the small skirmish between Hannibal's and Publius Scipio's scouts along the Rhone River demonstrate the utility of examining the narratives of historiographic texts through the tripartite lens of fabula-story-text. As each of these three authors ordered the events of the fabula to create their own story, they necessarily made choices about the presentation of particular episodes which could, in turn, suggest or indicate various interpretations. Nepos, in opposition to the strict chronology preserved by Polybius and Livy, places his account of the skirmish at the Rhone in proximity to Publius Scipio's other defeats in the opening stages of the

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<sup>38</sup> On the preface, Levene 2010: 9-15 and cf. Part 1 of this chapter, above.

<sup>39</sup> cf. Part 1 in this chapter, above.

war. The narrative sequence compounds the effect of the consequences suffered by the Romans in these three now defeats successive only in the narrative and not chronologically. While Polybius and Livy record the events of the fabula in strict chronological sequence and the specific event of the battle at the Rhone in largely similar fashion at the story level, Polybius allows the actions to stand on their own and makes no explicit suggestion for how to interpret the small encounter. Livy, on the other hand, includes a narrative aside at the textual level that explains that the skirmish is an analogue for the entire Hannibalic War that will be the subject of the subsequent ten books of his narrative. A single event with relatively few and minor changes takes on three different nuances and interpretations when examined through the narratological lens of the levels of fabula, story, and text. In all three texts, however, the fabula is the same; it is only the manner in which it is organized into a story and explicated in the narrative that differs, lending three distinct interpretations to three accounts of the same event.

Finally, the role of the external narrator in asserting and explaining the significance of the events he is about to describe becomes clearer as a function of the extradiegetic level of the narrative, at which Livy's narrating persona can offer interpretation and impart meaning to the acts proffered in the narrative. The intertextual references in the preface, discussed above, further the idea that the historian is qualified to provide explanation of the events in his text. Since the deeds contained in the account surpass all those that preceded them, the extradiegetic narrator, too, has authority that transcends that of his predecessors.

### Part 3: Livy's Internal Narrators and their Sources

The presence of rhetoric in Greco-Roman historiography has been a hot topic since Wiseman and Woodman championed this case.<sup>40</sup> Set speeches of several kinds are common tropes in ancient historical writing. The composition of these speeches, their overall historicity, and the probability that they reflect the *ipsissima verba* of any genuine, delivered orations remain lively topics of debate.<sup>41</sup> Historiographic speeches fall in the metadiegetic plane of narratology. Each speech is, in essence, a narrative act within a larger frame narrative. The internal narrator offers a meaningful explanation of the events that they describe, but the extradiegetic narrator can support, question, or reinterpret these metadiegetic comments. The internal narrators in Livy's Third Decade demonstrate his use of source texts and allusion in the composition of these speeches.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, a comparison of the comments made about these events at both levels of narration (intra- and extra-diegetic) reveals how the Livian external narrator controls and asserts his authority over a source text by incorporating it into the intradiegetic level of his narrative. Two speeches that Livy transmits following Hannibal's victory at Cannae—Mago's embassy to Carthage and Varro's speech to the Capuans—reveal Livy's use of

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<sup>40</sup> Wiseman 1979 and Woodman 1988.

<sup>41</sup> For arguments against the historicity of the speeches found in the ancient historians, v.: Hansen 1993, Erhardt 1995, Yunis 2002, and Damon 2007:400, among others. The opposite case is made by Fornara 1983: 142-68 and Pritchett 2002: 1-80. Adler 2011: 6-8 succinctly summarizes the key aspects of the debate.

<sup>42</sup> For more on Livian narrators, v. esp. Pausch 2010: 183-209 and 2011. Pausch's work undertakes a narratological survey of the *AUC* and demonstrates, above all, how Livy's narratorial practices communicate to and create expectations for his reader.

source texts in the composition of his speeches and how he as external narrator can reinterpret these sources through his extradiegetic comments and asides.

To open Book 23, Livy describes the various reactions of Romans, Italians, and Carthaginians to Hannibal's victory at Cannae. The account includes the report of an embassy made to the senate at Carthage by Hannibal's brother, Mago (23.11.7-13.7; 23.11.7 *nuntius uictoriae ad Cannas Carthaginem uenerat Mago Hamilcaris filius*), who describes the various successes Hannibal has had during the battles and then provides a display to drive home the Carthaginian success so far in the Italian campaign:

ad fidem deinde tam laetarum rerum effundi in uestibulo curiae iussit anulos aureos, qui tantus acruus fuit ut metientibus **dimidium supra tres modios** explesse sint **quidam auctores: fama** tenuit quae **propior uero** est, haud plus fuisse modio. adiecit deinde uerbis, quo **maioris cladis** indicium esset, neminem nisi equitem, atque eorum ipsorum primores, id gerere insigne. summa fuit orationis, quo propius spem belli perficiendi sit, eo magis omni ope iuuandum Hannibalem esse (23.12.1-3)

To add to the confidence of such successful endeavors, he ordered the golden rings to be poured out in the entrance of the Senate chamber. This made such a heaping pile that **some authors** claim that they filled **more than three and a half measures** when counted. **A report** which is **nearer to the truth** holds that it was not more than a single measure. He then added these words, in order that the significance of the **disaster be more clear**, that no one outside the equestrian order—and even then just the chief among them—wears this as a token of honor. The gist of the speech was that by as much as they were closer to the hope of finishing the war, there was that much more need of providing help to Hannibal.

In the sections preceding this one, Mago's speech focuses on the incredible numbers of enemies faced and defeated by Hannibal, concluding with the Carthaginians' encouraging

success at Cannae.<sup>43</sup> Livy breaks up the general's speech here with an anonymous citation (*quidam auctores*) to highlight other accounts of the oration and its associated scene. The reference alludes to other texts of Mago's speech and thereby calls to the mind of Livy's audience his sources for the oration in Carthage. The position of the citation in the middle of the speech underscores the presence of these predecessor texts and the external audience's awareness of them. Notably, too, the allusion to Livy's sources for the oration comes during the relation of a speech offered by a Punic general in the Senate chamber at Carthage.<sup>44</sup> Pausch has argued that Livy includes the foreign perspective to add to his credibility.<sup>45</sup> Livy therefore turns to the outsider's point of view in Mago's speech to give a sense of impartiality to his work in a moment where he ultimately discusses the veracity of his account compared to his predecessors' works. These anonymous authors total the rings displayed during Mago's speech to more than three *modii*.<sup>46</sup> However, Livy then makes a reference to another surviving version of the

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<sup>43</sup> Mago concludes the first section of his speech with this description: 23.11.12 *pro his tantis totque uictoriis*, emphasizing both the magnitude and the quantity of their victories to that point. Coelius F24 *FRHist* = Prisc. *GL* 2.198 likely suggests that at least part of this speech draws on Coelius' account of Mago's speech. On the fragment, Cornell 2014: 3.251-52.

<sup>44</sup> The composition of speeches generally and those that could not actually be known to the author, specifically, is a well-documented trend in historiographic works. The bibliography on speeches in Classical Historiography is vast. For a brief introduction to the topic: Marincola 2008b. On speeches in the genre generally: Fornara 1983: 142-68, Walbank 1985: 242-61, Brock 1995. On general's speeches in the ancient historians: Keitel 1987, Hansen 1993 and 1998, and Pritchett 2002. For Livy's approach to speeches in the *AUC*: Gries 1949, Walsh 1961: 219-44, Luce 1993, Forsythe 1999: 74-86. For speeches as they relate to Livy's approach to exemplarity: Chaplin 2000. Livy's reconstruction of the speech of a foreigner is not unusual: Adler 2011.

<sup>45</sup> Pausch 2011: 125-90 discusses the issue of multiple focalization at length and argues how the foreign perspective lends a sense of balance and impartiality to his account that ultimately contributes to Livy's credibility as an even-handed historian.

<sup>46</sup> cf. Florus 1.22.6.19 = *modii duo anulorum Carthaginem missi dignitasque equestris taxata mensural*; Coelius F24 = Prisc. *GL* 2.198 = *nullae mationi tot tantas tam continuas victorias tam brevi spatio datas arbitror quam vobis*.



story—apart from these initial anonymous sources. He initially describes the alternate tale as a *fama*, thereby limiting its truth value. However, Livy then remarks on the potential veracity of his account by noting that it best approximates the truth (*propior uero*). Livy's claim points to the fact that he can judge the apparent truth value of the various tales and that he does know the true (*vero*) account of Mago's speech. However, he declines to include the truest version of the speech and instead substitutes something near (*propior*) the truth. The structure and effect of the episode thereby lends further weight to a less accurate version, which allows Mago's speech and the display of the rings to convey a sense of Carthaginian success in Livy's narrative that exceeds the reality behind the account. The overly large total of rings, which equate to Roman deaths, fit into the claim that Livy makes in the preface to the Third Decade that the side that would ultimately conquer would first come closer to ruin (*propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt*, 21.1.2).

Mago's speech generally focuses on the overwhelming quantity of foes defeated by Hannibal. Livy notes the first explanation for the extent of the pile of rings at three or more measures, an account that is initially believable as its vast extent is grounded in and supported by the oration that precedes it. Furthermore, Mago continues by noting the link between the rings and the status of the Roman Equites. Livy asserts that Mago makes the comment in order to make the disaster appear greater (*maioris cladis*). The remarks made by both the internal and external narrators lend credibility to the larger value purported for the quantity of the rings. Mago's and Livy's comments surround and overwhelm the more accurate *fama* that claims the smaller measure for the number of rings. The content

of the speech, then, and comments made by both the internal and external narrators undermine the purported truth value of the *fama*. The structure of the episode, the comments made by both internal and external narrators, and the placement of the anonymous citation (*quidam auctores*) and the impersonal reference (*fama*) in the middle of the speech demonstrate how references and external and internal narrators question, emend, or cap the accounts of Livy's predecessors. The overall effect of the narrative of Mago's speech to the Carthaginian assembly is that the version of the events that is explicitly less likely—that of the three *modii* of rings—is the one whose consequences are meant to be felt as the narrative continues. Additionally, the Mago episode reveals how Livy's use of an internal speaker lends narratorial weight to a version of events that the historian dismisses as unlikely. Livy, as external narrator, establishes his authority as a credible historian through source criticism while still allowing an implausible account to be revealed through a character's speech. The interests and aims of the external and internal narrators are clearly separated in Livy's report of Mago's speech.

Shortly before Livy reports Mago's speech in the Carthaginian assembly, he turns his focus to the situation in which the remaining consul, Varro, finds himself. In a meeting with delegates from Capua, Varro replies to their offer of assistance with an all too frank retort about the Romans' current disastrous state. Near the end of his response, he explains how their enemies' behavior and identity further exacerbates the Romans' present circumstances:

**Poenus hostis** ne Africae quidem indigena<sup>47</sup> ab ultimis terrarum oris, freto Oceani Herculisque columnis, expertem omnis **iuris et condicionis et linguae prope humanae** militem trahit. Hunc natura et moribus immitem ferumque insuper **dux ipse** efferauit, pontibus<sup>48</sup> ac molibus ex humanorum corporum strue faciendis et, **quod proloqui etiam piget**, uesci corporibus humanis docendo. His **infandis pastos epulis**, quos **contingere etiam nefas** sit, uidere atque habere dominos et ex Africa et a Carthagine iura petere et Italiam Numidarum ac Maurorum pati prouinciam esse, cui non, genito modo in Italia, detestabile sit? (23.5.11-13)

**A Carthaginian enemy**, not even indigenous to Africa, drags his force from the furthest shores of the earth, from the strait of Ocean and the pillars of Hercules. Nor is his army aware of any **law or condition or even of speech remotely human**. On top of that, their **leader himself** makes their nature savage and fierce and cruel in their customs by making bridges and structures built with a heap of human corpses and—a **fact that even disgusts me to mention**—by teaching them to feed on human bodies. Would it not be utterly detestable for one even just born in Italy to see **those that have dined at these unspeakable banquets**, which it is a **crime just to touch**, and to have them as masters and to obtain laws from Africa and Carthage and to allow Italy to be a province of the Numidians and Mauritians?

Varro emphasizes the shock value of these rumors. He refrains from calling Hannibal by name in the passage, instead referring to him as *Poenus hostis* and *dux ipse*. He questions the origin of Hannibal's army and dehumanizes them by noting their lack of the usual markers of human civilization: law, custom, and speech. The language employed in the Carthaginian army was of fascination also to Polybius, who remarks with amazement that

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<sup>47</sup> *indigena* accepted by Dorey in his Teubner edition following various early MSS (*PCRMDA*). Walters and Conway in the OCT correct to *indigenam* following some later MSS, a *lectio faciliior* based on the idea that it seems outrageous to assert that the Carthaginians are not African. However, the overall force of Varro's speech aims at hyperbole and extremism, so a claim that comes off as initially surprising or strange fits well within the speech. Additionally, as Levene 2010: 221 points out, this description ties the Carthaginians back to their Phoenecian origins.

<sup>48</sup> While there is not a surviving reference in Polybius—or any of Livy's predecessors—to the construction of bridges out of human bodies, the tale is briefly dramatized by Appian: ὁ δ' ἔστι μὲν οὐς ἀπέδοτο τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, ἔστι δ' οὐς ὑπ' ὀργῆς ἀνήρει, καὶ τοῖς σώμασι τὸν ποταμὸν ἐγεφύρου καὶ ἐπέρα (*Hann.* 28), "But [Hannibal] sold some of the prisoners and executed others in anger, built a bridge with their bodies and crossed the river on it."

Hannibal managed to keep his polyglot contingent together over so long a campaign (11.19).<sup>49</sup> Polybius remarks that the Carthaginian forces “had neither law, custom, speech, nor any other thing naturally in common with each other” (11.19.4 οἷς οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος, οὐχ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους). The tripartite series *iuris et condicionis et linguae* in Varro’s speech mobilizes the reference to Polybius’ text, who here lays out the three ideas in the same sequence: οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος. Livy’s Varro, however, caps Polybius’ account by expanding and exacerbating the potentially troubling linguistic reality for the polyglot army by making these various groups not only unrecognizable to each other, but unrecognizable as humans (*prope humanae*).

Another reference to Polybius’ text later in the same speech comes in the mention of Hannibal’s rumored cannibalistic activity. Polybius includes in his narrative digression discussing Hannibal’s character (9.22-26) an account of advice that was given to the general by one of his friends that may reflect the origin of Varro’s claim of anthropophagy surrounding the Carthaginian general:

καθ' ὃν γὰρ καιρὸν Ἀννίβας ἐξ Ἰβηρίας τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν ἐπενόει στέλλεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, μεγίστης προφαινομένης δυσχρηστίας περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ τὴν ἐτοιμότητα τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, ἅτε καὶ κατὰ τὸ μῆκος ἀνήνυτον ἔχειν τι δοκούσης τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα τῶν μεταξὺ κατοικούντων βαρβάρων, τότε δοκεῖ καὶ πλεονάκις ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐμπιπτούσης ἀπορίας εἷς τῶν φίλων Ἀννίβας ὁ Μονομάχος ἐπικαλούμενος ἀποφήνασθαι γνώμην διότι μία τις ὁδὸς αὐτῷ προφαίνεται. δι' ἧς ἐστὶν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐλθεῖν ἐφικτόν. τοῦ δ' Ἀννίβου λέγειν κελεύσαντος, διδάξαι δεῖν

<sup>49</sup> cf., too, Livy’s frequent mention on the polyethnic army of the Carthaginians: 21.21.9, 22.43.2, 26.20.9, 28.12.1-9, and 30.35.5-9. Levene 2010: 236-46 argues that Hannibal’s polyglot army is a key element to Livy’s construction of the lesson to be drawn from the Battle of Zama, which he ties to Livy’s unusual comment of advice to future Roman commanders (25.33.5-6).

ἔφη τὰς δυνάμεις ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν καὶ τούτῳ ποιῆσαι συνήθεις ..... Ἀννίβας δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τόλμημα καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐδὲν ἀντεπεῖν ἐδυνήθη, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν οὐθ' αὐτὸν οὔτε τοὺς φίλους ἐδύνατο πείσαι. τούτου δὲ τὰνδρὸς εἶναι φασιν ἔργα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν εἰς Ἀννίβαν ἀναφερόμενα περὶ τῆς ὁμότητος, οὐχ ἦττον δὲ καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων. (9.24.4-8)

At the time when Hannibal was laying out his plans to make the campaign against Italy with his forces, a very difficult situation was foreseen about the provisions and the readiness of the supplies for the soldiers, since the path ahead seemed to hold endless difficulty due both to its length and the size of their forces, and the fierceness of the barbarians that lived along the way. Then it seems that they were often at a loss in their meetings about this lot, as one of his friends, a Hannibal nicknamed “Monomachus” declares his opinion that just a single road appears before him, through which it is possible to make it to Italy. After Hannibal (the general) asked him to speak, he said that it is necessary for him to teach his troops to eat human flesh and to make them accustomed to do this. Hannibal **was not at all able to speak against the boldness and practicality of this plan**, but he was not able to persuade himself nor his friends to take on a notion of the act. They say that those things done throughout Italy and attributed to Hannibal as acts of savageness are the work of this man, but are also no less due to the circumstances.

Polybius here notes that Hannibal cannot speak against the plan (τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐδὲν ἀντεπεῖν ἐδυνήθη). In Livy’s speech, Varro twice reiterates the unspeakable nature of the act (*quod proloqui etiam piget; infandis pastos epulis*). Further, in both of these texts the gladiator’s plan is to teach (διδάξαι, *docendo*) the troops to pursue this course of action. Although Hannibal in Polybius’ digression cannot quite bring himself to achieve the plan, neither does he condemn it. He notes instead that it is bold and practical (τὸ τόλμημα καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν), qualities that he has previously pursued in his endeavors.<sup>50</sup> Varro’s report

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<sup>50</sup> For Hannibal’s daring endeavors in Polybius: e.g., 3.61.6, where Publius Scipio is taken aback by Hannibal’s swift and bold trek across the Alps and sudden appearance in the Po Valley or 3.92.3, where Fabius notes how the boldness of Hannibal’s maneuvers make it difficult to follow through on his delaying tactics. For Hannibal’s practical and rational calculations before action: e.g., 3.17.8, 3.17.11, 3.63.11, 3.81.12, 3.89.4, 3.91.1, 3.92.2.

of Hannibal, however, describes these actions as *fait accompli* and starkly contrasts them to the expectations of an Italian, for whom it is a crime even to come in contact with banquets of such a sort (*contingere etiam nefas*). Livy's internal narrator has thereby rewritten the Polybian claim that Hannibal merely entertained the idea of cannibalism.

In each of the references to Polybius made in Varro's speech, Livy has incorporated into the text of his internal narrator comments made by the Polybian external narrator. Beyond a simple assimilation of these narrative asides, Livy's text caps (in the case of the note of the Carthaginian army's language) or questions and emends (in the case of Hannibal's rumored cannibalism) those statements made by Polybius as external narrator. Furthermore, the emendations made to Polybius' report in Varro's speech push the Carthaginians' behavior to the extremes: they eat flesh that is untouchable, perform tasks that are indescribable, and break the very laws of human nature. Livy's portrait of Varro focuses on his rash and ultimately destructive behavior.<sup>51</sup> Livy represents Varro as bold and reckless even in his role as an internal narrator, using and abusing the facets of the Polybian narrative to suit his need to disparage the conduct of his Carthaginian opponents. In subsuming these extradiegetic digressions from his predecessor into the metadiegetic plane of Varro's speech, Livy takes control of the account provided by his source text, asserts his own authority over it, and uses these features to highlight his criticism of the behavior of a character in his text.

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<sup>51</sup> Bernard 2000: 139-41 describes Livy's portrait of Varro as an irrational and reckless general. Varro, too, is just the last in a series of commanders whose rash behaviors lead to the Roman defeats in Italy in the early stages of the war: Bernard 2000: 262-64 and Levene 2010: 170-72.

This analysis focused on two speeches that concern the Carthaginians from the aftermath of Hannibal's victory at Cannae. Mago's embassy to Carthage shows Livy examining various source texts for the composition of the speech and demonstrates that the internal narrator can create an interpretation of the fabula that the historian subsequently questions through his explicit description of his sources. Varro's speech to the Capuans includes a short description drawn from Polybius' character-sketch of Hannibal. Between them, the two passages show Livy actively consulting various sources—including Polybius—in the composition of his speeches. Comments made by both the external and internal narrators in the *AUC* emend or question the accounts of Livy's source texts. Varro's speech also indicates that the concerns and comments of the Polybian external narrator find their way into the voice of an internal speaker in Livy's *AUC*. The incorporation of Polybius' explicit narratorial asides forecasts the analysis in the following two chapters, which argue that Livy undertakes a similar process in the characterization of Hannibal as an internal narrator in the Third Decade.

## Chapter Two

### A Polybian Hannibal in Livy's Third Decade

As the Carthaginian army approaches Italy during their campaign at the opening of the Second Punic War, the troops are bewildered when the Alps finally come into view. In a famous speech recorded by both Polybius and Livy in their narratives of the march, Hannibal exhorts the soldiers to relieve their trepidation in light of their previous efforts and campaigns these mountains have accommodated in the past.<sup>1</sup> Livy's version of the speech concludes with an attempt by Hannibal to counter the troops' fears based on the difference between the reputation of the lofty mountain range and the reality faced by the army. Hannibal bases his assertion on the actual appearance of the Alps and the experiences that have led his army to this point:

in conspectu Alpes habeant quarum alterum latus Italiae sit, in ipsis portis hostium fatigatos subsistere. quid Alpes aliud esse credentes quam montium altitudines? fingerent altiores Pyrenaei iugis: nullas profecto terras caelum contingere nec inexsuperabiles humano generi esse. Alpes quidem habitari, coli, gignere atque alere animantes; peruias paucis esse, esse et exercitibus. eos ipsos quos cernant legatos non pinnis sublimem elatos Alpes transgressos. ne maiores quidem eorum indigenas sed aduenas Italiae cultores has ipsas Alpes ingentibus saepe agminibus cum liberis ac coniugibus migrantium modo tuto transmisisse. (21.30.5-8)

They have the Alps in sight, with Italy on the other side of them, they stopped fatigued at the very gates of the enemy! What else do they believe the Alps are except heights of mountains? They might suppose that the Alps are higher than the ridges of the Pyrenees: surely, no lands touch the sky and are insurmountable to the human race. Indeed, the Alps are inhabited, cultivated, give birth to and nourish living beings,

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<sup>1</sup> Polybius' version of the speech (3.44) and Livy's (21.30) will be further analyzed in the final section of the chapter below. For more on these passages and how they create expectations for Livy's narrative: Pausch 2011: 149-56. For how these two speeches fit into the opening sequence of the Second Punic War: Händl-Sagawe 1995: 193-95.



allow passage to small forces and even to entire armies. The very legates whom they saw before their eyes did not pass over the Alps lifted from above on wings. He said that not even their ancestors were indigenous, but were the foreign inhabitants of Italy and had safely crossed these very Alps often with huge armies on the move, along with their children and wives.

While a similar rationale is not found in Polybius' version of the speech, scholars have noted that the evidence Hannibal uses in the argument in the *AUC* that the Alps are, in fact, passable is markedly similar to the explanation that Polybius gives in a well-known digression that attacks the outlandish claims of his predecessors (3.47.6-48.12).<sup>2</sup> These scholars have demonstrated that the Polybian aside is likely the source for this portion of Livy's speech or, as Levene has recently shown, can be viewed as both source and intertext.<sup>3</sup> In this chapter I push further the boundaries of the allusive relationship between Polybius' digression on the Alps and Hannibal's speech in the *AUC* by studying the role that the general plays as an internal narrator in these two historiographic texts. I first establish the narratological identities of the characters of Hannibal within each of the historians' texts and then reinterpret Hannibal's speeches in the Livian narrative in light of his role as an internal narrator in Polybius' *Histories*.

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<sup>2</sup> For Livy's echo of Polybius' digression here, v. esp.: Girod 1982: 1206-8, Doblhofer 1983: 142-44, Händl-Sagawe 1995: 196-7, Feldherr 2009b, Levene 2010: 148-55 and 2014: 208.

<sup>3</sup> For the significance of Levene's reading of the passage as both source and intertext, v. Levene 2010: 154-55. For the idea that Livy can simultaneously use Polybius both as a source and create a wider allusive relationship with his predecessor, v. Stübler 1941: 158-62 and Levene 2006: 84-5.

## Part 1: The Language of *Opsis* in Polybius' Didactic *Histories*:

Polybius' account of Hannibal's speech at the Rhone is both shorter than Livy's and makes up only a part of a larger meeting, at which the Gallic envoys who have arrived to make an agreement to aid the Carthaginians also speak. While Livy has these ambassadors only speak in private with Hannibal, Polybius' version of the general's speech picks up immediately after these ambassadors have reported the decisions made by their own assemblies:

μετὰ δὲ τούτους εἰσελθὼν αὐτὸς πρῶτον μὲν **τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων** ἀνέμνησε τοὺς ὄχλους· ἐν αἷς ἔφη πολλοῖς αὐτοὺς καὶ παραβόλοις **ἔργοις** καὶ κινδύνοις ἐπικεχειρηκότας ἐν οὐδενὶ διεσφάλλαι, κατακολουθήσαντας τῇ 'κείνου γνώμῃ καὶ συμβουλίᾳ. τούτοις δ' ἐξῆς εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει, θεωροῦντας διότι **τὸ μέγιστον ἦνυσται τῶν ἔργων**, ἐπειδὴ τῆς τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως κεκρατήκασι τῆς τε τῶν συμμάχων εὐνοίας καὶ προθυμίας **αὐτόπται** γεγονάσι. διόπερ ὥετο δεῖν περὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ῥαθυμεῖν, ὡς αὐτῷ μελόντων, πειθαρχοῦντας δὲ τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ **τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων** ἀξίους. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἐπισημαινομένου καὶ μεγάλην ὀρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐμφαίνοντος, ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων εὐξάμενος διαφῆκε, παραγγείλας θεραπεύειν σφᾶς καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὡς εἰς τὴν αὔριον ἀναζυγῆς ἐσομένης. (3.44.10-13)

He came up after them and first reminded the assembled troops **of their former achievements**, among which he said they had attempted many hazardous **tasks** and dangers and not failed in one of them, having followed his judgment and plans. Next, he wished that they would have courage, considering that **they have accomplished the greatest part of their tasks**, since they had mastered the crossing of the river and were **eyewitnesses** of the goodwill and eagerness of their allies. He asked them, therefore, to be at ease about the particulars, since those are his concern, but to obey his commands and be good men and worthy **of their former works**. After the assembly applauded and demonstrated the men's great desire and eagerness, he praised them, prayed to the gods on behalf of them all, and dismissed them. He ordered them to make themselves ready and to prepare with haste, since they were making their departure the next day.

At the heart of the speech, Hannibal teaches his soldiers how to read their current situation to pursue the necessary course of action. His lesson encourages them to consider first their prior experience (τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων), a point further iterated by his repetitive mentions of the tasks they have accomplished (ἔργοις; τὸ μέγιστον ἦνυσται τῶν ἔργων; τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων). Hannibal then notes that they are eyewitnesses (αὐτόπται) of the support of the Gallic tribes whose ambassadors just spoke in the assembly. Hannibal uses a two-pronged approach centered on a practical consideration of the troops' previous experiences and their own autopsy in the didactic speech to encourage his soldiers to dismiss their fears of continuing their campaign. These two elements, a pragmatic reliance on past events and the primacy of *opsis*, are also at the center of Polybius' historiographic method. At first glance, Hannibal appears to follow a Polybian approach to didactic narrative. To push the point further and examine the extent to which the Carthaginian general employs rhetoric that mirrors that of the text's external narrator, let us examine more fully how Polybius constructs the authority of his historiographic persona.

The didactic quality of Polybius' historical narrative is at the center of his thought and overall design, a fact scholars have often highlighted.<sup>4</sup> Walbank's influential work on Polybius has largely focused on the author's intent that his *Histories* serve as a model for

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<sup>4</sup> In addition to the work of Walbank and Eckstein discussed below, cf. Sacks' 1981 survey of Polybius' historiographic technique, which argues for a literal reading of Polybius' methodological statements. Marincola's 2001 seminal work on Greek historiography similarly argues (pp. 125-40) that the didactic qualities of Polybius' account are at the heart of his historiographic method.

political activity.<sup>5</sup> This becomes evident in the historian's unique type of pragmatic history that developed from his personal political experience as a statesman of the Achaean league. Eckstein, however, has countered Walbank's strictly politically-focused analysis by advocating a broader didactic aim for the text which includes ethical and moral concerns among the lessons that Polybius aimed to provide.<sup>6</sup> While critics have analyzed the intrusive role that the historian himself plays as primary narrator in his explicit comments on historiographic didacticism, the use of Polybius' secondary narrators as exemplars or teachers of pragmatic history remains largely unexplored.<sup>7</sup> Wiater's recent work on Polybian speeches examines various speeches as functional elements with their narrative context.<sup>8</sup> He argues that the speeches in Polybius provide an

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<sup>5</sup> Walbank's 1972 Sather lectures on Polybius address the issue at length; v. esp. pp. 32-97, the two chapters that layout Polybius' overall method and unique place in the historiographic tradition following the method of Thucydides but on a larger, more universal scale. Walbank notes that Polybius' focus on military and political matters is at the heart of his *pragmatikē historia*. Similarly, Walbank 2002: 231-42 argues that Polybius frequently contrasts the idea of his "useful" history with the pleasurable accounts of other historians, thereby marking his own narrative as explicitly more didactic than his fellow writers. Schepens 2010 shows the tension present in the narrative between Polybius' model for practical experience as a necessary teacher for the political actor and his defense of Roman imperialism and the Greek resistance to it. Chaplin 2000: 23-25 discusses the practical nature of Polybius' approach as a kind of exemplarity.

<sup>6</sup> Eckstein 1995: 26 claims that his "main purpose... is to reemphasize the moral dimension in Polybius's work—to rescue his moral seriousness," a goal that has subsequently opened up avenues of research into the historian's moralistic aims.

<sup>7</sup> Davidson 1991 on the Polybian "gaze" recognizes the multiple layers of the historiographic narrative, but fails to pursue the implications of those narratological levels as part of Polybius' overall didactic purpose. Rood 2004: 147-64 on Polybius in deJong's volume on narratology in Greek Literature focuses primarily on the intrusive role of the historian's explicit comments on his method and purpose in writing as guiding the narratology of his account and in the construction of his persona as a "professional" historiographer. Thornton 2013 argues that various characters in Polybius' narrative are particularly exemplary of Greek political action and thereby contextualize the didactic purpose of the *Histories* within the understanding of his audience.

<sup>8</sup> Wiater's 2010 chapter is part of Pausch's edited volume on speeches in the ancient historians. His analysis includes a section (pp. 80-83) on Hannibal's speeches in the third book of the *Histories* that examines some of the same speeches as this chapter. Overall, he argues that Polybius' speeches serve as a model for a new type of political education. While he, too, argues that Hannibal serves as an ideal student of history, this chapter focuses instead on demonstrating the conflation of identities of the Carthaginian general and Polybius as internal and external narrators. For scholars who have analyzed Polybius'

alternative model of political education with a pragmatic approach to political and military action.

Sight, autopsy, and spectacle play key roles in Polybius' construction of his authority as a historian and in his discussion of the method and purpose of communicating historical knowledge. His reliance on his own visual investigations or on the accounts of eyewitnesses, when compared to his scrutiny of physical documents, reveals a clear model for the kind of historiographic inquiry that he intends to pursue. Polybius' method privileges information gained directly through his own sight or that of his oral sources. Similarly, from the very beginning of the *Histories*, Polybius employs a language focused on the visualization of the examples in his narrative to demonstrate the power of *opsis* and his ability to control the gaze of his audience as the most efficacious ways for the reader to gain practical knowledge. Sight thereby becomes a key method of didacticism in the historian's work. Just as Polybius shows himself to be one who acquires knowledge through *opsis* and subsequently communicates the information by directing the gaze of the reader, so too does he display Hannibal as an internal narrator and historian, capable of performing a parallel role.

After the two preliminary books that serve as a backdrop for the central topic of the *Histories*, Polybius begins his main narrative with events from the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad. As he turns to address the Greek affairs of the period, he relates in a secondary proem the reason for starting his main historical account at this point (4.1-2). The prefatory remark

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theoretical approach to speech-writing, cf. Pédech 1964: 254-302, Walbank 1962, Schepens 1990, and Nicolai 1999, e.g..

provides a glimpse into Polybius' historical method. On the one hand, he notes that he begins at precisely the moment in time where Aratus leaves off, while on the other the chronological framework provides him with access to direct knowledge of the events described:<sup>9</sup>

δεύτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ τοὺς χρόνους οὕτως συντρέχειν τοὺς ἐξῆς καὶ τοὺς πίπτοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὥστε τοὺς μὲν καθ' ἡμᾶς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν· ἐξ οὗ συμβαίνει τοῖς μὲν **αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς παραγεγονέναι**, τὰ δὲ παρὰ **τῶν ἑωρακόντων ἀκηκοέναι**. (4.2.2)

Secondly, [I pick up the narrative at this point] because this period of time and that subsequently included in my history coincides with my own era and that of my father, such that it happens that **I myself was present for** the events discussed or **have heard** about them from **eyewitnesses**.

Polybius' rationale demonstrates an ideal time frame from which he can begin the main narrative of his *Histories*. It also reveals that his historical methodology relies on his own personal experience (αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς παραγεγονέναι) or the eyewitness (ἑωρακόντων) testimony of those that were present for events discussed.<sup>10</sup> In this way, Polybius depicts

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<sup>9</sup> Polybius is one of many historians who cast themselves as continuators of their predecessors: Xenophon's *Hellenica* takes up its narrative at the chronological point at which Thucydides' quite abruptly ended. Ephorus may have followed suit in continuing Xenophon's account. On the trend of continuation in Hellenistic historiography, v. Marincola 2001: 105-12. Polybius' successors in Rome similarly build upon each other's chronological frameworks as Tacitus begins the *Annales* where Livy's *AUC*—which itself is partly derivative of Polybius' work—left off.

<sup>10</sup> Livy's preface to Book Six has several thematic parallels to Polybius' secondary preface in Book Four of his *Histories*. Each of the historians marks a sharp contrast between the murkier events of the remote past and the more grounded events of more recent history. While Polybius prioritizes the accounts of eyewitnesses, Livy focuses on written sources—and laments the loss of written records in the Gallic sack of Rome—as the keys to fuller and more accurate history in his preface to Book Six: *Quae ab condita urbe Roma ad captam eandem Romani sub regibus primum, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus decemvirisque ac tribunis consularibus gessere, foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque libris exposui, res cum vetustate nimia obscuras, velut quae magno ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur, tum quod parvae et rariae per eadem tempora litterae fuere, una custodia fidelis memoriae rerum gestarum, et quod, etiam si quae in commentariis pontificum aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis, incensa urbe pleraeque interiere. clariora deinceps certioraque ab secunda origine velut ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque renatae urbis gesta domi militiaeque exponentur.* (6.1.1-3).

an image of himself as an experienced *pragmatikos* and as a historian capable of ascertaining historical fact and fiction through the inquiry (ἄκηκοέναι) that he makes of others.<sup>11</sup> As part of his attack on the writings of Timaeus in a surviving section from the twelfth book of his work (12.24-28), Polybius measures his predecessor by these same two standards in a well-known polemic.<sup>12</sup> While he asserts that Timaeus' account is full of sensationalism, inaccuracies, and other errors, the underlying faults that Polybius sees as the root causes for the errors in the former's historical methodology is that he writes from a position of inexperience (τὸν μηδεμίαν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντα) and without evidence gained through sight (διὰ τὴν ὁρασίαν; 12.25g1-4). Just as Polybius builds his own authority through practical knowledge and visual investigation, he deconstructs the account of others through their failure to demonstrate a similar experiential awareness. Polybius thereby privileges the ability of autopsy to provide historians with the only means through which they can ascertain the truth about the events they recount.

Similarly, Polybius demonstrates his own superiority as a knowledgeable historian through the insistence of his reliance on autopsy of physical artifacts and geography. As he notes with a high degree of numerical specificity the origins and quantity of troops that Hannibal exchanged between Spain and Africa to guard these

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<sup>11</sup> Polybius' claims in the passage are reminiscent of those of Thucydides, who notes his reliance on his own experience and the testimony of eyewitnesses in his methodological statement at the close of his "Archaeology" (v. 1.22.1-2, esp.). Herodotus, similarly, attributes his knowledge both to autopsy and oral inquiry in comments scattered throughout his *Histories* but especially prominent in his account of the Egyptians (v. esp. 2.2-3, 2.54-55, 2.143, e.g.)

<sup>12</sup> For analysis of Polybius' remarks against Timaeus, see esp. Pédech 1961, Vercruysse 1990: 29-34, Schepens 1990: 51-2, and Walbank 1967 comm. *ad loc.*

lands during his invasion of Italy (3.33.5-16), Polybius preemptively attempts to quiet his potential critics:

Οὐ χρή δὲ θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀναγραφῆς... ἡμεῖς γὰρ εὐρόντες ἐπὶ Λακινίῳ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἐν χαλκῳματι κατατεταγμένην ὑπ' Ἀννίβου, καθ' οὓς καιροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις ἀνεστρέφετο, πάντως ἐνομίσαμεν αὐτὴν περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιόπιστον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ κατακολουθεῖν εἰλόμεθα τῇ γραφῇ ταύτῃ. (3.33.17-18)

It is not necessary to marvel at the accuracy of this description... for **I found** this written account drawn up in bronze by Hannibal at the Lacinian point, at the time when he was busying himself in places throughout Italy, and I consider that it is altogether **trustworthy** about such things. I consequently decided to follow this account.

The historian here notes in order the actions of discovering the written account (ἡμεῖς... εὐρόντες), determining its veracity (ἀξιόπιστον), and subsequently deciding to adhere to its details.<sup>13</sup> He embeds within his description a depiction of Hannibal writing the record himself, made more vivid by the inclusion of particulars about the material of the tablet and about how the Carthaginian took the time to document these facts while he was engaged in his campaigns in Italy. Polybius thus portrays his historical methodology as relying on his personal search for primary documents and estimation of their value while simultaneously describing himself as the direct recipient of Hannibal's personal, handwritten accounts.<sup>14</sup> Polybius thereby adds a distinct mark of primacy to his authority

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<sup>13</sup> Guzzo 2007 attempts a reconstruction of the inscription.

<sup>14</sup> In an example that is somewhat parallel, Polybius remarks that Philinus is ignorant of the bronze tablets housed in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline (3.26). While Polybius took the effort to examine these physical documents for himself and thereby can speak authoritatively on these matters, he excuses Philinus for his ignorance and instead focuses his attack on the fact that Philinus says the exact opposite of the truth, even though there is no basis for such a claim (3.26.2-5).



on these matters through his emphasis on his personal experience and connection to these documents.

Polybius similarly argues that he gains authority through autopsy in a digression from his narrative of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, during which he debates the weaknesses of other historians' claims of fantastical tales regarding the account (3.47.6-48.12). While Polybius lists several points of criticism, he notes that their explanations primarily make two mistakes: outright lies (ψευδολογεῖν) and the declaration of direct contradictions (μαχόμενα γράφειν αὐτοῖς; 3.47.6). Polybius' final remark on these matters summarizes the basis of his claims:

ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀποφαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρ' αὐτῶν **ἱστορηκέναι** τῶν παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ τόπους **κατωπτευκέναι** καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων αὐτοὶ κεχρηῆσθαι πορείᾳ γνώσεως ἔνεκα καὶ θέας. (3.48.12)

But I give a secure account of these events because **I inquired** about these matters from those that happened to be present at the time and because **I examined** the places **myself** and personally made the passage through the Alps in order to know and see it for myself.

In the description of his historical method for investigating the crossing of the Alps, Polybius combines the various types of evidence available to him. First, he conducted historical inquiry (ἱστορηκέναι). In this particular case, he claims to have questioned those that were present for the actual crossing, thus relying on eyewitnesses to the historical events he sets out to describe. Polybius then asserts that he performed a visual inspection (κατωπτευκέναι) of the pass itself to confirm its actual geographic and topographical qualities. These actions bolster his knowledge both of the land itself and the path taken by Hannibal's army on their crossing. Further, the two-part process allows

Polybius to assert his superiority to the fantastical accounts of his historiographic predecessors. The explication of his methodological process also mirrors and prescriptively forecasts the procedure described in his secondary proem (4.1-2), discussed above. Thus, as the reader encounters Polybius' explicit description of the ideal historical methodology at the beginning of the fourth book, it retroactively provides the appearance of authority for his preceding narrative.

Beyond the role that *opsis* plays in lending clout to Polybius' position as a knowledgeable historian, sight and spectacle have a key function within the larger didactic program of his work. In the proem that opens the two prefatory books of the *Histories*, he lays out the practical benefit that he envisions his audience gaining from his narrative and ties it to the visual language that describes his overall endeavor. Polybius first notes that his fellow writers often describe the benefits of the study of history:

ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ τινὲς οὐδ' ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀρχῇ καὶ τέλει κέχρηται τούτῳ, φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι **παιδείαν** καὶ **γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις** τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας **μάθησιν**, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην **διδάσκαλον** τοῦ δύνασθαι **τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς** γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τὴν **τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν** ὑπόμνησιν, δῆλον ὡς οὐδενὶ μὲν ἂν δόξαι καθήκειν περὶ τῶν καλῶς καὶ πολλοῖς εἰρημένων ταυτολογεῖν, ἥκιστα δ' ἡμῖν. (1.1.2-3)

But since not just some [historians] to a lesser extent but really all use this as the beginning and end, so to speak, saying that the truest **education** and **training for political affairs** is the **learning** of history, and even that the recollection of **the downfalls of others** is the clearest and in fact the only **way to teach** one to be able to bear **the changes of fortune** nobly, it is clear that it seems proper for no one, and least of all for myself, to go on about things previously said well and by many.

Polybius accentuates the point that historical narrative is meant to serve an instructive purpose: *παιδείαν*, *γυμνασίαν*, *μάθησιν*, and *διδάσκαλον* all mark the didacticism of

knowledge of the past. The accumulation of synonyms makes the didactic quality of his narrative clear from the very start of the *Histories* and is further strengthened by his remark that the fact is universally accepted by his predecessors. Furthermore, Polybius includes two elements in his comment that clarify the aim and focus of his *Histories*. He envisions his narrative as instruction meant for the affairs of the state (πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις) and he achieves his intended lesson by focusing on the vicissitudes of fortune (τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς) as evident in the experiences of others (τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν).<sup>15</sup> These two components, matters concerning the state and changes of fortune, serve as the basic building blocks for what Polybius deems to be his “pragmatic” version of history (τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας; 1.2.8)—a description of the past that primarily serves as instruction for those involved in political affairs.

Polybius continues in his proem to describe the overall undertaking he aims to accomplish as a spectacle (θεώρημα) which is evident (ἐμφανές) through a comparison of his primary subject—the growth and supremacy of the Roman state—with the empires that preceded it (1.2.1-7). The two visually-oriented words bear a direct connection to didacticism in the *Histories*. Throughout Polybius’ work, the noun θεώρημα denotes a correlation to pragmatic instruction.<sup>16</sup> The adjective ἐμφανές, on the other hand,

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<sup>15</sup> The adjective πολιτικός denotes something broader than its English counterpart of “political.” As the *Histories* largely focuses on military affairs and statecraft, broadly speaking, Polybius probably has a similar range of meaning behind his use of the adjective; v. Walbank 1972: 32-65 on this matter.

<sup>16</sup> For its six instances in the text, see 1.2.1, 6.26.10, 9.14.5, 10.47.12, 12.25i.7, and 36.15.5. In his *exkursus* on the qualities of generalship (9.14), Polybius notes that θεώρημα is a part of instruction (μάθησις) that gives a general personal experience. Similarly, in his attack on Timaeus, Polybius notes (12.25i) that θεώρημα can represent personal suffering that allows one to know what is opportune in a given situation, knowledge that can only be gained through experiential trial.

combines the idea of appearance with what can be gained through knowledge of that outward form.<sup>17</sup> After Polybius explicitly compares several of the empires to which the Romans have proved themselves superior, he goes on to state that his aim has a distinctive (ἴδιον) and marvelous (θαυμάσιον) quality. Polybius further notes that *tyche* has forced all matters toward one and the same end (πρὸς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν; 1.4.1).<sup>18</sup> The unique outcome, Polybius argues, requires the historian “to treat the administration of fortune through his history under one synoptic view for his audience” (1.4.2 διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης). Of the six other uses of σύνοψις in the *Histories*, only one other refers to Polybius’ overall narrative design (14.1a.1) as the instance does here. The remaining five examples of the word describe an object or person “in plain sight” within a larger context that implies that knowledge can be gained through the recognition of the visible object.<sup>19</sup> Polybius notes the visual qualities (θεώρημα, ἐμφανές, θαυμάσιον, σύνοψιν) of his historical narrative throughout the proem to heighten the idea that the past is meant to become visible through his account. That is, that his text should evoke a clear image in the mind of the reader of the events that it sets out to describe if it is to accomplish its didactic aims.

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<sup>17</sup> The adjective appears only four times: 1.2.1, 13.2.2, 21.32.7, and 31.28.5, but its meaning in these passages is consistent. V. esp. 13.2.2 and 31.28.5 for examples of the character of individuals as being “ἐμφανές” through their actions as recorded by Polybius.

<sup>18</sup> On the central role that *tychē* plays in Polybius’ *Histories*, Walbank 1957: 16-26. cf. Chapter 1, Part 1, above.

<sup>19</sup> 2.69.5, 3.66.11, 6.27.1, 38.18.6.

As he discusses the disastrous outcome of Regulus' campaigns in Africa (1.35.1-7), Polybius claims that he relates the story for the rectifying edification of his readers (1.35.6 χάριν τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διορθώσεως). As the historian notes, there are two ways for people to change themselves for the better: either by experiencing their own misfortunes, which he calls more evident (ἐναργέστερον), or through those of others, which he notes are less harmful (1.35.7). As he continues, Polybius again turns to visual language to describe why one must therefore seek to learn from others' downfalls, "since it is possible to see the better in it without harm" (1.35.8 ἐπεὶ χωρὶς βλάβης ἔστιν συνιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον).<sup>20</sup> Polybius similarly employed the adjective ἐναργής, used here to describe the experience of one's own misfortunes, in the proem, as noted above, to refer to the fact that historians agree that the most manifest (ἐναργεστάτην) teacher within history is human misfortune. From the proem to the later explicit aside on the purpose of potentially painful *exempla* in didactic history, Polybius describes his historiographic method with language that centers on teaching through *opsis* and visualization within his narrative. Furthermore, he explicitly connects the visual qualities of his *Histories* to their pragmatic didacticism, creating a clear link between the spectacle contained within his account and its ability to demonstrate the proper action in a given situation.

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<sup>20</sup> Polybius uses σύνοιδα and the uncompounded οἶδα seemingly interchangeably in the 163 instances of the two words. As expected in these terms formed from the perfect of ὁράω, they generally denote the present state of knowledge gained through the action of sight; v. LSJ under \*εἶδω, p. 483.

## Part 2: *Opsis* and Knowledge: Hannibal as a Student of History

While Polybius uses *opsis* to demonstrate his own authority as a didactic historian, he does not restrict such examples of visual language only to himself. At perhaps the most pivotal moment in the *Histories*, as he closes the geographically disparate narratives of books one through five to begin the *symplokē*, Polybius employs language marked by *opsis* in the reported speech of Agelaus at the assembly of the Achaeans, who are debating whether or not to come to terms with Philip.<sup>21</sup> The speech, as related by Polybius through his customary combination of direct and indirect speech, bears direct implications for the historian's subsequent narratological design as Agelaus suggests that the Greeks band together as do those that interlock (συμπλέκοντες) their hands before crossing a river (5.104.1).<sup>22</sup> The imagery foregrounds the design of the *symplokē* that the *Histories* will follow from this point forward.<sup>23</sup> To make his case further, Agelaus urges the Achaeans to take thought for (προϊδομένους) the forces currently waging war in the west and then examines the potential outcomes of the

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<sup>21</sup> The *symplokē*, for Polybius, is a radical reorganization of his historiographic narrative after the fifth book of his *Histories*. In the first five books, the historian allowed each book (or pairs of books) to address a large geographic area over an extended period of time. From the conclusion of his digression on Rome that begins the sixth book forward, Polybius interweaves the narratives of each geographic area of the Mediterranean into a more concise account of a year or Olympiad. For the historian, this allows the connections between events occurring across the Mediterranean. Walbank 1975 discusses the importance of the *symplokē* to Polybius' overall narrative as a means to intensify the links between Rome and the *oikoumenē*. Quinn 2013, conversely, notes how the overall ideology of the *symplokē*, as well as its narratological structures is largely Hellenocentric.

<sup>22</sup> Usher 2009 notes how Polybius frequently utilizes a combination of direct and indirect speech throughout the *Histories*. He demonstrates that except in exceptional cases, the orations related in the *Histories* begin with *oratio obliqua* to build up the rationale behind the speech and subsequently alter form to *oratio recta* as the speech moves on to its main point, which Usher terms, the "moment of fullest exhortation."

<sup>23</sup> Champion 1997 argues against the historicity of Agelaus' speech, on the grounds that it has been tailored to fit the introduction of the *symplokē*.

Hannibalic war (5.104.2-4). As Agelaus encourages the Achaeans to “catch sight of” the forces in the west, he thereby encourages them to trust his prediction of the outcome of these events. Agelaus then addresses Philip in his speech and similarly directs his gaze toward the west (πρὸς τὰς δύσεις βλέπειν; 5.104.5-7). While words derived from ὁράω generally indicate the knowledge gained through sight, the instances of βλέπω in Polybius’ *Histories* frequently denote the use of *opsis* to evoke an emotional or mental response.<sup>24</sup> As Agelaus directs the gaze of the assembled Achaeans and Philip westward, therefore, he attempts to induce the sort of reaction of *pathos* and consequently employs the now-famous metaphor that the Romans and Carthaginians represent clouds appearing from that direction (τὰ προφανόμενα νῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσπέρας νέφη; 5.104.10). Polybius then immediately switches to *oratio recta* to relate the remainder of the speech, which notes the potential for disaster that hangs over their heads should they not band together (5.104.11). As Usher has argued, Polybius builds up the rationale and emotions employed by his speaking characters through *oratio obliqua* and then transitions to *oratio recta* to convey the key sentiment of the speech.<sup>25</sup> The essential point that Agelaus tries to get across, then, is the thought that the Polybian narrator first relates in *oratio recta*.

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<sup>24</sup> Forms of the verb βλέπω and its compounds occur over one hundred times throughout the *Histories*; cf., e.g., 3.16.4, in which the Romans “look toward” the successes of Macedon and are subsequently strengthened in their desire to strengthen their holdings in the east, or 3.64.10, in which Scipio tells his men before Ticinus to take heart because they can “catch sight of him” on the battlefield, or 3.107.8, in which the Romans “look toward” Aemilius with hope before Cannae, or, finally, 3.118.3, in which Rome’s allies in southern Italy “have an eye for” Carthage after Hannibal’s victory at Cannae.

<sup>25</sup> Usher 2009 similarly notes that these portions of the speeches are generally concerned with questions of justice or expediency—key themes within Polybius’ *Histories*. The portion reported through direct speech is frequently tied to Polybius’ overall characterization of the speaker.

The speech achieves the desired result as the assembly votes to make peace with Philip (5.105.1-2). Polybius highlights the role that *opsis* plays in Agelaus' attempt to direct the gaze of both Philip and the assembly and his reliance on visual imagery. The visual emphasis in Agelaus' speech demonstrates the ability of controlled sight to influence politically involved figures to make an informed decision based on what Agelaus presents as sound historical knowledge, here evident from the viewpoint of a secondary audience. Just as Polybius is on the verge of interweaving the overall design of his historical narrative, he similarly intertwines the language describing the role of didactic history and *opsis* as a historical tool by having Agelaus briefly take on the role of a historian within the narrative who controls the viewpoint of others to achieve a desired pragmatic end.

Unlike Agelaus, who occupies the stage for a fleeting instance to deliver the speech that brings about peace between the Achaeans and Philip, Hannibal takes a much larger role within Polybius' narrative across several books. As such, Hannibal's ability to serve as an internal narrator and to play the role of historian can be tracked as it develops throughout the *Histories*. Polybius characterizes Hannibal as a model *pragmatikos* leader, capable of recognizing the proper action in a given situation through autopsy and subsequently controlling the *opsis* of others during the campaign or on the battlefield. Hannibal also creates visual displays of various kinds to control the *opsis* of and evoke particular responses from other characters within the narrative. As such, Hannibal shows himself to be the ideal student of history parallel to the model that Polybius proposes for his audience.



In his preparations for and then throughout his campaign in Italy, Hannibal goes to great lengths to ensure that he gains knowledge through personal autopsy or through the direct reports of scouts (κατασκόποι) or local guides (καθηγεμόνες).<sup>26</sup> As he is in the process of crossing the Alps, Hannibal sends inhabitants of the passes ahead as scouts into the difficult areas (3.48.11 εἰς τε τὰς μεταξύ δυσχωρίας ὁδηγοῖς καὶ καθηγεμόσιν ἐγχωρίοις ἐχρήτο). The scouts allow him to gain local knowledge and insight into areas that might lead to setbacks without risking his own safety. Hannibal thus comes to follow a method of practical decision-making that mirrors the historical methodology of Polybius discussed above.<sup>27</sup> Each of them places a primacy on the ability of autopsy to convey the surest level of historical knowledge and only seeks out through the inquiry of others facts that cannot be ascertained directly—Hannibal actively dispatches the scouts to go where he cannot, while Polybius interviews those of the previous generation with direct knowledge of events before his own time. Hannibal both demonstrates that Polybius’ methodology is sound and serves as an exemplar for the external audience to model their own exploits after.

In addition to his ability to learn of the topography of the land through direct or secondary *opsis*, Hannibal also creates his own visual cues to aid actions and decision-

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<sup>26</sup> For Hannibal’s autopsy, v., e.g., 3.50, in which he himself catches sight of the ambush set up in his troops’ path while crossing the Alps. For κατασκόποι, v., e.g., 3.45.1 as Hannibal sends out Numidians as scouts around the Rhone or 3.100.1 in which the scouts return to report the location of Roman supplies that aids Hannibal in his maneuvers around Minucius. Polybius uses καθηγεμόνες to describe the inhabitants of a region that Hannibal sends as scouts to gain local knowledge of areas with which he is unfamiliar: v., e.g., 3.42.6, 3.48.11, and 3.52.7. Conversely, the Roman Senate is frequently shown by Polybius to rely on rumor and report of the events occurring during the campaign and have to make counter maneuvers without the privilege of direct firsthand knowledge. The implications of the disparity between the methods of Roman and Hannibalic intelligence-gathering are the subject of a separate potential project.

<sup>27</sup> cf. Chapter 2, Part 1.

making. In order to facilitate his crossing of the Rhone in the face of Gallic opposition, Hannibal orders his men to traverse the river in two stages, thereby requiring lines of communication between the two parts of his forces (3.43). His solution is having the soldiers who have already crossed send smoke signals to mark their presence, a visible sign that he himself had previously arranged with his troops:

Ἀννίβας δ' ἄμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐν τῷ πέραν ἐγγίζοντας ἤδη τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ στρατιώτας, σημηνάντων ἐκείνων τὴν παρουσίαν τῷ καπνῷ κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον, ἐμβαίνειν ἅπασιν ἄμα παρήγγελλε (3.43.6)

**At the same time** that Hannibal **saw** that the soldiers had already crossed to the opposite bank ahead of him, with them making smoke signals to mark their presence **as ordered**, he gave the command for all to embark together.

Here, Hannibal sees (συνιδεῖν) that the first portions of his army have crossed by means of smoke signals—a visible sign that he had prearranged (τὸ συντεταγμένον) with his troops. Polybius notes that he orders the remaining part of his forces to cross immediately (ἄμα) after he recognizes the smoke signals. On the one hand, Hannibal here follows the suggested Polybian behavior of pursuing a course of action based on what he sees before him. On the other, Hannibal anticipated a situation in which he would need to gain the knowledge of his troops' crossing and he preemptively arranged for the means to recognize their arrival by ordering them in advance to mark their crossing with the smoke signals. Polybius thereby portrays Hannibal as actively avoiding a situation in which he would lack the knowledge necessary to proceed as planned.

Polybius further establishes Hannibal’s management of *opsis* by showing his capacity to control the sight available to others to his own advantage.<sup>28</sup> For example, Hannibal misdirects the sight of his enemies—who become an internal audience for the gambit—by taking advantage of the unexpected appearance of fog before the battle of Trasimene to conceal the movement and position of his troops.<sup>29</sup> As Polybius describes the encounter, Hannibal’s troops jump out of the fog at the sound of a predetermined signal which creates confusion on the part of Flaminius and his troops:

οὔσης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ὁμιχλώδους διαφερόντως, Ἀννίβας ἅμα τῷ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς πορείας εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα προσδέξασθαι καὶ συνάπτειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἤδη τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων πρωτοπορείαν ἀποδοὺς τὰ συνθήματα καὶ διαπεμνόμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις **συνεπεχείρει πανταχόθεν ἅμα** τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον, **παραδόξου** γενομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς **ἐπιφανείας**, ἔτι δὲ **δυσσυνόπτου** τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα περιστάσεως ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους **ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου** καταφερομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων, **οὐχ οἷον παραβοηθεῖν ἐδύναντο** πρὸς τι τῶν δεομένων οἱ ταξίαρχοι καὶ χιλίαρχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ **συννοῆσαι τὸ γινόμενον**. ἅμα γὰρ οἱ μὲν **κατὰ πρόσωπον**, οἱ δ' **ἀπ' οὐρα**, οἱ δ' **ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων** αὐτοῖς προσέπιπτον. διὸ καὶ συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἤς πορείας σχήματι κατακοπῆναι, **μὴ δυναμένους αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν**, ἀλλ' ὥσανεὶ προδεδομένους ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀκρισίας. ἔτι γὰρ **διαβουλεύόμενοι τί δεῖ πράττειν ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως**. (3.84.1-5)

As it was an especially foggy day, as soon as the greater part of the marching column had entered into the valley and the vanguard of the enemy had already made contact with him, Hannibal gave the signal and sent word to those lying in ambush and **they attacked** the enemy **from all sides at once**. But, since the **sudden appearance** of the enemy was

<sup>28</sup> In addition to the example of the fog at Trasimene discussed below, another famous instance of Hannibal misdirecting the knowledge of others through his control of *opsis* is the anecdote that recounts his use of wigs and disguises around the camp to fool visitors and even those who knew him well (3.78). Polybius describes the ruse as a “Punic subterfuge” (3.78.1 Φοινικικῷ στρατηγίῳ τοιοῦτῳ).

<sup>29</sup> Hannibal similarly creates a false understanding of the situation for Fabius when he uses the torches attached to oxen to misdirect the Romans’ efforts after they had trapped the Carthaginians in a narrow gorge (3.93-94). Hannibal shows his ability to evoke an expected response from the Roman general by generating a state of disinformation.

**unexpected** and since the condition of the atmosphere still **hindered visibility** and since the enemy was bearing down on them and attacking on all sides **from the higher ground**, those around Flaminius—the centurions and tribunes of the Romans—**were not able to come to the aid** of the those that were in need and **they were not even able to comprehend what was going on**. At the same time the enemy attacked them, some **from the front**, others **from the rear**, and still others **from the flanks**. Consequently it came about that the majority of them were cut down in the marching column itself, **not being able to help each other**, but instead betrayed by the bad judgment of their commander, for **they were unexpectedly killed** while **they were still deliberating what it was necessary to do**.

The narrative creates an extreme contrast of both the battlefield organization and the resulting order or chaos experienced by each side. Hannibal draws up his men in an orderly fashion, even though they are spread out in ambushes, and is able to signal them to attack all together (συνεπεχείρει; ἅμα) at every side (πανταχόθεν) of the enemy. The sudden and unexpected appearance (παραδόξου...ἐπιφανείας) of the Carthaginians renders Flaminius and his officers completely unable to comprehend what is happening (συννοῆσαι τὸ γινόμενον), leaving them at a loss as to how to proceed (διαβουλευόμενοι τί δεῖ πράττειν). Hannibal's plan exploits Flaminius' state of inadequate *opsis* (δυσσυνόπτου).

Polybius begins the passage with Hannibal as the subject of the main verb of the sentence and the series of attributive participles that show him taking advantage of the atmospheric conditions, demonstrating Hannibal's control over the situation as he sets up the action. After that, however, the historian maintains the focus of his narrative on the utter despondency of the Romans through the repetition of their inability to help one another (οὐχ οἷον παραβοηθεῖν ἐδύναντο... μὴ δυναμένους αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν). Furthermore,

his external audience becomes unable to see the actions of the Carthaginian troops, much like the experience of Flaminius' legions themselves. Hannibal's men attack suddenly at various instances from above (ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου), in front (κατὰ πρόσωπον), behind (ἀπ' οὐραῖς), and from the sides (ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων), maximizing the chaos that the tactic produces. Polybius recounts only the results of their actions, namely that the Romans are destroyed contrary to all expectations (ἀπώλλυντο παραδόξως), rather than describing the maneuvers that occur behind the veil of the fog.

The narrative conflates the roles of Hannibal as general, capable of wreaking havoc on the Romans by taking advantage of the appearance of an unexpected mist, and that of Polybius, creating confusion on the part of his audience by suppressing in his narrative the movements of the Carthaginian forces behind that same haze, as each sets out to maximize the effects of the purportedly unexpected fog on the battlefield. Throughout the account of Hannibal's campaign in Italy, Polybius crafts a portrait of the general as an ideal student of history that mirrors the historiographic approach that he himself takes in producing his narrative. As Hannibal privileges information gained through autopsy or via the direct testimony of eyewitness accounts he models that type of pragmatic decision-making that Polybius advocates in the comments he makes as external narrator.

### Part 3: Learning from the Past: Hannibal the Historian

Let us now return to the point which began the chapter: that Hannibal's speech at the crossing of the Rhone (3.44) uses language that recalls Polybius' historiographic didacticism. As Hannibal takes on the role of internal narrator in his battlefield speeches, he continues to model the types of pragmatic behavior that Polybius attributes to him. Hannibal uses Polybian language to exhort his troops to particular exploits and thereby plays the role of a historian at the metadiegetic level of the *Histories*.<sup>30</sup> Hannibal's first major engagement after the Carthaginian army crosses the Alps—the battle at the Ticinus River—shows the general taking on the persona in the speech and spectacle that he uses to exhort his troops to success in the battle. As Polybius narrates the preparations of each side, he describes how Hannibal creates a vivid spectacle out of some Gallic captives he had taken during his transalpine route:<sup>31</sup>

τούτους δὲ κακῶς διετίθετο, παρασκευαζόμενος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· καὶ γὰρ δεσμοὺς εἶχον **βαρεῖς** καὶ τῷ λιμῷ συνέσχηντο, καὶ ταῖς πληγαῖς αὐτῶν τὰ σώματα διέφθαρτο. καθίσας οὖν τούτους εἰς τὸ μέσον **προέθηκε** πανοπλίας Γαλατικῆς, οἷαις εἰώθασιν οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν, ὅταν μονομαχεῖν μέλλωσιν, κατακοσμεῖσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἵππους **παρέστησε** καὶ σάγους **εἰσήνεγκε πολυτελεῖς**. (3.62.4-6)

He was mistreating them, while making preparations for the future: for they were holding **heavy** fetters, and they had been distressed by starvation, and their bodies were crippled by blows. After he sat them down in the middle, he **set out** Gallic panoplies, of the sort which their kings were accustomed to wear when they were about to fight in single

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<sup>30</sup> On the multiple narratological levels within the *Histories*: Davidson 1991 and Rood 2004. For a brief general introduction to battlefield speeches in historiography: Erhardt 1995. cf., too, the discussion in Chapter 1, Parts 2 and 3, above.

<sup>31</sup> Walbank 1957: 397 deems the entire episode of the spectacle and the speech “apocryphal.” Seibert 1993: 115-16 concludes that the savageness of this episode is made up and added to the tradition in order to make Hannibal appear more barbaric. Adler 2011: 65 notes how the spectacle does constitute a moral appeal, albeit on the basis of an “overwrought” argument on Hannibal's part.

combat. In addition to these, he **stood** horses there and **brought in lavish** cloaks.

Polybius highlights Hannibal's attention to the visual details of the spectacle with his own emphasis on illustrative language. The descriptive adjectives βαρεῖς and πολυτελεῖς vivify the depiction of the chains and cloaks and bookend the account of the spectacle. The starvation and subsequent torture of the captives paints a dramatic portrait of the state of their bodies. The historian then notes the general's placement of these prisoners in the middle of the scene, following which he employs several compound verbs to record each additional step in the creation of the vignette. The sequence of verbs allows the reader to visualize each element of the spectacle in its place in relation to the other components. First, the armor is laid out in front (προέθηκε) and Polybius as external narrator further specifies the panoply as the kind worn by Gallic kings for single combat—armor that is likely resplendent in its own right, though the details are left to the imagination of the reader. Then, the horses are brought in to stand alongside (παρέστησε) the other offerings, before the setting of the scene comes to a close with the introduction (εἰσήνεγκε) of the lavish garments. The spatial prefixes of the verbal sequence clarify the positions of each of the vignette's elements and thereby add depth and visual perspective to the scene. The objectives of the efforts of these two men—the external historian and the internal character—are therefore aligned: as Polybius carefully narrates Hannibal's creation of the vignette, he himself paints a vivid picture of the scene that can evoke the same response in the mind of his external audience that it did for Hannibal's internal audience composed of the Carthaginian army.

In contrast to the elaborate entrance scene, the narrative of the duel itself is contained within a short genitive absolute (3.62.10 γενομένης δὲ τῆς μάχης). This limits the focus on the act itself and instead highlights the setup of the spectacle and the troops' reaction to it.<sup>32</sup> Before Polybius closes his account with Hannibal's speech, he first notes the effects of the duel and explains the purpose behind the exhibition:

ἦν δὲ παραπλησία καὶ περὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡ διάληψις· ἐκ παραθέσεως γὰρ **θεωρουμένης** τῆς τῶν ἀγομένων καὶ ζώντων ταλαιπωρίας, τοὺτους μὲν ἠλέουν, τὸν δὲ τεθνεῶτα πάντες ἐμακάριζον. Ἀννίβας δὲ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων τὴν προκειμένην διάθεσιν ἐνεργασάμενος ταῖς τῶν δυνάμεων ψυχαῖς, μετὰ ταῦτα προελθὼν αὐτὸς τοῦτου χάριν ἔφη παρεισάγειν τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, ἵν' ἐπὶ **τῶν ἄλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων** ἐναργῶς **θεασάμενοι** τὸ συμβαῖνον βέλτιον ὑπὲρ τῶν σφίσι παρόντων βουλευῶνται πραγμάτων. (3.62.11-63.1)

For the majority of the Carthaginians, the sentiment was very similar: on comparison, after **they saw** the hardship of those being led away while still alive, they were pitying them, but all were considering the one that died as blessed. Through the aforementioned means, Hannibal created the intended effect in the minds of his soldiers and, after this, he stepped forward and said that he had brought out the prisoners for this purpose, so that they, **having looked on the misfortunes of others** clearly, would determine to bring about the better outcome for their own present circumstances.

Both Polybius, as he closes his narrative of the spectacle of the prisoners, and Hannibal, as he opens his speech, note with participial forms derived from *θεάομαι* that the act of seeing the drama unfold produces the intended emotional response, to fight in the forthcoming campaign as if they have nothing to lose.<sup>33</sup> Hannibal's assertion that his

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<sup>32</sup> This observation was brought to my attention by John Marincola in a public lecture, "*Lacrimae Rerum: Emotions and the Ancient Historian*," given at UTAustin, 10 April 2015.

<sup>33</sup> Various forms of the verb and its derivative *θεωρέω* appear well over 400 times throughout the *Histories*, often with little difference in meaning except when the latter means to "consult an oracle."



troops see “others’ misfortunes” (συμπτώματα ἀλλότρια) as a means of didacticism echoes a passage discussed above.<sup>34</sup>

...τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων **συμπτωμάτων** καὶ τοῦ διὰ **τῶν ἀλλοτρίων**...τὸν δ' αἰεὶ θηρευτέον, ἐπεὶ χωρὶς βλάβης ἔστιν συνιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον.  
(1.35.7-8)

[Of the two possibilities of learning] through one’s own **misfortunes** or **those of others**...the latter must always be sought, since it is possible to see the better in it without harm.

The very model of historiographic instruction that Polybius purports to pursue himself resonates in Hannibal’s spectacle and speech. After the historian recounts the rest of the general’s oration—which focuses on how the sight of the captives should remind the troops not to surrender but to stand and fight—he leaves no doubt that the Carthaginian’s overall performance brings about the intended didactic effect.<sup>35</sup> Polybius closes his account with the following summary:

τῶν δὲ πολλῶν ἀποδεχομένων τό τε **παράδειγμα** καὶ τοὺς **λόγους** καὶ λαμβανόντων ὁρμὴν καὶ παράστασιν οἷαν ὁ παρακαλῶν ἐσπούδασε, τότε μὲν ἐπαιέσας αὐτοὺς διαφῆκε (3.63.14).

Since the majority received both the **spectacle** and the **speech** favorably and caught the very enthusiasm and fire that the speaker was eager for, he then praised them and dismissed them.

Polybius calls the show put on by Hannibal a **παράδειγμα** and throughout his narrative, he uses the term **παράδειγμα** to denote an example from which one can take a didactic

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<sup>34</sup> For further discussion of this passage, cf. Chapter 2, Part 1, above.

<sup>35</sup> Adler 2011: 64-72 discusses the actual speech at greater length and also compares the speeches of Hannibal and Publius Scipio before the Ticinus. Adler notes, in particular, how both Hannibal’s speech and Publius Scipio’s are not “particularly strong or particularly feeble” (p. 72); neither appears to be clearly favored in Polybius’ construction of these speeches, but both speeches are fairly appropriate to the situation at hand.

lesson.<sup>36</sup> Through the combination of the visible display and his words (λόγους) Hannibal leads his audience to recognize their current need for courageous action. In consequence of the speech and spectacle, the Carthaginian forces win a resounding victory over the Roman troops. The overall narrative of the Battle of the Ticinus River thereby shows Hannibal playing the role of historian as an internal narrator within the *Histories* that teaches pragmatic lessons to his internal audience through spectacle and speech in much the same way as Polybius intends his readers to learn through the visually evocative words of his text.

The conflation of general and historian continues in Hannibal's speech before the pivotal battle of Cannae, the nadir of fortune for the Romans in the Second Punic War, but a veritable zenith of success for Hannibal. The Battle of Cannae also takes on narratological significance for Polybius, who breaks his otherwise continuous narrative of the campaign at this point to turn to affairs in Greece for the subsequent two books of the *Histories*. When he finally returns his focus to Rome at the start of Book Six, Polybius first embarks on a long digression about the structure and nature of the Roman state and then resumes his historical narrative in a vastly different format: the *symplokē*, the interwoven account of affairs across the Mediterranean world.<sup>37</sup> The drastic break in the narrative and the subsequent shift that occurs after the battle gives Cannae a privileged position as a key didactic moment for Polybius' audience—a fact that he makes clear in

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<sup>36</sup> There are fourteen instances of the simple noun: 1.20.15, 1.59.8, 3.21.2, 3.63.14, 4.23.8, 4.53.4, 5.9.7, 5.98.6, 5.111.7, 7.11.3, 9.28.3, 10.47.6, 11.10.5, and 21.31.6. Verbal forms also appear (2.60.7, 15.32.5, 29.19.5, 35.2.10, 38.9.2, and 38.20.1) as do its compounded form παραδειγματισμός (6.38.4, 15.20.5, and 30.8.8).

<sup>37</sup> cf. Chapter 2, Part 2, above.

the aside that ends the third book (3.118). Polybius notes that it is only through the peculiarity of their constitution that the Romans are able to overcome the crisis that occurred after Cannae.<sup>38</sup> The narrative of the fate of Rome after the disaster at Cannae is held in suspense until after Polybius describes the Roman constitution in the sixth book of the *Histories*. In his aside here after Cannae, Polybius describes the Roman constitution and their ability to recover after the disaster as a lesson that is useful for the instruction of his politically-minded audience.<sup>39</sup>

Just as he did before the Battle at the Ticinus River, Hannibal addresses his troops in preparation for the battle.<sup>40</sup> Polybius fills this speech, too, with themes that relate to *opsis* and his own historiographic method:

Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν **θεωρῶν** ὅτι καλεῖ **τὰ πράγματα** μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, εὐλαβούμενος δὲ μὴ διατέτραπται τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, κρίνας προσδεῖσθαι παρακλήσεως τὸν καιρὸν συνῆγε τοὺς πολλοὺς. ἄθροισθέντων δέ, **περιβλέψαι** κελεύσας πάντας εἰς **τοὺς πέριξ τόπους**, ἤρετο τί μείζον εὖξασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ τοὺς παρόντας ἐδύναντο καιροῦς, δοθείσης αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας, τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ τῶν πολεμίων ἱπποκρατοῦντας ἐν τοιοῦτοις τόποις διακριθῆναι περὶ τῶν ὅλων. πάντων δὲ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἐπισημηναμένων **διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν**... (3.111.1-3)

At the same time Hannibal, when **he saw** that **the matters** call him to fight and to engage the enemy, and since he was wary that the army might be troubled by the recent defeat, thought that the situation required an assembly and he gathered the troops. After they gathered, he urged

<sup>38</sup> 3.118.8-9: ὁμολογουμένως γὰρ Ῥωμαίων ἡττηθέντων τότε καὶ παραχωρησάντων τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀρετῆς, τῇ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ιδιότητι καὶ τῷ βουλευέσθαι καλῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας δυναστείαν, νικήσαντες μετὰ ταῦτα Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἰκουμένης ἀπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο μετ' ὀλίγους χρόνους.

<sup>39</sup> 3.118.11-12: τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας ποιησόμεθα λόγον, νομίζοντες οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἱστορίας σύνταξιν οἰκεῖαν εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ἐξήγησιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων διορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι καὶ πραγματικοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

<sup>40</sup> Adler 2011: 77-81 compares the orations of Paullus (3.108-9) and Hannibal (3.111) before the Battle of Cannae. Adler notes that Hannibal's speech portrays the Carthaginians in strongly imperialistic terms (v. esp. 3.111.8-10). Erskine 1993 argues that this imperialistic bent is a Polybian invention.

them all **to look around at the surrounding places** and he asked them what greater thing would they be able to request from the gods in the present circumstances, were the opportunity offered to them, than to fight a decisive encounter in such surroundings seeing as they were far superior in cavalry compared to their enemy. Everything **clearly** confirmed what was said.

In good Polybian fashion, Hannibal takes notice of (θεωρῶν) and analyzes the matters at hand (τὰ πράγματα) to recognize the need for battle. As he begins his speech, he encourages his troops to use their own autopsy to recognize the necessary course of action. Hannibal prepares his troops for his message by first directing their gaze (περιβλέψαι) toward a sight that is representative and illustrative of their current situation.<sup>41</sup> The guidance of his audience's *opsis* is an act of focalization. Just as Polybius as external narrator uses a focalizer's perspective in his relation of the story to add an interpretation of the events of the fabula, Hannibal here forces a point of view onto his internal audience. This focalizes the Carthaginian army's outlook for the campaign and shows them how they ought to interpret their current situation. Although he had to manipulate the appearance of the Gallic captives before the battle at the Ticinus River to provide the spectacle he required, the surrounding lands themselves (τοὺς πέριξ τόπους) demonstrate the strength of their position without the need to contrive a spectacle to provide a visual representation of their situation as he did at the Ticinus River. Hannibal orders his army to observe what is plainly evident (διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν); the lesson to be drawn from this is purportedly unmistakable. As Hannibal continues, he shifts his focus

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<sup>41</sup> cf., too, the speech of Agelaus in Chapter 2, Part 2.

from interpreting the events for his soldiers to demonstrating that they already have the tools required to read the situation themselves.

After he explicitly lists the various advantages that the Carthaginian army has in these circumstances, the general continues his exposition of their superiority by noting the practical experience gained during the recent campaign.

ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρως διέκεισθε τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μάχης, ἔδει τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ μεθ' ὑποδειγμάτων ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολλοὺς διεθέμην λόγους· ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τρισὶ μάχαις τηλικαύταις ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου νενικήκατε Ῥωμαίους, ποῖος ἂν ἔτι λόγος ὑμῖν ἰσχυρότερον παραστήσαι θάρσος αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; (3.111.6-7)

When you were **inexperienced** concerning battle against the Romans, it was necessary that I do this and I was reciting many speeches to you along with **examples**. But since you have by all accounts beaten the Romans successively in three large battles, what sort of speech would render your courage still stronger than **your deeds themselves**?

In recollecting the exemplary spectacles (ὑποδείγματα) he had employed as part of his earlier orations, Hannibal acknowledges their role in making his previously inexperienced (ἀπείρως) troops learn to succeed against the Roman army. The word ὑπόδειγμα bears a special significance within Polybius' narrative: in nearly all of the ten instances in which it occurs, Polybius employs it to denote his own use of an example within the *Histories*.<sup>42</sup> Hannibal's designation of his past spectacles as ὑποδείγματα therefore represents a direct conflation of the roles of Polybius as external narrator and Hannibal as internal speaker. The displays of manipulated *opsis* used in earlier battlefield speeches, however, are no longer necessary as the practical experience the Carthaginians

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<sup>42</sup> v., e.g., 6.54.6, 8.21.11, 9.16.5, 11.2.8, 12.25i.1, and 15.20.5.

have gained through their deeds (τῶν ἔργων) supersedes any requirement of spectacle. The rank and file of Hannibal's army can now acquire understanding directly through autopsy as their general does—a parallel denoted in the opening of the speech as he encouraged them to look at the topography of the land just as he was. His role as internal narrator and quasi-historian has consequently accomplished its larger didactic aim: his troops, that is, his audience, are provided with some measure of success following the observation of ὑποδείγματα. These achievements endow the army with the practical experience that is, in Polybius' estimation, the best teacher for the pragmatically inclined individual.

In the final battlefield oration of Hannibal's Italian campaign, the roles of the external and internal narrators converge to their greatest extent. In addition to the historian's explicit commentary about the instructive purpose of historiography, Polybius has also woven into his larger narrative a depiction of the didactic progression of an internal audience—the Carthaginian army, as led by the secondary narrator and quasi-historian Hannibal, through the same process he envisions for his readers. Just as Polybius followed Hannibal's footsteps through the Alps, then, the student of Polybian history is meant to follow the path of the Carthaginian army in the development of his or her own historical knowledge and understanding.

## Part 4: Livy's Polybian Hannibal

After the narrative of the fall of Saguntum and the immediate Roman response, Livy notes Hannibal's advance preparations for his Italian campaign. These measures include an exhortation to his troops before dismissing them to winter quarters for the chance to spend time with their families.<sup>43</sup> Hannibal's brief speech is his first in the Third Decade and consequently provides the earliest opportunity to examine Livy's use of the Carthaginian general as an internal narrator.<sup>44</sup> Livy reports Hannibal's oration through direct speech:

'credo ego uos'<sup>45</sup> inquit, 'socii, et ipsos cernere **pacatis omnibus Hispaniae populis** aut finiendam nobis militiam exercitusque dimittendos esse aut in alias terras transferendum bellum; ita enim hae gentes non pacis solum sed etiam uictoriae bonis florebut, si ex aliis gentibus praedam et gloriam quaeremus. itaque cum **longinqua ab domo instet militia** incertumque sit quando domos uestras et quae cuique ibi cara sunt uisuri sitis, si quis uestrum suos inuisere uolt, commeatum do. primo uere edico adsitis, ut dis bene iuuantibus bellum ingentis gloriae praedaeque futurum incipiamus.' (21.21.3-6)

“Allies!” he says, “I believe that you yourselves also perceive that, since **all the peoples of Spain have been subdued**, we must either make an end to our campaign and dismiss our troops or we must carry on the war into other lands. Indeed, in this way these clans will flourish with the

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<sup>43</sup> Levene 2010: 60 notes how these preparations fit into the larger anachronistic order of events that Livy draws in his narrative of the sack of Saguntum: keeping these events here heightens the sense that Hannibal is the real threat that needs to be dealt with and allows Livy to establish and develop the relationship between Hannibal and his troops, a theme that recurs throughout the narrative.

<sup>44</sup> There is no indication in the *Periochae* of Hannibal playing any role in the *AUC* before his appearance in Book 21. Additionally, given Livy's careful and comprehensive set up of Hannibal's childhood oath (21.1), his succession to command of the army (21.3), the character sketch (21.4), and his initial tasks as general (21.5), there is no reason to suppose that Hannibal appeared in the text prior to his grand entrance to the stage at the opening of the Third Decade. It is even less likely that he gave any speeches before the fall of Saguntum. On the monographic qualities of the Third Decade and its focus on the Hannibalic War, v. Levene 2010: *passim*, but v. esp. the Introduction, viii-x, and how his fifth chapter ties the various threads of the book together into a coherent explanation for some of the anomalies in Livy's narrative.

<sup>45</sup> The phrase *credo ego vos* recalls the opening of Cicero's *pro S. Rosc. Amer.*, which begins with the same three words. Livy uses the opening again in a speech by Pinarius during the civil unrest in Syracuse (24.38.1).

benefits not only of peace but even of victory, if we procure booty and glory from other nations. And so, **since a campaign far from home stands over us** and it is uncertain when you will see your homes and those things which are dear to each of you, if any of you wishes to visit your family, I offer you a leave of absence. I declare that you are to be present at the beginning of spring, so that we can begin a war that will offer great glory and wealth, with the gods helping us well.”

Hannibal’s speech touches on several themes: the status of the Iberian peninsula (*pacatis omnibus Hispaniae populis*), the need for and potential benefits to be derived from the forthcoming war, the great distance they will cover in their imminent campaign, and, finally, a prayer that they find divinely supported success in the endeavor.

Polybius, conversely, makes no mention of the speech or of the furlough granted to the Carthaginian troops. Two of the prominent themes noted in Livy’s version of the speech, however, do appear at the conclusion of a lengthy geographical digression that Polybius makes at the onset of Hannibal’s campaign (3.36-38). After mentioning the Carthaginians’ control of the northern coast of Africa, Polybius notes that they also subdued all of the Iberian peninsula up to the Pyrenees (ἐκεκρατήκεισαν καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἀπάσης ἕως τῆς ῥαχίας, ὃ πέρας ἐστὶ πρὸς τῇ καθ’ ἡμᾶς θαλάττῃ τῶν Πυρηναίων ὁρῶν; 3.39.4). Polybius then provides a summary of the distances Hannibal and his army traversed in various stages throughout the campaign, with the distance from New Carthage to the Po Valley totaling, in his estimate, about nine thousand stades.<sup>46</sup> The

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<sup>46</sup> 3.39.5-11: ἀπέχει δὲ τοῦ καθ’ Ἡρακλείους στήλας στόματος οὗτος ὁ τόπος περὶ ὀκτακισχιλίους σταδίου. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ Καινὴν πόλιν ἀπὸ στηλῶν εἶναι συμβαίνει τρισχιλίους, ὅθεν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὁρμὴν Ἀννίβας τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν· [τὴν δὲ Καινὴν πόλιν ἔνιοι Νέαν Καρχηδόνα καλοῦσιν]· ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εἰσὶν ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμὸν ἑξακόσιοι στάδιοι πρὸς διςχιλίους, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου πάλιν εἰς Ἐμπορίον χίλιοι σὺν ἑξακοσίοις, (ἀπὸ δ’ Ἐμπορίου πόλεως εἰς \*\*\* περὶ ἑξακοσίου), καὶ μὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διάβασιν περὶ χιλίους ἑξακοσίου· [ταῦτα γὰρ νῦν βεβημάτισται καὶ σεσημείωται κατὰ σταδίους ὀκτὼ διὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐπιμελῶς·] ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς διαβάσεως τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ πορευομένοις παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πηγὰς ἕως πρὸς τὴν



catalogue of marches highlights the span between the homes of Hannibal's men and their eventual destination of Italy, as did the *longinqua ab domo instet militia* of Livy's version of the speech. These two themes—the Carthaginian conquest of Spain and the distance their forthcoming campaign will take them from home—stand out both in Polybius' geographical aside and in Hannibal's speech in Livy's *AUC* at the same point in each of the historians' narratives. The parallel placement and thematic overlap mobilize the Polybian reference in Livy's version of the general's speech. As the speech is Hannibal's first in the Third Decade, it serves a paradigmatic function for Livy's use of Hannibal as an internal narrator.

Finally, we return to Livy's version of the speech at the Rhone, which—as noted above—contains references to Polybius' digression on the passing of the Alps. Unlike the exhortation given after the fall of Saguntum, the speech at the Rhone has a direct Polybian parallel. A close comparison of these two versions of Hannibal's speech reveals how Livy incorporates into his internal narrative text comments originally made as asides by the external narrator in Polybius. As Livy puts the words of Polybius into Hannibal's mouth in these speeches, he conflates the identities of the two narrators—one internal, the other external—found in his source material. As I argued above, basic elements of the conflation exist in Polybius' own text as well, as the Polybian Hannibal uses language

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ἀναβολὴν τῶν Ἀλπεων τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν χίλιοι τετρακόσιοι. λοιπαὶ δ' αἱ τῶν Ἀλπεων ὑπερβολαί, περὶ χιλίους διακοσίους· ἃς ὑπερβαλὼν ἐμελλεν ἥξειν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία τῆς Ἰταλίας. ὥστ' εἶναι τοὺς πάντας ἐκ Καινῆς πόλεως σταδίου περὶ ἑννακισχίλιους, οὓς ἔδει διελθεῖν αὐτόν. On the identity of the passage described from the Emporium to the Rhone as the Via Domitia of 118 and Polybius' awareness of the road, v. Reynolds 1966: 118. On the actual distances covered during Hannibal's campaign, Hoyos 2006: 408-65; v. esp. 409 and his bibliography on the topic.

that mirrors that used by the author for his own historiographic comments. Livy, however, amplifies the conflation of identity between the Greek historian and his Carthaginian general to a greater extent. While Hannibal is a model of the Polybian method of didactic historiography in the *Histories*, he speaks with the voice of Polybius throughout Livy's Third Decade.

Before Hannibal begins his speech at the Rhone in the *AUC*, Livy first sets the stage for both the exhortation itself and for the allusive relationship he draws with Polybius' text in the ensuing account. He notes the situation in the camp, the arrival of some Gallic envoys, the general disposition of the troops, and Hannibal's reaction to these matters:

Hannibalem, incertum utrum coeptum in Italiam intenderet iter an cum eo qui primus se obtulisset Romanus exercitus manus consereret, auertit a praesenti certamine Boiorum legatorum regulique Magali aduentus, qui **se duces itinerum, socios periculi fore** adfirmantes, integro bello nusquam ante libatis uiribus Italiam adgrediendam censent. multitudo timebat quidem hostem nondum oblitterata memoria superioris belli; sed magis iter immensum Alpesque, rem fama utique inexpertis horrendam, metuebat. itaque Hannibal, postquam ipsi sententia stetit pergere ire atque Italiam petere, aduocata contione uarie militum uersat animos castigando adhortandoque. (21.29.6-30.1)

Hannibal, uncertain whether to continue on the journey he had begun or to engage in battle with this Roman army which was the first to present itself to him, is turned away from this present conflict by the arrival of the envoys of Boii and Chief Magalus. They asserted that **they would be guides for the march** and **allies** in this peril and advised him to invade Italy before engaging in battle anywhere or weakening his forces. The rank and file was certainly afraid of the enemy, since the memory of the previous war had not yet been erased, but even more were they fearing the immeasurable journey and the Alps, a task made dreadful by rumor, at least to the inexperienced. And so, Hannibal, after he stood firm in his decision to continue to march toward and attack Italy, called together an

assembly and stirred the spirits of the soldiers in various ways by chastising and encouraging them.

Hannibal's disposition moves from uncertainty to decisiveness at the arrival of some Gallic envoys, which provides him with an opportunity to improve the faltering state of the Carthaginian army. Though the Gauls pledge their alliance and service, they do so in private, before Hannibal gathers the army into the assembly. In Polybius' version of the meeting, however, the Gallic diplomats speak at the gathering before the general himself steps forward to give his speech:

αὐτὸς δὲ συναγαγὼν τὰς δυνάμεις εἰσήγαγε τοὺς βασιλίσκους τοὺς περὶ Μάγιλον – οὗτοι γὰρ ἦκον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων – καὶ δι' ἑρμηνέως τὰ δεδογμένα παρ' αὐτῶν διεσάφει τοῖς ὄχλοις. ἦν δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἰσχυρότατα **πρὸς θάρσος τῶν πολλῶν** πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς παρουσίας ἐνάργεια τῶν ἐπισπωμένων καὶ **κοινωνήσιν** ἐπαγγελλομένων **τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πολέμου**, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας αὐτῶν ἀξιόπιστον, ὅτι **καθηγήσονται** διὰ τόπων τοιούτων δι' ὧν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεόμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων συντόμως ἅμα καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ποιήσονται τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῆς χώρας γενναιότης, εἰς ἣν ἀφίζονται, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ προθυμία, μεθ' ὧν μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγῶνας πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κελτοὶ τοιαῦτα διαλεχθέντες ἀνεχώρησαν. (3.44.5-9)

[Hannibal] called together his forces and introduced the chieftains and Magalus—for they came to him from the plains around the Po—and he explains through an interpreter the things decided in their assemblies. Of the things mentioned in the speech, the most effective **for the encouragement of the troops** were, first, the visible presence of those welcoming them and promising **to take part in the war against the Romans**; second, the trustworthiness of their offer that **they would be led** safely and quickly through lands of the sort through which they would make the campaign into Italy without the lack of any necessity; additionally, the richness of the country into which they were about to campaign, and its magnitude, and still further the eagerness of the men with whom they are about to make an attack against the Roman forces. Then the Celts withdrew after speaking such things.

The offers made by the envoys and the chief Magilus to serve as allies (*socios...fore/κοινωνήσιν...τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πολέμου*) and to lead the Carthaginians to Italy (*se duces itinerum/καθηγήσονται*) appear in both texts. Livy records these proposals through indirect speech as though they are made directly to Hannibal, not in the wider assembly of the troops. Their words affect only the general himself. His doubt is removed and his resolve strengthened. Polybius, on the other hand, has the ambassadors speak to the assembled troops and he describes the offers that they make not through a record of their speech, but instead through extradiegetic comments about the effect that these promises had on Hannibal's troops (*πρὸς θάρσος τῶν πολλῶν*). In other words, Polybius focalizes the Gallic envoys' offers from the perspective of the Carthaginian army.

Livy, however, removes the frame created by Polybius' external narratorial remarks, and returns the words of Gallic ambassadors to the mouths of those who originally spoke them. As he does in Hannibal's speech after the fall of Saguntum, Livy restores comments from the extradiegetic level of Polybius' narrative to the metadiegetic text of one of his internal narrators. He simultaneously diminishes the influence that the Gallic ambassadors had in Polybius' text over the entire Carthaginian army and limits their impact to the general himself. By removing the Gauls' speech in the assembly, however, Livy heightens the focus on the role that Hannibal plays in the forthcoming gathering.

In general, Livy's version of the speech given at the Rhone is longer and more detailed than Polybius'. As Hannibal opens his exhortation in the assembly, he includes

comments recalling the assembly after the fall of Saguntum.<sup>47</sup> The first phase of

Hannibal's later speech notes his surprise at the army's unexpected fear:

mirari se quinam pectora semper impauida repens terror inuaserit. per tot annos uincentes eos stipendia facere neque ante **Hispania** excessisse quam **omnes gentesque et terrae** quas duo diuersa maria amplectantur **Carthaginiensium essent**. indignatos deinde quod quicumque Saguntum obsedissent uelut ob noxam sibi dedi postulare populus Romanus, **Hiberum** traiecisse ad delendum nomen Romanorum liberandumque orbem terrarum. tum nemini uisum id longum, cum **ab occasu solis ad exortus intenderent iter**: nunc, postquam multo **maiores partem itineris** emensam cernant, **Pyrenaeum** saltum inter **ferocissimas gentes** superatum, **Rhodanum**, **tantum amnem**, tot **milibus Gallorum prohibentibus**, domita etiam ipsius fluminis ui traiectionem, in conspectu **Alpes** habeant quarum alterum latus Italiae sit, in ipsis portis hostium fatigatos subsistere. (21.30.2-5)

He said that he was amazed at the kind of sudden fear that invaded their always fearless hearts. They served and conquered for so many years and they did not depart **from Spain** before **all tribes and all the lands** which the two separate seas surround **were under Carthaginian control**. Second, that they had crossed **the Ebro** to destroy the name of the Romans and to free the whole world because they were indignant that the Roman people were demanding that anyone who had besieged Saguntum be handed over to them as if they were guilty. At that time it seemed long to no one, although **they made their way from the far west to the extreme east**. Now, after they could see that by far **the greater part of their journey** had been traversed, and that the pass through **the Pyrenees** had been overcome among **the most ferocious clans**, and that **the Rhone—such a river!**—had been crossed although **so many thousands of Gauls were preventing them** and after the force of even the river itself was overcome, and that they have **the Alps** in sight, with Italy on the other side of them, they stopped fatigued at the very gates of the enemy!

Hannibal first recalls the army's efforts to conquer Spain (*Hispania...omnes gentesque et terrae... Carthaginiensium essent*). In the speech he gives after the fall of Saguntum, he

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<sup>47</sup> Pausch 2011: 149-56 also sets this speech within the larger narrative context and demonstrates how Livy focalizes his account of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps from various perspectives throughout his narrative to build suspense and entertainment for the readers of Livy's text.

also relates the troops' deeds in Spain (*pacatis omnibus Hispaniae populis*; 21.21.3). As noted above, the mention of the conquest of Spain strongly parallels a note made in Polybius' geographical digression (3.39.4), which is found at the same point in his narrative as the Livian speech. Similarly, Hannibal's oration after Saguntum stresses the distance the army would travel on the campaign (*longinqua ab domo instet militia*; 21.21.5). The comment evokes the substance of the catalogue of marches found in Polybius' narratorial aside (3.39.5-11). At the assembly on the Rhone, too, Hannibal notes the distance and routes already travelled by his troops (*ab occasu solis ad exortus intenderent iter*). The list in Livy's text includes the natural geographical boundaries mentioned specifically in Polybius' digression (3.39.5-11): the Ebro (*Hiberum*), the Pyrenees (*Pyrenaeum*), the Rhone (*Rhodanum*), and the Alps (*Alpes*), strengthening the connections between Livy's account and that of Polybius.<sup>48</sup>

Since the association between these two texts is grounded in the opening of Livy's version, let us now examine Polybius' account of Hannibal's speech at the assembly on the Rhone in full:

μετὰ δὲ τούτους εἰσελθὼν αὐτὸς πρῶτον μὲν **τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων** ἀνέμνησε τοὺς ὄχλους· ἐν αἷς ἔφη πολλοῖς αὐτοὺς καὶ παραβόλοις ἔργοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἐπικεχειρηκότας ἐν οὐδενὶ διεσφάλλαι, κατακολουθήσαντας τῇ 'κείνου γνώμῃ καὶ συμβουλίᾳ. τούτοις δ' ἐξῆς **εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει**, θεωροῦντας διότι **τὸ μέγιστον** ἦνυσται **τῶν ἔργων**, ἐπειδὴ **τῆς τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως** κεκρατήκασιν τῆς τε τῶν συμμάχων εὐνοίας καὶ προθυμίας **αὐτόπται** γεγόνασι. διόπερ ὧρετο δεῖν περὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ῥαθυμεῖν, ὥς αὐτῷ μελόντων, πειθαρχοῦντας δὲ τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων ἀξίους. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἐπισημαινομένου καὶ μεγάλην ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐμφαίνοντος, ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ πάντων

<sup>48</sup> For the text of the passage, v. above.

εὐξάμενος διαφῆκε, παραγγείλας θεραπεύειν σφᾶς καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὥς εἰς τὴν αὐριον ἀναζυγῆς ἐσομένης. (3.44.10-13)

He came up after them and first reminded the assembled troops **of their former achievements**, among which he said they had attempted many hazardous tasks and dangers and not failed in one of them, having followed his judgment and plans. Next, **he wished that they would have courage**, considering that they have accomplished **the greatest part of their tasks**, since they had mastered **the crossing of the river** and were **eyewitnesses** of the goodwill and eagerness of their allies. He asked them, therefore, to be at ease about the particulars, since those are his concern, but to obey his commands and be good men and worthy of their former works. After the assembly applauded and demonstrated the men's great desire and eagerness, he praised them, prayed to the gods on behalf of them all, and dismissed them. He ordered them to make themselves ready and to prepare with haste, since they were making their departure the next day.

To open the speech in Polybius' *Histories*, Hannibal first calls to mind the troops' prior actions (τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων), which would include, of course, the conquest of Spain. The added specificity of the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, however, additionally strengthens the reference to Hannibal's speech at Saguntum, with its own Polybian parallels, as noted above.

Livy's version of the speech surpasses Polybius' by incorporating mentions of the crossings of both rivers and with the evocative note of the Rhone's greatness. As Hannibal continues in Polybius' version, he encourages his men and then describes that they have already accomplished most of their tasks and crossed the river. Livy incorporates the act of encouragement in his description of the opening of the speech (*adhortando*; 21.30.1). Polybius's *paraklesis* (εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει) becomes its Latin near equivalent with Livy's *adhortatio*. Livy also incorporates the idea that the army had already completed most of their journey, as *maiolem partem itineris* mirrors

Polybius' τὸ μέγιστον...τῶν ἔργων. Livy also caps Polybius' description of the crossing of a river (τῆς τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως) by noting both the crossing of the Ebro (*Hiberum traiecisse*) and the Rhone (*Rhodanum*), the latter qualified by the descriptive phrase: *tantum amnem*.

Livy makes a meaningful change to the next section of Polybius' speech, however. While the Polybian Hannibal next notes that the army are eyewitnesses (αὐτόπται) of the goodwill and support of their Gallic allies, the Livian general mentions the opposition that the Carthaginians have already faced from the tribes in the area: the *ferocissimas gentes* of the Pyrenees and the Gauls who hindered their crossing of the Rhone (*milibus Gallorum prohibentibus*). Since Magilus and the Boii had offered their assistance to Hannibal in private in Livy's text and made no speech in the assembly, the Carthaginian rank and file in the *AUC* were not, in fact, eyewitnesses of the support as they are in the Greek historian's account.<sup>49</sup> By noting instead the hostile presence of the Gauls in Hannibal's speech, Livy intensifies the challenges already faced by the Carthaginian army. The absence of a note of allied support also makes their forthcoming campaign seem more difficult. The Livian Hannibal gives the impression in his speech that his troops have tougher tasks both behind and ahead of them in the campaign, a change that effectively undermines the entire reason the Polybian Hannibal makes the speech. On the whole, Livy incorporates the entirety of Polybius' account of Hannibal's speech into just the opening of his version and in an act of intertextual one-upmanship,

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<sup>49</sup> These envoys do make an appearance later in Livy's version of the speech, however, on which, cf. the discussion of 21.30.6-11, below.



surpasses it in detail and content, while simultaneously undercutting the main purpose behind the speech in his predecessor.

After the end of Hannibal's speech, Polybius continues his narrative up to the army's arrival at the foot of the Alps and the beginning of their trek across the mountains (3.45-47). At this point, Polybius embarks on a well-known digression attacking the fantastical and unrealistic accounts of his predecessors (3.47.6-48.12).<sup>50</sup> After he describes the unlikely scenarios posited by prior historians—including overly steep paths, a lack of information on the part of Hannibal, and the appearance of divine intervention—Polybius presents a rational defense of his more realistic account that Hannibal not only knew where he was going but that he traversed well-used paths:

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἔτι δ' ἐρυμνότητος καὶ δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων ἔκδηλον ποιεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν. οὐχ ἰστορήσαντες γὰρ ὅτι συμβαίνει τοὺς Κελτοὺς τοὺς παρὰ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντας **οὐχ ἄπαξ οὐδὲ δις** πρὸ τῆς Ἀννίβου παρουσίας, οὐδὲ μὴν πάλαι προσφάτως δέ, μεγάλους στρατοπέδοις ὑπερβάντας τὰς Ἄλπεις παρατετάχθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίοις, συνηγωνίσθαι δὲ Κελτοῖς τοῖς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία κατοικοῦσι, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐδηλώσαμεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων φύλον κατ' αὐτὰς οἰκεῖν συμβαίνει τὰς Ἄλπεις, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες ἕκαστα τῶν εἰρημένων ἥρω τινά φασιν ἐπιφανέντα συνυποδείξαι τὰς ὁδοὺς αὐτοῖς. (3.48.5-7)

Likewise, as for what is said about the isolation, it makes the falseness of their accounts of the difficulty and ruggedness of the passages still more conspicuous. For they have not learned through their inquiry that it so happens that the Celts that live along the Rhone have **not once, but twice** before Hannibal's campaign, and not long ago but very recently, crossed over the Alps with great armies to fight against the Romans and come to the aid of the Celts that live along the Po valley, just as I described in an

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<sup>50</sup> It is unclear which of his predecessors specifically Polybius is attacking here. Possibilities include Phylarchus, Chaereas, Sosylus, and Silenus, among others: Walbank *Comm.* ad loc: I: 381-82. The fantastical elements of Silenus are well known in their inclusion in Coelius Antipater's monograph, on which, cf. Chapter 5, Part 1, below, and the fragment on Hannibal's dream: Coelius F32 *FRHist* = Cic. *de Div.* 1.48.

earlier section.<sup>51</sup> In addition to this, they do not know that a very large group of men happen to live between the Alps, but they are in the wrong about each of the things mentioned and say that some hero appears to show them the path.

Polybius' argument rests on the actual passability of the Alps, as demonstrated by the Transalpine Gauls who had already crossed the mountains on two occasions to fight against the Romans. The historian also mentions the Alpine tribes who live within the mountain range and from whom Hannibal and his troops will shortly face opposition (3.50-53).

Polybius' rational explanation of the viability of the Carthaginian army's plans to cross the Alps is found in Hannibal's speech in the *AUC*, where Livy continues the interplay with his Greek predecessor. The general picks up his expression of surprise that his troops are wary of the Alps with a rhetorical question before proceeding to a rational defense that mirrors Polybius' digression:

quid Alpes aliud esse credentes quam montium altitudines? fingerent altiores Pyrenaei iugis: nullas profecto terras caelum contingere **nec inexsuperabiles** humano generi esse. **Alpes** quidem **habitari, coli,** gignere atque alere animantes; **peruias** paucis esse, esse et exercitibus. eos **ipsos quos cernant legatos** non pinnis sublime elatos Alpes transgressos. ne maiores quidem eorum indigenas sed aduenas Italiae cultores has ipsas Alpes **ingentibus saepe agminibus cum liberis ac coniugibus migrantium** modo tuto transmisisse. militi quidem armato nihil secum praeter instrumenta belli portanti quid inuium aut inexsuperabile esse? Saguntum ut caperetur, quid per octo menses periculi, quid laboris exhaustum esse? Romam, caput orbis terrarum, petentibus quicquam adeo asperum atque arduum uideri quod inceptum moretur? cepisse quondam Gallos ea quae adiri posse Poenus desperet; proinde aut cederent animo atque uirtute genti per eos dies totiens ab se uictae aut itineris finem sperent campum interiacentem Tiberi ac moenibus Romanis. (21.30.6-11)

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<sup>51</sup> Polybius describes the campaign in the preceding book of his *Histories*: 2.21-2.

What else do they believe the Alps are except heights of mountains? They might suppose that the Alps are higher than the ridges of the Pyrenees: surely, no lands touch the sky and are **insurmountable** to the human race. Indeed, **the Alps are inhabited, cultivated**, give birth to and nourish living beings, **allow passage** to small forces and even to entire armies. The **very legates whom they saw before their eyes** did not pass over the Alps lifted from above on wings. He said that not even their ancestors were indigenous, but were the foreign inhabitants of Italy and had safely crossed these very Alps **often with huge armies on the move, along with their children and wives**. Indeed, what is impassable or unsurmountable for an armed soldier carrying nothing with him except his implements of war? What danger and what labor had been expended for eight months in order to take Saguntum? As they are attacking Rome, the capital of the world, does anything seem so difficult and arduous to delay their undertaking? The Gauls once took those places which a Carthaginian is giving up hope of attacking! Then they should either yield to a people conquered by them in spirit and courage so often in those days or they should hope that the end of their journey is the field lying between the Tiber and the walls of Rome.

Hannibal's speech here in the *AUC* incorporates several elements of Polybius' digressive attack on his historiographic predecessors: first, he notes that people inhabit the Alps (*Alpes...habitari, coli*). Second, he includes the various campaigns taken by the Gauls (*ingentibus saepe agminibus*), substituting *saepe* for Polybius' οὐχ ἄπαξ οὐδὲ δις. Additionally, Livy's Hannibal mentions that the Gallic tribes have crossed the Alps not just for military purposes, but also for permanent migration, taking along their wives and children (*cum liberis ac coniugibus migrantium*). Lastly, the presence of the Cisalpine envoys in sight of the army (*ipsos quos cernant legatos*) shows that the Alps can be crossed. The claim recalls part of Polybius' version of the speech, discussed above, that the troops were eyewitnesses (αὐτόπται) of the support of their allies. Livy removes the mention of the assistance the legates are offering and moves his note of their physical

presence from the context of Hannibal's *adhortatio* to the Polybian rationale about the passability of the Alps, strengthening the connections between his text and that of his Greek predecessor.

Just as he does in Hannibal's first speech in the decade, Livy incorporates the allusions to Polybius' digression into the close of Hannibal's oration. As Livy integrates these comments and moves them from the extradiegetic text in Polybius into his story, he thereby subsumes Polybius' voice into that of the internal narrator and actor Hannibal. This allows Livy to take authority over his Greek predecessor's text by changing, correcting, or capping Polybius' words. Additionally, the very passage that the Roman historian incorporates into Hannibal's speech at the Rhone was, for Polybius, an expression of polemic against his own predecessors. As Livy asserts his control over Polybius' text, he also stakes his own claim in the historiographic dispute. If his Greek counterpart towers over his own predecessors, Livy's incorporation of Polybian language allows him to surpass these earlier authors as well.

Despite Hannibal's reassurances, the reality that the Carthaginian army encounters proves much more difficult than their general leads them to expect.<sup>52</sup> After the column crosses to the Italian side of the Alps and Hannibal encourages his worn out troops (21.35), the advance scouts arrive at what they deem to be the end of the road (*ad*

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<sup>52</sup> cf. Levene 2010: 148-55. In discussing the intertextual relationship between Livy and Polybius on the crossing, Levene notes (v. esp. p. 152) that the imagery Livy draws of their frightful crossing (21.32.7) also proves worse than the expectations the troops had upon hearing the *fama* of the Alps. cf. Doblhofer 1983:142-44.

*finem viae*, 21.36.3). The impasse eventually causes a disruption in the progress of the column and prompts a response from the general:

miranti Hannibali quae res moraretur agmen nuntiatur rupem **inuia**m esse. digressus deinde **ipse** ad locum **uisendum**. haud dubia res uisa quin per **inuia** circa nec trita antea, quamuis longo ambitu, circumduceret agmen. ea uero uia **insuperabilis** fuit (21.36.3-5)

As Hannibal was wondering what was causing the march to be delayed, it was announced to him that the cliff was **impassable**. **He himself** then set off **to examine** the pass. It seemed that there was no doubt but that the column would be led around through **impassable** places never before trodden on, however long the detour. The path was truly **insurmountable**.

Livy's description of Hannibal's action here includes an act of autopsy (*ipse...visendum*), noted with a direct calque of the Greek term. Just as Livy conflates the narratorial identities of Polybius and Hannibal in the speeches noted above, here the general acts in a manner that mirrors the historiographic persona that the Greek historian constructs for himself. Although Livy incorporates a note of Polybian autopsy into the passage, the repetition of remarks on the impassability of the route (*inuiam...invia... insuperabilis*) echo Hannibal's speech given before the start of the crossing. In the rationale transferred from Polybius' text, Livy's Hannibal describes the Alps as *nec insuperabiles* and *pervias* (21.30.7). The speech thereby contains a negation and a direct antonym of the adjectives that now describe the passageways when viewed through direct autopsy. The depiction calls to question the rationale employed by Polybius and incorporated into Hannibal's speech by Livy. The Carthaginian army finds their passage just as impassable and impossible as they imagined.

When the Punic army reaches the insurmountable impasse, Livy instead notes that they have to cut a new, previously unpassed road into the mountain (21.37), thereby fulfilling the wildest expectations of Hannibal's troops that they were venturing where no army had travelled before.

inde ad rupem muniendam per quam unam uia esse poterat milites ducti, cum caedendum esset saxum, arboribus circa immanibus deiectis detruncatisque struem ingentem lignorum faciunt eamque, cum et uis uenti apta faciendo igni coorta esset, succendunt ardentiaque saxa infuso aceto putrefaciunt. ita torridam incendio rupem ferro pandunt molliuntque anfractibus modicis cliuos ut non iumenta solum sed elephantum etiam deduci possent. (21.37.2-3)

Then soldiers were led out to open up the rocky cliff, the one place through which there was able to be a path. Since the rock had to be cut, they made a huge pile of wood after they toppled over and cut up the large trees nearby and they set this pile on fire when the force of the wind had arisen that was suitable for making a fire. They weakened the burning rocks by pouring vinegar onto them.<sup>53</sup> In this fashion they opened up the rocky cliff, dried out by the fire, with iron implements and they made the sloping roads gentler with curving little paths so that not only the pack animals but even the elephants were able to be led across.

Polybius, conversely, makes no mention of the fires and vinegar, but does relate a several-day-long effort to widen a previously existing path for the elephants to come down (3.54-55).<sup>54</sup> Livy's description of the crossing caps that of his Greek predecessor in that his Carthaginians cut rock to open up an entirely new path, whereas Polybius' Punic

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<sup>53</sup> Vitruvius provides a nearly contemporaneous description of this practice in his *de Arch.*: *saxa silicea, quae neque ferrum neque ignis potest per se dissolvere, cum ab igni sunt percalefacta, aceto sparso dissiliunt et dissolvuntur* ("limestone rocks, which neither iron nor fire are able to dissolve through their own efforts, burst open and are dissolved with the application of vinegar after the rocks have been heated up by fire"; 8.3.19).

<sup>54</sup> ἅμα δὲ τῷ παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τοιοῦτον τόπον, ὃν οὔτε τοῖς θηρίοις οὔτε τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις δυνατόν ἦν παρελθεῖν διὰ τὴν στενότητα ("just as soon they arrived at such a place as was impossible to pass through for the elephants and for the pack animals, due to its narrowness; 3.54.7).

troops only expand a path for their animals. Livy's account makes them the first to traverse this specific path, drawing upon a trope of "firstness": *ego primus*. Becoming the first person in Rome to accomplish a particular feat granted cultural and political significance. The *primus* trope is well exhibited in Duilius' naval victory, the first for Rome, which is commemorated through a monumental inscription reported by Appian (App. *BCiv.* 5.130) and surviving on a column setup as a memorial of the victory.<sup>55</sup>

Duilius continued to have resonance in Livy's own day, as Augustus likely renewed his triumphal monument and added one of his own of similar design. Additionally, Duilius is included, with accompanying *elogium*, among the Augustan monument of the *summi viri*.<sup>56</sup> Despite the textual issues for the inscriptions and the *elogium*, the central feature of each of the narratives surrounding Duilius is his that he first accomplishes a naval victory and receives other unprecedented honors.<sup>57</sup> Livy draws upon the cultural capital of primacy when he has Hannibal's troops be the first to traverse newly opened pathways.

The situation brings to fruition the worst fears experienced by the Carthaginian army before they crossed the Alps, directly contradicting the rationale first voiced by Polybius and then assimilated into Hannibal's speech. The dread felt by the army prompts

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<sup>55</sup> On Duilius' original monument: Plin. *NH* 34.20, Sil. 6.663-69, and Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.12. Scholarly discussions: Sehlmeier 1999: 117-19, Kondratieff 2004: 7-10 and Roller 2013. The surviving inscription of the Duilius column (CIL I<sup>2</sup> 25 = CIL 6.1300) is of uncertain date, since Augustus (then Octavian) reinvigorated the tradition of Duilius after his own victory at Naulochos. On the inscription: Bleckmann 2002: 118-24.

<sup>56</sup> On Duilius as an *exemplum* followed and perpetuated by Augustus: Chaplin 2000: 184-87 and Roller 2009. On the Duilius monument and its place within the larger Augustan landscape: Roller 2013.

<sup>57</sup> The *Columna Duilia* Inscription features a repetition of *primus*: *[r]em navebos marid consol primos c[eset copiasque] / [c]lasesque navales primos ornavet pa[ravetque]* (CIL 6.1300, ll. 5-6). The *elogium* is reconstructed by Chioffi as follows: *pri[m]us d[e Poeneis n]a[ge]val[em trium]/[phum egit]*. (CIL 6.40952); cf. Kondratieff 2004: 11, n. 40. cf. Polyb. 1.22-23, Cic. *de Sen.* 44, Livy *Peri.* 17, Val. Max. 3.6.4, Tac. *Ann.* 2.49, Front. *Strat.* 2.3.24, in addition to those cited in the note above.

the Carthaginian general to call the assembly at which he gives the Polybian speech discussed above. Livy summarizes the Carthaginians' fears of the Alps before their crossing:

multitudo timebat quidem hostem nondum oblitterata memoria superioris belli; sed magis iter immensum Alpesque, rem fama **utique inexpertis** horrendam, metuebat. (21.29.7)

The rank and file was certainly afraid of the enemy, since the memory of the previous war had not yet been erased, but even more were they fearing the immeasurable journey and the Alps, a task made dreadful by rumor, **at least to the inexperienced**.

The phrase *utique inexpertis* makes three potential references to Livy's incorporation of Polybius. First, it effectively foregrounds Hannibal's forthcoming Polybian rationale that the very journey is not worth fearing as it had been successfully crossed multiple times by the local inhabitants and by waves of Gallic armies. The Gauls have the experience and are therefore unafraid. Second, the note also recalls Polybius' assertion of his own journey through the Alps, which serves as part of his defense of his reliability on Hannibal's crossing.<sup>58</sup> Third, the phrase also heightens the accomplishment made by these soldiers during their actual crossing, as they travel on paths that are *inexpertis* to all, even to the local inhabitants. The army's worst fears concerning the immense and horrendous task are fulfilled from the perspective of even the most knowledgeable Alpine

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<sup>58</sup> 3.48.12: ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀποφαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρ' αὐτῶν ἱστορηκέναι τῶν παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ τόπους κατωπτευκέναι καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων αὐτοῖ κεχρησθαι πορείᾳ γνώσεως ἕνεκα καὶ θέας. "But I give account of these matters securely because of the fact that I inquired about these matters from those that happened to be present at the time and because I examined the places myself and personally made the passage through the Alps in order to know and see it myself." On the passage and its importance in Polybius' assertion of autopsy and his historiographic authority, cf. Chapter 2, Parts 2 and 3, above.



tribes. Livy's Hannibal encounters the startling and—given his logical defense of the likelihood of crossing—unexpected impasse only to overcome it. Although the overall situation that Livy describes of the actual impassability of the Alps calls to question Polybius' rational defense of the Carthaginians' crossing, as noted above, the creation of a completely new road in the face of such travails demonstrates that Livy's account of the text surpasses that of his Greek predecessor. The intertextual one-upmanship also adds to Hannibal's *fama* as a notable general who can overcome the seemingly unsurmountable crossing, a situation that even the pragmatic rationalist Polybius deemed impossible.

Hannibal's next speech during his campaign into Italy—recorded by both Polybius and Livy—occurs in the middle of his crossing of the Alps, just before his men encounter the impassable routes that require them to cut new roads into the mountain paths. Hannibal takes advantage of a spectacular view of their eventual target area to encourage and inspire his troops to continue the pursuit of their goal. Polybius' account of the speech is dominated by his description of the physical appearance of the landscape:

ἐπειρᾶτο συναθροίσας παρακαλεῖν, μίαν ἔχων ἀφορμὴν εἰς τοῦτο **τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν**· οὕτως γὰρ **ὑποπεπτώκει** τοῖς προειρημένοις ὄρεσιν ὥστε συνθεωρουμένων ἀμφοῖν **ἀκροπόλεως** φαίνεσθαι διάθεσιν ἔχειν τὰς Ἄλπεις τῆς ὅλης Ἰταλίας. διόπερ **ἐνδεικνύμενος** αὐτοῖς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ καθόλου τῆς εὐνοίας **ὑπομιμνήσκων** τῆς τῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὰ Γαλατῶν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς τόπον **ὑποδεικνύων** ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. (3.54.2-3)

He tried to call together an assembly of the army, having a single cause for this meeting: **the clear view of Italy**. For, Italy **lies under** the aforementioned mountains in such a way that when both are viewed together the Alps have a general appearance to seem to be **a citadel** for all of Italy. He therefore **shows** to them all the plains around the Po and generally **reminds** them of the favorable disposition of the Gauls living

there. At the same time he also **points out** the situation of Rome itself and made the men take heart to some extent.

Polybius first notes as external narrator the purpose for Hannibal's exhortation: the striking and spectacular appearance of Italy (τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν). The claim to *enargeia* is further strengthened by the vividness of the narrator's description that follows, which notes the physical layout of the countryside to the mountains and then employs a result clause to equate the Alps to be the bastion (ἀκροπόλεως) of all of Italy. Hannibal's speech, related through a series of participial phrases (ἐνδεικνύμενος... ὑπομνήσκων... ὑποδεικνύων), begins only after the external narrator sets the stage with the vivid description of the mountains.

Livy too opens his account with a depiction of the physical appearance of the view but then quickly moves into Hannibal's speech:

praegressus signa Hannibal in promunturio quodam, unde **longe ac late prospectus** erat, consistere iussis militibus Italiam ostentat subiectosque Alpinis montibus Circumpadanos campos, **moenia**que eos tum transcendere non Italiae modo sed etiam urbis Romanae; cetera plana, procliuia fore; uno aut summum altero proelio **arcem et caput Italiae** in manu ac potestate habituros. (21.35.8-9)

Hannibal stepped out in front of the standards at a certain promontory, from which **the view was far and wide**, and ordered the soldiers to stop there. He points out to them Italy and the fields on the plains along the Po **lying below** the Alps. He says that they are now climbing **the walls** not just of Italy but even of the city of Rome. He says that the rest of the journey will be flat or downhill and that after one or two more battles they will take into their possession and under their power **the citadel and capital of Italy**.

Hannibal here encourages his troops to perform an act of autopsy on the lands into which they are about to campaign.<sup>59</sup> He stops them on the point at which they have the most open view (*longe ac late prospectus*) of Italy.<sup>60</sup> Several elements of the report bear striking parallels to Polybius' version of the fabula. First, Hannibal describes the plains of Italy as lying under (*subiectos*) the Alps, a direct translation of Polybius' ὑποπεπτόκει. Then he notes that the mountains they are in the process of crossing act as walls (*moenia*) for Italy and the city of Rome itself. The claim captures the sense of Polybius' description of the Alps as the acropolis of Italy, another defensive structure meant to guard a city. Livy here corrects the Polybian depiction in his incorporation of these comments into Hannibal's speech. The acropolis of a city generally lies at its interior, while its walls form its perimeter. As each historian describes the Alps, the sense is that these mountains represent the defensive boundary of Italy which the Carthaginians are in the midst of crossing. Livy's *moenia* is then a more fitting choice of vehicle for the simile describing the Alps than Polybius' ἀκρόπολις. To heighten the force of the correction further, Livy does incorporate a direct reference to the acropolis mentioned by his Greek predecessor. At the end of Hannibal's speech, he describes Rome as the citadel and capital of Italy (*arcem et caput Italiae*), using *arx*, a direct calque of the Greek ἀκρόπολις.

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<sup>59</sup> Pausch 2011: 151-52 also describes the focalization of this account from the perspective of the Carthaginian troops. cf. Feldherr 2009b: 317-18, fn. 9, who notes that the entire account of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps is so centrally focalized from the perspective of the Carthaginians that "a Roman reader may be in danger of forgetting who he is."

<sup>60</sup> Jaeger 2006: 402-3 and Levene 2010: 17 both describe how this view forecasts and is paralleled by Hannibal's final look at Italy upon his departure: 30.20.7-9.

Additionally, Hannibal's depiction of Rome as the *caput* of Italy recalls the claim he had just made in his speech at the Rhone that they are campaigning against the capital of the whole world (21.30.10 *caput orbis terrarum*). The reminiscence to his earlier oration further mobilizes the reference made back to Polybius' text and strengthens the sense of the validity of the correction the Roman historian has Hannibal make here, in that it repeats a metaphor already employed by the Carthaginian general. Just as Livy does in the other speeches in the opening book of the Third Decade examined above, here he incorporates comments originally made by the external narrator in Polybius into the voice of Hannibal. Livy uses an internal narrator to mediate his interaction with his Greek predecessor and to provide points of clarification and emendation to the claims originally posited by Polybius.

These three speeches of Hannibal that I have analyzed are his first of the Third Decade and serve a paradigmatic function for the general's strategic process and his interaction with his troops for the narrative that follows. Livy incorporates into each of these three orations language, comments, and rational arguments that originally appeared in Polybius' *Histories* from the voice and perspective of the external narrator. Consequently, Hannibal speaks not just in a Polybian fashion in the Third Decade of the *AUC*, but by using the actual words of Polybius. As Livy alludes to and incorporates these comments, he also corrects and caps the claims and comments found in his Greek predecessor, either through his own word choice or in the events of the narrative that follow. While the Carthaginian general's speeches record and give voice to the Polybian

historiographic tradition in Livy's text, they also offer emendations and instances of intertextual one-upmanship. In effect, then, Livy's Hannibal as internal narrator supplants Polybius and as he relates not only the content of these *Histories* but also the historiographic reasoning behind the process that created them.

Moreover, the conflation of the identities of Hannibal and Polybius into the voice of a single internal narrator in the Third Decade provides a potential explanation for Livy's lack of direct citation of Polybius' text within the decade. Only after the decisive Battle of Zama and its aftermath does Livy mention the Greek historian's name in his text: "Polybius, an author not at all to be rejected, recounts..." (*Polybius, haudquaquam spernendus auctor, tradit...*; 30.45.5).<sup>61</sup> The otherwise complete absence of direct citations of Polybius' *Histories* throughout the Third Decade, despite Livy's now established use of Polybius as a source text, both highlights and avoids concealing the nuance of the conflation of the narratological identities of Polybius and Hannibal. In effect, Hannibal in Livy's Third Decade functions like a Contean "*modello-esemplare*" in place of Polybius, much as Homer does for Vergil's *Aeneid*.<sup>62</sup> Direct citations to Polybius' text are unnecessary as the intertextual references made within Hannibal's speeches recall the text throughout the Third Decade. The allusive language of the

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<sup>61</sup> For more on the citation, cf. Chapter 4, Part 4, below, and Luce 1977: 141, n. 3; Levene 2010: 161-62; Moore 2010: 148.

<sup>62</sup> The "*modello-esemplare*" comes to stand as a model for a particular author based on an accretion of a number of imitations, rather than through direct reference. Conte 1981, 1985: 121-22, 1986: 31. cf. Conte-Barchiesi 1989: 93-96; and Hinds 1998: 41-44 (v. esp. n. 46). Conte notes that, for Vergil, Homer functions also as a "*modello-codice*," that is, as a representative of the entire genre of epic poetry. The consistent Polybian bent of Hannibal in the Third Decade (and the fact that Polybius does not stand at the beginning of the historiographic tradition) suggests that the Polybian *modello-esemplare* in Hannibal does not extend to be a representative of the entire genre of historiography. As I will argue in the remaining chapters, Livy has other internal narrators to stand in as other *modelli-esemplari*.

Carthaginian general's speeches maintains the intertextual connections between Livy's and Polybius' texts.

As Hannibal speaks with a Polybian voice throughout the decade, his speeches themselves serve as citations of Polybius' text and markers of the influence that his *Histories* played on the Third Decade of the *AUC*. Livy's speeches fully conflate the roles of the external and internal narrators that had already functioned with mirrored methodologies in Polybius' text, amplifying a previously existing phenomenon from the account of his Greek predecessor. However, the conflation also reveals Livy's ability to assert his authority over the Polybian narrative. As the Roman historian subsumes Polybius' extradiegetic comments into Hannibal's speeches, he takes control of the explanation of these events and speeches through his own extra-narrative comments. Livy is thereby able to question, emend, or cap the Polybian version of the war and offer in its place his own interpretation, without resorting to the explicit polemic that Polybius employs in the digression on the crossing of the Alps that we took as a starting point for this chapter.

### Chapter Three

#### Scipio as a Methodological Narrator for Polybius and Livy

As I argue in the previous chapter, Livy uses Hannibal as a mouthpiece for Polybian history in the Third Decade. It stands to reason, then, that other internal narrators are also able to speak from the point of view of a particular historian's language and methodology. The larger-than-life figure that looms over the Third Decade on the Roman side and, as has been argued, is in many ways a foil for and parallel with Hannibal, is the young Publius Cornelius Scipio.<sup>1</sup> As the young Scipio takes command of his father's and uncle's former troops in Spain, he evokes the memory of the past to change the fortunes of the Roman army in the region. In a rousing speech, he employs several examples from the recent past to rouse his troops to action. As Chaplin has argued, the young general uses some typical elements of exemplarity in his speech to demonstrate Roman *virtus* and to defend his explanation for the forthcoming events of the war.<sup>2</sup> In the central portion of his speech, Scipio uses several wars, from both the recent and far past to encourage and exhort his men:

vetera omitto, Porsennam Gallos Samnites: a Punicis bellis incipiam.  
quot classes, quot duces, quot exercitus priore bello amissi sunt? iam quid  
hoc bello memorem? omnibus aut ipse adfui cladibus aut quibus afui,  
maxime unus omnium eas sensi. Trebia Trasumennus Cannae quid aliud  
sunt quam monumenta occisorum exercituum consulumque Romanorum?  
adde defectionem Italiae, Siciliae maioris partis, Sardiniae; adde ultimum  
terrorem ac pauorem, castra Punica inter Anienem ac moenia Romana  
posita et uisum prope in portis uictorem Hannibalem. in hac ruina rerum

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<sup>1</sup> Rossi 2004 on the parallel but opposite trajectories of Hannibal and Scipio in the Third Decade. Levene 2010: ch. 1, esp. pp. 14-19, on Livy's narrative organization that suggests the parallel action between Hannibal in Book 21 and Scipio in Book 30 and, more largely, H. in the first half of the decade and S. in the second.

<sup>2</sup> Chaplin 2000: 64-65.

stetit una integra atque immobilis uirtus populi Romani; haec omnia strata humi erexit ac sustulit. uos omnium primi, milites, post Cannensem cladem uadenti Hasdrubali ad Alpes Italiamque, qui si se cum fratre coniunxisset nullum iam nomen esset populi Romani, ductu auspicioque patris mei obstitistis; et hae secundae res illas aduersas sustinuerunt. (26.41.10-13)

I pass over things of the far past: Porsenna, the Gauls, the Samnites. I will begin from the Punic Wars. How many fleets, how many leaders, how many armies were lost in the previous war? What, then, should I recall in this war? I myself was either present for all the disasters or, for those from which I was absent, I alone felt their effects most sharply. What else are Trebia, Trasimene, or Cannae than the monuments of slaughtered armies and Roman consuls? Add to that the defection of Italy, the greater part of Sicily, and Sardinia; add, too, the greatest fear and dread, a Punic camp positioned between the Anio and the walls of Rome and a conquering Hannibal seen almost at our gates. Only the excellence of the Roman people stood uninjured and immovable during this eventful disaster. This virtue lifted up and elevated all that had collapsed to the ground. You, soldiers, first of all, under the leadership and command of my father, opposed Hasdrubal as he advanced toward the Alps and Italy after the disaster at Cannae and, had he joined up with his brother, the name of the Roman people would no longer exist. These successes deferred those defeats.

While the full speech is much longer and contains several other elements, the section at hand typifies the speech's exemplary nature most explicitly. Scipio claims to avoid the use of old *exempla*, but then mentions briefly, in a clear instance of *praeteritio*, three exemplary stories recorded earlier in Livy's *AUC* and that various internal narrators recall as *exempla* in their speeches.<sup>3</sup> Chaplin notes that Scipio's speech is the last time a Roman

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<sup>3</sup> In addition to the speech discussed here, Porsenna is invoked as an *exemplum* at 6.40.17, 9.11.6, 10.16.7; the Gauls: 6.7.4, 6.28.9, 21.30.11, 21.43.13, 21.52.7, 22.59.8, 38.43.9; and the Samnites (specifically): 8.4.9, though this is likely a reference to the Roman disaster at Caudium: 9.36.1, 9.38.4 and 15, 22.14.12, 23.41.14, 23.42.7, 25.6.10, and 35.11.3; Chaplin 2000: 32-49 discusses the use of Caudium as *exemplum* in great detail as a major case study in her examination of Livy's exemplary techniques. For these lists (and other exemplary figures and events), Chaplin 2000: 203-14.



attempts to use Cannae as an *exemplum*.<sup>4</sup> His mention of the ability of the event to demonstrate the *virtus* of the Roman people reflects the proper interpretation of the defeat. The addition of the three common *exempla* from the distant past to the more recent *exempla* from the initial stages of the Hannibalic war puts a Livian interpretation of the later events at the forefront of the external audience's mind. Scipio, in effect, speaks with a voice that models Livy's approach as historian and external narrator, in much the same way that Hannibal recalls Polybius' methods and techniques in the Third Decade. This chapter elaborates on the exemplary nature of Scipio's speeches throughout the last half of the Third Decade and explores how the Livian voice of Scipio adds further interpretive and historiographic significance to the narrative of Scipio's campaigns in Spain and the debate leading up to his invasion of Africa. As with Hannibal in the previous chapter, however, I will first return to Polybius' *Histories* to examine the precedent for Scipio's behavior and speeches before returning directly to Livy's account.

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<sup>4</sup> Chaplin 2000: 65.

## Part 1: The Polybian Scipio in Spain

The Polybian version of Scipio's speech quoted above is notably shorter and focuses on the current situation of the Roman army in Spain:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε συνηθροισμένων τῶν δυνάμεων παρεκάλει μὴ καταπεπλῆχθαι τὴν προγεγενημένην περιπέτειαν· οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἡττήσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων οὐδέποτε, τῇ δὲ **προδοσίᾳ** τῇ Κελτιβήρων καὶ τῇ **προπετείᾳ**, διακλεισθέντων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων. ὧν ἑκάτερα νῦν ἔφη περὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπάρχειν· χωρὶς γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολὺ διεσπασμένους στρατοπεδεύειν, τοῖς τε συμμάχοις ὑβριστικῶς χρωμένους ἅπαντας ἀπηλλοτριωκέναι καὶ πολεμίους αὐτοῖς παρεσκευακέναι. διὸ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἤδη διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς, τοὺς δὲ λοιπούς, ὥς ἂν τάχιστα θαρρήσωσι καὶ **διαβάντας ἰδῶσι τὸν ποταμόν**, ἀσμένως ἥξειν, οὐχ οὕτως εὐνοοῦντας σφίσι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀμύνεσθαι σπουδάζοντας τὴν Καρχηδονίων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀσέλγειαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνας ἄθρους διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐ θελήσειν, κατὰ μέρος δὲ κινδυνεύοντας εὐχειρώτους ὑπάρχειν. διὸ **βλέποντας** εἰς ταῦτα παρεκάλει περαιοῦσθαι τὸν ποταμόν εὐθαρσῶς· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξῆς ἀνεδέχετο μελήσειν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγεμόσι. (10.6.1-6)

Nevertheless, at that time, after the soldiers were gathered together, he exhorts them not to be astounded at their previous reversal. He said the Romans were never beaten in valor by the Carthaginians, but by the **treachery** and **fickleness** of the Celtiberians, since the generals were cut off from each other through their trust in the alliance with the aforementioned people. Each of these things now happens for the enemy, for they make their camps far apart from each other, they used their allies in a hubristic fashion, alienated them, and made enemies for themselves. On account of this, some have sent messages to the Romans already and the rest, as soon as they take heart and **see the Romans crossing the river**, they will gladly come, not as much being well disposed to the Romans but rather because they are eager to take vengeance because of the insolence of the Carthaginians toward them. But the greatest reason is that their leaders of the opposing groups are at odds with each other and will not be willing to fight together against the Romans, and they are easy to overcome if they attack group by group. He therefore bids his troops **to examine** these things and to cross the river boldly. Afterwards, he promises that the rest will be a matter of concern to him and the other generals.

Scipio in the Polybian version of the speech focuses on the matters at hand in Spain. There is no mention of the deeds, recent or long past, of the troops in Spain corresponding to what appears in Livy's version. Scipio here first explains the recent defeats suffered by the Roman armies in Spain as the result of others' treachery (προδοσία) and fickleness (προπετεία). He asserts that the fault did not lie within these soldiers who now fall under his command, but in the unexpected betrayal of their allies. He turns the tables further by noting how the Celtiberians now find themselves in the same position that the Romans were under their previous commanders. Each of these elements appears in Livy's version of the speech, though in a slightly different order.<sup>5</sup> Near the end of the speech in Polybius, Scipio encourages his troops to examine the situation for themselves (βλέποντας) to demonstrate these facts to them before they cross the river. The note of autopsy in the Polybian speech is replaced in the *AUC* with an emotional appeal that focuses on Scipio's appearance as a reoccurrence of his father's and uncle's presence.<sup>6</sup> This change will be discussed further below.

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<sup>5</sup> 26.41.20-22: *quod mens sua sponte diuinat, idem subicit ratio haud fallax. uexati ab iis socii nostram fidem per legatos implorant. tres duces discordantes prope ut defecerint alii ab aliis, trifariam exercitum in diuersissimas regiones distraxere. eadem in illos ingruit fortuna quae nuper nos adflixit; nam et deseruntur ab sociis, ut prius ab Celtiberis nos, et diduxere exercitus quae patri patruoque meo causa exitii fuit; nec discordia intestina coire eos in unum sinet neque singuli nobis resistere poterunt.* "What my mind foretells of its own accord, likewise a rational and non-deceptive examination also supports. Troubled by the Carthaginians, their allies beg for an agreement with us via their ambassadors, and their three generals, quarreling to the extent that each is just about to abandon the others, have led their armies in three different directions into completely different areas. The same misfortune that recently troubled us now falls onto the Carthaginians, for they are now also being deserted by their allies, just as we were by the Celtiberians before. And they have divided their armies, which was the cause of ruin for my father and uncle. Their infighting does not allow them to come together as one and they are unable to resist us each on their own."

<sup>6</sup> 26.41.22-25: *uos modo, milites, fauete nomini Scipionum, suboli imperatorum uestrorum uelut accisis recrescenti stirpibus. agite, ueteres milites, nouum exercitum nouumque ducem traducite Hiberum, traducite in terras cum multis fortibus factis saepe a uobis peragratas. breui faciam ut, quemadmodum nunc noscitatis in me patris patruique similitudinem oris uoltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei*

Additionally, the Polybian Scipio suggests that the actions of his troops will encourage particular reactions from their Celtiberian opponents. Once the Romans cross the Ebro, the Celtiberians will respond to the sight of their crossing (διαβάντας ἴδωσι τὸν ποταμόν) by forsaking their ties with Carthage and coming to the side of the Romans. Scipio's suggestion that his troops' actions will provoke a response mirrors the way that Hannibal engineers others' behavior by creating spectacles or directing their vision, as I argued in the previous chapter. In Livy's version of the speech there is no indication that the Celtiberians will see and respond to the presence of the Roman troops. Upon quick inspection, therefore, Scipio in the *Histories* appears to use the visually charged language that Hannibal employs in his campaign in Italy, while Scipio in the *AUC* does not. The Polybian version of the speech characterizes Scipio in a manner parallel to his treatment of Hannibal in his Italian campaign. Both Hannibal and Scipio rely on visually-evocative language and the creation or manipulation of spectacles to provoke expected responses from various internal audiences. Polybius continues his characterization of Scipio as a character driven by Polybian methodology in the ensuing campaign as Scipio besieges and captures New Carthage and turns the tide in Spain against the Carthaginians.

Scipio's speech at the start of his Spanish campaign also serves as a conclusion to Polybius' introduction to the general and his character. As Polybius resumes his narrative

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*uirtutisque effigiem uobis reddam ut reuixisse aut renatum sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat.*  
“You, then, soldiers, grant favor to the name of the Scipiones, the progeny of your commanders, as though I am growing from the stalk just cut. Come on, veteran soldiers, lead this new army and your new commander across the Ebro. Lead us into lands that have often been traversed by you with many brave deeds. Just as you now recognize in me a likeness of the face, appearance, and bodily features of my father and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I provide to you a copy of their character, loyalty, and courage in order that you each of you would say that Scipio the general lives again or has been born a second time.”

of the campaign after his report of the speech, he concludes his account with the following summary:

ὁ δὴ καὶ πρῶτον ἂν τις λάβοι καὶ μέγιστον σημεῖον **τῆς** ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἄρτι **ῥηθείσης διαλήψεως**. ἔτος γὰρ ἑβδομον ἔχων πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ πράξεις αὐτὸν ἔδωκε τελέως παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηλπισμένας διὰ <τὸ> μέγεθος τῶν προγεγονότων ἐλαττωμάτων, δεύτερον δοὺς αὐτὸν τὰ μὲν κοινὰ καὶ **προφαινόμενα πᾶσι παρέλειπε**, τὰ δὲ μήτε παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις <μήτε παρὰ τοῖς φιλοῖς προσδοκηθέντα><sup>7</sup>, ταῦτ' ἐπενόει καὶ προετίθετο πράττειν. ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν χωρὶς **ἐκλογισμῶν** τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων. (10.6.9-12)

This, indeed, anyone would accept as the first and greatest indication **of the opinion I just expressed above**. For in the first place, though he was twenty-seven, he applied himself to tasks having been thought to be dangerous by most people because of the extent of the previous defeats; second, as he devoted himself to these things, **he left behind the things** common and **obvious to everyone**, and instead contrived and set out to do the things not expected by his enemies nor his friends. None of these things were done without **his calculation** of the slightest details.

The assertion that Polybius refers back to here (τῆς...ῥηθείσης διαλήψεως) is his claim about Scipio at the opening of his character sketch that Scipio uses calculation and foresight in all his endeavors.<sup>8</sup> Polybius sets the character of Scipio apart from the majority of Polybius' subjects as he avoids what is anticipated (προφαινόμενα πᾶσι παρέλειπε) and instead follows a precise and exacting method of calculation (ἐκλογισμῶν). The word ἐκλογισμός appears only four times in the extant sections of the *Histories* and three of these instances come from Polybius' narrative about Scipio's

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<sup>7</sup> I follow Reiske's supplement for this lacuna.

<sup>8</sup> 10.2.13: ὅτι δ' ἕκαστα μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας ἔπραττε, καὶ διότι πάντα κατὰ λόγον ἐξέβαινε τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ, δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων. "That he accomplished everything with logical calculation and foresight and the fact that all the ends of his actions fell out for him exactly as he reasoned will be clear through the things I am about to relate."

actions at the opening of his Spanish campaign.<sup>9</sup> The term's only other appearance in Polybius' text comes at a similarly watershed and, ultimately, decisive moment for the Romans: when they resolve during the First Punic War to abandon their land-based strategy and adopt naval warfare to have a chance to defeat the Carthaginians.<sup>10</sup> Through his use of the term ἐκλογισμός to describe Scipio's overall approach to action, Polybius therefore subtly sets up the general's campaign in Spain as the moment that turns the tide of the Hannibalic War in favor of Rome in the way that the embracing of naval techniques did in the First Punic War.<sup>11</sup>

In order to examine how Polybius sets up the decidedly unique and ultimately paradigm-altering behavior of Scipio, let us turn back to the character sketch and a summary of the Scipio's accomplishments that Polybius makes reference to in the passage just quoted (10.6.9-12) and which opens his account of Scipio's exploits in Spain. The digression itself and Polybius' remarks that open it suggest this moment is

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<sup>9</sup> 1.59.2, 10.6.12, 10.9.2, and 10.9.3. There are four instances of the denominative verb ἐκλογίζω, as well: 3.33.8, 3.99.3, 4.12.2, and fr. 49.

<sup>10</sup> 1.59.1-3: ὁμοίως δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι ψυχομαχοῦντες, καίπερ ἔτη σχεδὸν ἥδη πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν πραγμάτων ὀλοσχερῶς ἀφεστηκότες διὰ τε τὰς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεων κρινεῖν τὸν πόλεμον, τότε συνορῶντες οὐ προχωροῦν αὐτοῖς τοῦργον κατὰ τοὺς ἐκλογισμοὺς καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν τόλμαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, ἔκριναν τὸ τρίτον ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐλπίδων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης, εἰ καιρίως ἄψαιτο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, μόνως ἂν οὕτως πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. ὃ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. "Similarly, the Romans, fighting to the last gasp, even though they had for nearly five years withdrawn from naval operations because of their misfortunes and because they believed that they would decide the war with their infantry forces, but then seeing that they were not having the success that matched their expectations and that this was mostly due to the boldness of the Carthaginian general, they decided for the third time to make an attempt at the hopes for naval forces. They were thinking that only through this plan, if they could achieve a timely attack, would they achieve an advantageous end to the war, an end they even achieved."

<sup>11</sup> Polybius seems to prefer the uncompounded λογισμός or another compound, διαλογισμός or συλλογισμός, e.g., for Hannibal's rational calculations, cf., e.g., 3.17.8, 3.17.11, 3.63.11, 3.81.12, 3.89.4, 3.91.1, 3.92.2. Hannibal does, however, verbally perform the action of ἐκλογισμός at one point in the *Histories* (ἐκλογιζόμενος 3.33.8), when he plans to ensure the loyalty of the Spanish and African troops by exchanging their defensive positions before his campaign to Italy.

Scipio's grand entrance to the stage in the *Histories* and that he did not make much of an appearance, if any, in the earlier, now lost sections.<sup>12</sup> Beyond his introductory remarks, Polybius also includes within the character sketch the two best known episodes of Scipio's life before his Iberian campaign: his heroic action at the Ticinus River to save his father's life (10.3.3-7) and his election to the aedileship under extraordinary means (10.4.1-5.8). These two stories come into the digression as analepses, not in their expected chronological positions in the larger narrative. In particular, Polybius actively omits the case of the younger Scipio's heroism at the Ticinus in his account of the battle, downplaying the consul's wound altogether until after the encounter.<sup>13</sup> The character sketch and the analepses that describe Scipio's early life provide a similar introduction to Polybius' narrative of the events in Spain that the digression on Hannibal's oath and

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<sup>12</sup> Polybius opens the digression as follows: "Ὅτι μέλλοντες ἱστορεῖν τὰ πραχθέντα Ποπλίου κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, συλλήβδην δὲ πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιτελεσθείσας αὐτῷ πράξεις, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθα τὸ προεπιστῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τἀνδρός, "Since I am about to relate the deeds of Publius in Spain and, in short, all the accomplishments he completed throughout his life, I find it necessary to set out to my audience the character and nature of that man" (10.2.1). The processes of selection that produced the fragments of the *Histories* after that survive after Book Six, which focus on leadership figures and Polybius' Scipionic ties, also suggests that it is unlikely that any earlier episodes concerning Publius Scipio that were in the original text and are now lost. On the manuscript tradition of Polybius and the collection and ordering of the fragments after Book 6, Moore 1965 and the introductions to Vols. ii and iii of Walbank's commentary (1967 and 1979).

<sup>13</sup> During his main narrative of the Battle at the Ticinus River, Polybius makes no mention of Scipio's possible actions, instead merely noting that some of the cavalry closed around the Publius Scipio near the end of the battle (τινὲς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα συστραφέντες, 3.65.11), without clarifying the danger the Consul faced or any wound he received. Polybius also twice mentions in his narrative of the aftermath of the battle a wound suffered by Publius Scipio (αὐτὸν ἐθεράπευε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τραυματίας, 3.66.9; αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος, 3.70.5). Livy highlights the possibility that Scipio saved his father's life at the Ticinus by including it in his main narrative of the battle (*auxitque pauorem consulis uolnus periculumque intercurso tum primum pubescentis filii propulsatum*, 21.46.7) and by noting Coelius' version that Publius Scipio was instead saved by a Ligurian slave, which Livy claims to be less likely (*seruati consulis decus Coelius ad seruum natione Ligurem delegat; malim equidem de filio uerum esse, quod et plures tradidere auctores et fama obtinuit*, 21.46.10). On the possible significance of the foreshadowing of Scipio's eventual defeat of Hannibal at this point in the narrative of Livy's twenty-first book, Levene 2010: 14-19, esp., and Rossi 2004.

childhood did for his account of the invasion of Italy in Book Three.<sup>14</sup> For both Hannibal and Scipio, then, Polybius inserts into his narrative of the openings of their major campaigns analepses to their youth that establish the fundamental components of their characters and provide his readers with a frame of reference with which to judge their subsequent actions.

After some preliminary remarks about the general qualities of Scipio's character, Polybius relates Scipio's bold action that saved his father's life at the Ticinus River as the first major event that he includes in the digression. He sets the story up to add to the purported agreement of Scipio's beneficence and generosity (εὐεργετικός καὶ μεγαλόψυχος; 10.3.1) that he is "keen in wit, discreet, and fixed in thought on his intended purpose" (ἀγχίνους καὶ νήπτης καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὸ προτεθὲν ἐντεταμένος; 10.3.1). The framing comment suggests that the audience interpret the Ticinus story through a lens focusing on Scipio's cunning and decision-making rather than on his courageous action. Polybius also frames the tale through the account of Gaius Laelius, who was the general's close friend from childhood and accompanied him to Spain. Since Polybius notes the personal connection between the two Romans, he provides Laelius' narrative with the quality of eyewitness-authority that he so often advocates.<sup>15</sup> Polybius

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<sup>14</sup> On which, cf. Chapter 1, Part 1, above.

<sup>15</sup> Polybius describes their personal relationship as follows: ὧν εἷς ἦν Γάιος Λαίλιος, ἀπὸ νέου μετεσχηκῶς αὐτῷ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ λόγου μέχρι τελευτῆς, ὁ ταύτην περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν ἡμῖν ἐνεργασάμενος διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν εἰκότα λέγειν καὶ σύμφωνα τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνου πεπραγμένοις (10.3.2), "One of these was Gaius Laelius, who partook in [Scipio's] every deed and word from youth up to his death, and he made the same impression about Scipio on me, due to the fact that his account seems probable and fitting with deeds done by Scipio." That Polybius notes that Laelius produces the same impression on him that Scipio did on Laelius only strengthens the purported air of authority. On Gaius Laelius, *RE* Laelius 400-404.



notes Laelius' direct knowledge of these events and makes himself the recipient of that information thereby following his preferred method of consulting direct eyewitnesses when autopsy is impossible.<sup>16</sup> As a result of this personal connection, Polybius describes Laelius' account as probable (εἰκότα) and fitting with Scipio's other deeds (σύμφωνα τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνου πεπραγμένοις; 10.3.2), even though he made no mention of the tale in his full narrative of the Battle at the Ticinus River (3.65.1-11).

After his claim concerning Laelius' reliability, Polybius includes his account of Scipio's action at the Ticinus River:

ἔφη γὰρ πρώτην γεγονέναι Ποπλίου πράξιν ἐπίσημον, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἵππομαχίαν συνεστήσατο πρὸς Ἀννίβαν περὶ τὸν Πάδον καλούμενον ποταμόν. τότε γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἑπτακαιδέκατον ἔτος ἔχων καὶ πρῶτον εἰς ὕπαιθρον ἐξεληλυθώς, συστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς διαφερόντων ἱππέων οὐλαμὸν ἀσφαλείας χάριν, **συνθεασάμενος** ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ τὸν πατέρα περιειλημμένον ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων μετὰ θυεῖν ἢ τριῶν ἱππέων καὶ τετρωμένον ἐπισφαλῶς, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐπεβάλετο **παρακαλεῖν** τοὺς μεθ' αὐτοῦ βοηθῆσαι τῷ πατρί, τῶν δ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν κατορρωδούντων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν περιεστώτων πολεμίων, αὐτὸς εἰσελάσαι παραβόλως δοκεῖ καὶ τολμηρῶς εἰς τοὺς περικεχυμένους. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων **ἀναγκασθέντων** ἐμβαλεῖν οἱ μὲν πολέμιοι καταπλαγέντες διέστησαν (10.3.3-6)

For [Laelius] says that Publius' first notable deed was when his father engaged in the cavalry battle with Hannibal around the Po River. At that time, so it seems, he was seventeen years old and made his first trip into the field, his father put him in charge of a unit of excellent cavalry for the sake of his safety. But **he caught sight** of his father in danger, surrounded by the enemy along with two or three cavalry and gravely wounded. At first, he tried **to call** his men to go help his father, but since they were afraid for some time because of the number of enemies surrounding him, so he decided to dive in himself against the massed enemies recklessly and daringly. After this, the rest **were forced** to rush in and the enemy, being struck with fear, scattered.

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<sup>16</sup> On this method, 3.48.12 and Chapter 2, Parts 1 and 2, above.

Polybius first notes Scipio's age and inexperience, a status that prompted his father to surround him with a group of experienced cavalry for his son's protection. The account then immediately picks up in the middle of the battle with the young Roman catching sight (συνθεασάμενος) of his father in peril in the midst of the enemy. As Scipio recognizes the need for action, he attempts first to exhort (παρακαλεῖν) the cavalry before ultimately rushing into the fray himself. His action forces (ἀναγκασθέντων) his troops to respond in kind.

Since Polybius sets up the account to demonstrate Scipio's cunning, the bold move reflects the young man's ability to decide upon the proper course of action for a given situation, not just his reckless but effective courage. When he is unable by his verbal harangue to compel his men to act, Scipio forces them to respond to his actions instead, exhibiting the power of deeds over words. He accomplished the feat by creating a situation that allows his troops to see him in danger. Scipio puts into military action a method Polybius advocates for his own historiographic approach, that an audience learns effectively by viewing the misfortunes of others.<sup>17</sup> Scipio's objective is to save his father from the peril he currently faces, a feat he cannot accomplish alone. Had Scipio wanted to demonstrate his bravery in combat or if he thought his own presence in the battle alone would rescue his father, he would have immediately taken action. He instead first attempts, and fails, to convince the cavalrymen to attack the enemy. The younger Scipio overcomes the hesitation of the troops tasked with his protection by utilizing a Polybian

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<sup>17</sup> For Polybius' remarks on his didactic process, 1.35.7-8 and 3.63.1. These passages are discussed in Chapter 2, Part 1, above.

didactic technique that forces these men to pursue the correct course of action after seeing him in danger. Polybius' account of Scipio's feats at the Ticinus River does not emphasize his bravery but instead his ability to use *opsis* to his advantage. He examines the situation at hand and solves the problem by guiding the sight of his men to force their action in a way that mirrors the historiographic process of Polybius.

The next episode Polybius includes in the character sketch of Scipio is his successful election to the aedileship. Polybius records this story as a representation of Scipio's ability to accomplish his deeds through calculation and foresight (τῶν δι' ἀγγίνοιαν ἐκ λογισμοῦ <καὶ> προνοίας ἐπιτελουμένων; 10.5.8), as he makes clear in his summarizing remarks that conclude the character sketch (10.5.8-10). Polybius reflects Scipio's logical approach from the beginning of the account by noting the step-by-step analysis that led to his feat:

συνεγγιζούσης δὲ τῆς καταστάσεως, λογιζόμενος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πλήθους φορᾶς οὐκ εὐμαρῶς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐφιζόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς, τὴν δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν τοῦ δήμου **θεωρῶν** μεγάλην ὑπάρχουσαν, καὶ μόνως οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων κάκεῖνον καθίξεσθαι τῆς προθέσεως, εἰ συμφρονήσαντες ἅμα ποιήσαιντο τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τινα τοιαύτην ἔννοιαν. **θεωρῶν** γὰρ τὴν μητέρα περιπορευομένην τοὺς νεῶς καὶ θύουσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ τᾶδελφοῦ...ἔφη πρὸς αὐτὴν ὄνειρον **τεθεωρηκέναι** δις ἤδη τὸν αὐτόν. (10.4.3-5)

With the election drawing near, as Scipio determined from the favor of the people that his brother would not easily attain office but **saw** that he possesses a great deal of the goodwill of the people for his own part, and as he came to the decision that his brother would only achieve his aim if they made the attempt together in the spirit of cooperation, he came to a plan along these lines: He **saw** his mother going around to the temples and making sacrifices to the gods on behalf of his brother...he told her that **he had** already twice **seen** the same dream.

Scipio here reasons both the need for action and the plan he will follow based on his visual inspection of the events, like he did above, when he saves his father. Polybius twice mentions the action of sight with the participle θεωρῶν and quotes Scipio as describing the appearance of his supposed dream with a perfect infinitive (τεθεωρηκέναι) of the same verb. As I argued in the previous chapter, Polybius constructs and conveys his own authority through autopsy and by relating the results of that visual inspection to his audience. Here, Polybius' depiction of Scipio models a parallel process: he first visually examines the situation and then describes what he has seen to his mother, though here his vision is the dream he claims to have had.<sup>18</sup>

Polybius' narrative of the ensuing election also demonstrates Scipio's attention to the visual appearance presented to others. Much as Hannibal creates a spectacle out of the duel of the Gallic captives in before the Battle at the Ticinus River, Scipio here fashions his appearance before the public to ensure that the sight provokes the electorate to vote for him and his brother.<sup>19</sup> After noting Pomponia's response to Scipio's report of his dreams, Polybius describes Scipio's surprising entrance to the candidacy for the aedileship as follows:

ἡξίου **τήβενναν** αὐτῷ **λαμπρὰν** εὐθέως ἐτοιμάσαι· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς μεταπορευομένοις. καὶ τῇ μὲν οὐδ' ἐν νῶ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἦν, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν πρῶτον **λαμπρὰν ἐσθῆτα** κοιμωμένης ἔτι τῆς μητρὸς παρῆν εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους καὶ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον καὶ διὰ τὴν προὔπαρχουσιν **εὐνοίαν** ἐκπληκτικῶς αὐτὸν ἀποδεξαμένου, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα προελθόντος εἰς τὸν ἀποδεδειγμένον τόπον καὶ στάντος παρὰ τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὐ μόνον τῷ Ποπλίῳ περιέθεσαν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

<sup>18</sup> While the likely feigned dream suggests a sense of falseness that does not seem to correspond with Polybius' larger claims toward truth-telling, it also mirrors the deceptive manipulated appearances that the historian praises Hannibal for being able to create, cf. 3.78.

<sup>19</sup> On the spectacle before Ticinus, cf. Chapter 2, Part 3, above.

τὰδελφῷ δι' ἐκεῖνον, καὶ παρῆσαν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἀμφοτέροι γεγονότες ἀγορανόμοι. (10.4.8-10.5.3)

He was asking her to prepare a **white toga** for him immediately: for this is the custom for those who are standing for political offices. What she said earlier was no longer in her mind and, as soon as he received the **white toga** and while his mother was still sleeping, he arrived at the forum. The people received him enthusiastically, due to its unexpected nature and because of their previous **goodwill** toward him, and when he came to the appointed place later and stood next to his brother, not only did the public bestow the office upon Publius, but even on his brother for his sake, and then both appeared at their house having been elected aediles.

In his narrative, Polybius emphasizes the visual qualities of the event. He twice describes the white hue of the toga (τήβενναν...λαμπρὰν, λαμπρὰν ἐσθῆτα). Polybius retains the color descriptor between the two repetitions while varying the noun, which suggests that he is not using the phrase in its technical sense of the *toga candida*, but rather in highlighting the visually striking appearance of the whitened toga. As Scipio arrives in the forum, the crowd reacts positively, in part because of the goodwill (εὐνοίαν) they had shown him in the past. As noted above, Scipio bases his decision to press for the office after recognizing the goodwill (εὐνοίαν) the people had for him. In repeating the phrase again in his narrative of the election, Polybius signals that Scipio's estimation of the people's favor was correct. Further, their roles are intertwined as the reasoning that motivates Scipio as a character to pursue the aedileship, the people's εὐνοία, corresponds to the rationale that Polybius as external narrator credits for the people's response.

Polybius then concludes his digression on Scipio's character by explaining the purpose behind his excursus:

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τῶν ἀκουόντων, ἵνα μὴ  
συγκαταφερόμενοι ψευδῶς τῇ καθωμιλημένῃ δόξῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ  
παραπέμπωσι τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ κάλλιστα τάνδρός, λέγω δὲ τὴν  
ἐπιδεξιότητα καὶ φιλοπονίαν. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦτο συμφανὲς ἐπ’  
αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων. (10.5.9-10)

These things were therefore recounted by me for the sake of my  
audience, in order that they do not dismiss the most notable and finest  
qualities of the man being falsely brought down by the commonly  
accepted opinion. I am talking about his cleverness and his  
industriousness. This will be even clearer in his deeds.

Polybius describes how the forthcoming narrative of Scipio’s subsequent actions should  
be read: in the context of how clever and hard-working he was. Immediately following  
this remark, Polybius records the Scipionic speech (10.6.2-6) discussed above. The  
speech relates how Scipio encourages his troops to use their own *opsis* (βλέποντας,  
10.6.6) to recognize the need for action and to follow his direction. Further, he notes how  
the Romans’ actions will evoke a particular response from the Celtiberians when they see  
(ἴδωσι, 10.6.4) the army crossing the river. As an internal narrator, Scipio models the  
Polybian method of autopsy and the management of others’ sight, just as Hannibal does  
in his speeches in his campaign in Italy. Scipio also gains the knowledge of the situation  
in Spain and his estimation of the type of action required come through Polybian methods  
of inquiry.

Throughout the subsequent episodes, Polybius repeatedly describes Scipio’s  
investigation into the state of affairs: πυνθανόμενος (10.7.1, 10.7.4, 10.8.1), ἀκούων  
(10.7.3, 10.8.2), and ἐξητάκει (10.8.1). Furthermore, he notes on two occasions that  
Scipio makes these inquiries of those that have visual and experiential knowledge of the  
places and events: ἐξητάκει...τῶν εἰδόντων (10.8.1), διὰ δέ τινων ἀλιέων τῶν

ἐνείργασμένων τοῖς τόποις ἐξητάκει (10.8.7). An investigation based on oral inquiry from those with personal knowledge mirrors Polybius' method of historical inquiry as he describes it in his account of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps (3.48.12).<sup>20</sup> After Polybius notes Scipio's careful inquiry into the state of affairs in Spain and the layout of New Carthage, he narrates in detail the city's design and orientation to his audience (10.10.1-10.11.4). Polybius thereby provides for the external audience the knowledge that Scipio has just gained and that the historian himself learns through autopsy (10.11.4).<sup>21</sup> Similarly, just as Polybius makes a polemic against the fantastical accounts of his predecessors during his narrative of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps (3.47.6-48.12), he makes a similar attack against other historians' explanations for Scipio's success.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀποφαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρ' αὐτῶν ἱστορηκέναι τῶν παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ τόπους κατοπτευκέναι καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἀλπεων αὐτοῖ κεκρῆσθαι πορεία γνώσεως ἕνεκα καὶ θέας. (3.48.12) "But I give a secure account of these events because I inquired about these matters from those that happened to be present at the time and because I examined the places myself and personally made the passage through the Alps in order to know and see it for myself." Polybius' assertion of autopsy here, when combined with other known elements of his political career, has encouraged a debate that this passage is part of a later insertion to the text: Walbank 1957: 382, e.g.; Pédech 1964: 528, however, ties this passage to the timing of Polybius' questioning of eye-witnesses, which must have occurred earlier. cf., Chapter 2, Part 2, above.

<sup>21</sup> ὁ δὲ περίβολος τῆς πόλεως οὐ πλεῖον εἴκοσι σταδίων ὑπῆρχε τὸ πρότερον – καίτοι γ' οὐκ ἄγνοῶ διότι πολλοῖς εἴρηται τετταράκοντα· τὸ δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκοῆς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' αὐτόπται γεγονότες μετ' ἐπιστάσεως ἀποφαινόμεθα – νῦν δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι συνήρηται. (10.11.4) "The circuit around the city was of old not more than twenty stades. Indeed, I am aware of the fact that it is stated by many to be forty, but this is false, for I do not give an account based on hearsay, but being an eyewitness from careful observation. And it is contracted still further now." On the potential problems that lie behind Polybius' geographic accounts in this narrative and their relation to his assertion of autopsy, cf. Walbank 1967: 204-5 and Gauthier 1968: 93-4.

<sup>22</sup> Τούτοις δὲ τοῖς ἐκλογισμοῖς ὁμολογοῦντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἔλθωσι τῆς πράξεως, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν τούτου πρόνοιαν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὴν τύχην ἀναφέρουσι τὸ γεγονός κατόρθωμα, καὶ ταῦτα χωρὶς τῶν εἰκότων καὶ τῆς τῶν συμβεβιωκότων μαρτυρίας, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πομπηίου σαφῶς ἐκτεθεικότος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς ἐκλογισμοῖς χρησάμενος, οἷς ἡμεῖς ἀνώτερον ἐξελογισάμεθα, καθόλου τε τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλοιτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῇ τῆς Καρχηδόνης πολιορκίᾳ. (10.9.2-3) "Authors are in agreement about the calculations, but whenever they come to the conclusion of his plan, I do not know how they do not attribute the success that happened to the man and to his foresight, but instead to the gods and to chance. They claim this despite the probability and the testimony of those that lived with him, and the letter of Publius himself sent to Philip that clearly explains that he used the very calculations which I recorded here as he conducted affairs in

Polybius launches a defense of his historiographic method as he demonstrates a character and internal narrator performing actions that follow his prescribed approach. The narrative around the siege of New Carthage allows Polybius to both model and defend his methodology through Scipio's actions.

Finally, Polybius concludes his narrative of the set up for the siege at New Carthage with a report of Scipio's speech before the encounter:

πλὴν ὃ γε Πόπλιος, συνάψαντος καὶ τοῦ στόλου πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν, ἐπεβάλετο συναθροίσας τὰ πλήθη παρακαλεῖν, οὐχ ἑτέροις τισὶ χρώμενος ἀπολογισμοῖς, ἀλλ' οἷς ἐτύγχανε πεπεικῶς αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἄρτι πεποιήμεθα λόγον. (10.11.5)

Publius, however, after the fleet had also arrived at the appropriate time, decided to call together the troops and address them, using no other arguments except those which happened to have been persuasive to himself, the reasons which I just recounted in detail.

Polybius notes that Scipio communicates to his troops the same rationales used to determine their proposed course of action and that these are the points that he has just conveyed as external narrator. The knowledge that Polybius and Scipio have gained through the inquiry of eyewitnesses and through their own autopsy is made known to both of their audiences, external and internal, in the same narrative act. As Polybius describes the layout of New Carthage and the state of affairs in Spain, he conflates his role as external narrator with his account of Scipio's actions. Each of them pursues the same methodology to gain knowledge of the city and recounts their logical calculations of the necessary course of action with the same words.

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Spain generally and in particular in the siege of New Carthage.” The authors to whom Polybius refers here likely include Silenus: *FGrH* 175; cf. Livy 26.49.3. On the passage at 3.47.6-48.12, Chapter 2, Part 2, above. On Scipio's letter to Philip, Walbank 1940: 210-11.



In the middle of his description of the siege at New Carthage, Polybius paints a picture of Scipio as an active participant in the engagement, fulfilling the tasks necessary to ensure the success of the endeavor. Scipio takes measures to ensure his safety, however, tasking three men with large shields to cover his movements from enemy missiles (10.13.2). Scipio takes advantage of the visual possibilities provided by the safety of his concealment, as Polybius describes the results of the enterprise:

διὸ παρὰ τὰ πλάγια καὶ τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους ἐπιπαριῶν μέγала συνεβάλλετο πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ **έώρα** τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δ' αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων **ὀρώμενος** ἐνειργάζετο **προθυμίαν** τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις. **ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε** μηδὲν ἐλλιπὲς γίνεσθαι τῶν πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλ' ὁπότε τιν' αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ὁ καιρὸς ὑποδείξειε, πᾶν ἐκ χειρὸς αἰεὶ συνηγεῖτο πρὸς τὸ δέον. (10.13.3-5)

Because of this, as he passes along the flanks of his lines and the higher ground, he contributed a great deal to the action: at the same time, **he saw** what was happening and also **was seen** by all and brought about an **eagerness** on the part of those engaging in the fighting. **The result was** that nothing necessary for the battle was left out, but whenever the right moment indicated to him something for what lay before him, everything was always at hand for what was needed.

Scipio's action demonstrates his recognition of the power that *opsis* has, as it allows him to recognize and subsequently to encourage his men to the behaviors necessary to the situation. His position under the cover of the shields allows him to reach higher ground, which, in turn, enables him to see (*έώρα*) for himself what is occurring, and to inspire his troops as they see him (*ὀρώμενος*) in their midst. His visible presence creates the eagerness (*προθυμίαν*) necessary to spur his men to fight in a successful manner. Scipio values *opsis* both as a means of gaining sure knowledge and as a way to evoke an expected response through a constructed or managed appearance. Polybius' comment on

Scipio's appearance and presence on the battlefield makes the battles' success dependent upon (ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε) the general's sight and visibility among the troops.

Polybius' account of Scipio's invasion of Spain provides a contained narrative episode that demonstrates Scipio's qualities, approaches to practical decision making, and means of communicating information to his troops. Polybius weaves into his accounts of Scipio's early life and throughout his narrative of the campaign in Spain elements of *opsis* and pragmatic decision making that mirror his own historiographic process, just as he does with Hannibal in the third book of the *Histories*. Scipio, too, recognizes the value of *opsis* and manages others' sight to his advantage, and he forces the Celtiberians and his troops to pursue expected courses of action based on his visible presence or actions. Scipio, like Hannibal, models Polybian methods of analyzing and conveying the situation to his army. In his speeches to his troops in Spain he uses language that mirrors Polybius' own construction of knowledge and authority based on autopsy and practical reasoning.

## Part 2: Putting *Exempla* to Work: Scipio in Spain

Scipio's speech to his father's and uncle's former troops as he arrives in Spain, as noted above, appears in both Polybius' and Livy's texts. The main elements of the Polybian speech are found in the closing of Livy's version. A direct comparison of the two versions best demonstrates what Livy's Scipio takes or leaves from Polybius' Scipio. First, let us consider the entire report of the speech in Polybius, which highlights the reversal of the situation in Spain and Scipio's expectation of success:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε συνηθροισμένων τῶν δυνάμεων παρεκάλει μὴ καταπεπλῆχθαι τὴν προγεγενημένην περιπέτειαν· οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἡττησθαι Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων οὐδέποτε, τῇ δὲ προδοσίᾳ τῇ Κελτιβήρων καὶ τῇ προπετείᾳ, διακλεισθέντων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων. ὧν ἑκάτερα νῦν ἔφη περὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπάρχειν· **χωρὶς γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολὺ διεσπασμένους στρατοπεδεύειν, τοῖς τε συμμάχοις ὕβριστικῶς χρωμένους ἅπαντας ἀπηλλοτριωκέναι** καὶ πολεμίους αὐτοῖς παρεσκευακέναι. **διὸ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἤδη διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς**, τοὺς δὲ λοιπούς, ὥς ἂν τάχιστα θαρρήσωσι καὶ διαβάντας **ἴδωσι** τὸν ποταμόν, ἀσμένως ἥξειν, οὐχ οὕτως εὐνοοῦντας σφίσι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀμύνεσθαι σπουδάζοντας τὴν Καρχηδονίων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀσέλγειαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνας ἄθρους διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐ θελήσειν, κατὰ μέρος δὲ κινδυνεύοντας εὐχειρώτους ὑπάρχειν. διὸ **βλέποντας** εἰς ταῦτα παρεκάλει περαιοῦσθαι τὸν ποταμὸν εὐθαρσῶς· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξῆς ἀνεδέχετο μελήσειν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγεμόσι. (10.6.1-6)

Nevertheless, at that time, after the soldiers were gathered together, he exhorts them not to be astounded at their previous reversal. He said the Romans were not ever beaten in valor by the Carthaginians, but by the treachery and fickleness of the Celtiberians, since the generals were cut off from each other through their trust in the alliance with the aforementioned people. Each of these things now happens for the enemy, **for they make their camps far apart from each other, they used their allies in a hubristic fashion, alienated them**, and made enemies for themselves. **On account of this, some have sent messages to the Romans already** and the rest, as soon as they take heart and **see** the Romans crossing the river, they will gladly come, not as much being well

disposed to the Romans but rather because they are eager to take vengeance because of the insolence of the Carthaginians toward them. But the greatest reason is that their leaders of the opposing groups are at odds with each other and will not be willing to fight together against the Romans, and they are easy to overcome if they attack group by group. He therefore bids his troops **to examine** these things and to cross the river boldly. Afterwards, he promises that the rest will be a matter of concern to him and the other generals.

The parallels to the Polybian version of the speech are present in just the closing of

Livy's account:

quod mens sua sponte diuinat, idem subicit ratio haud fallax. uexati ab iis socii nostram fidem per legatos implorant. tres duces discordantes prope ut **defecerint alii ab aliis**, trifariam exercitum in diuersissimas regiones distraxere. eadem in illos ingruit fortuna quae nuper nos adflixit; nam et deseruntur ab sociis, ut prius ab Celtiberis nos, et **diduxere exercitus** quae patri patruoque meo causa exitii fuit; nec discordia intestina coire eos in unum sinet neque singuli nobis resistere poterunt. uos modo, milites, fauete nomini Scipionum, suboli imperatorum uestrorum uelut accisis recrescenti stirpibus. agite, ueteres milites, nouum exercitum nouumque ducem traducite Hiberum, traducite in terras cum multis fortibus factis saepe a uobis peragratas. breui faciam ut, quemadmodum nunc noscitis in me patris patruique similitudinem oris uoltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei uirtutisque effigiem uobis reddam ut reuixisse aut renatum sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat. (26.41.20-25)

What my mind foretells of its own accord, likewise a rational and non-deceptive examination also supports. Troubled by the Carthaginians, their allies beg for an agreement with us via their ambassadors, and their three generals, quarreling to the extent that **each is just about to abandon the others**, have led their armies in three different directions into completely different areas. The same misfortune that recently troubled us now falls onto the Carthaginians, for they are now also being deserted by their allies, just as we were by the Celtiberians before. And **they have divided their armies**, which was the cause of ruin for my father and uncle. Their infighting does not allow them to come together as one and they are unable to resist us each on their own. You, then, soldiers, grant favor to the name of the Scipiones, the progeny of your commanders, as though I am growing from the stalk just cut. Come on, veteran soldiers, lead this new army and your new commander across the Ebro. Lead us into lands

that have often been traversed by you with many brave deeds. Just as you now recognize in me a likeness of the face, appearance, and bodily features of my father and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I provide to you a copy of their character, loyalty, and courage in order that you each of you would say that Scipio the general lives again or has been born a second time.

Both of these accounts stress the importance of the current situation in Spain and how the tables have turned on the Carthaginians, who now face the same situation that the Romans did when the previous Scipiones were in command there. In Livy's version, Scipio notes that an honest reckoning of the situation leads to a sure recognition of the state of affairs, echoing Polybius' assertion that Scipio uses λογισμός throughout the narrative of the siege of New Carthage. In each version of the speech, Scipio notes that the Carthaginians have split into discordant camps (χωρίς γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολὺ διεσπασμένους στρατοπεδεύειν; *diduxere exercitus*) and that their support from their allies is waning (τοῖς τε συμμάχοις ὕβριστικῶς χρωμένους ἅπαντας ἀπηλλοτριωκέναι; *defecerint alii ab aliis*). In both versions, too, Scipio mentions that the Celtiberians send to him for assistance or alliance (διὸ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἤδη διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς; *socii nostram fidem per legatos implorant*).

Despite these parallels to Polybius' account of the speech, Livy's version lacks the focus on *opsis* that the Polybian Scipio asserts (ἴδωσι, βλέποντας), through which he both encourages his men to see the situation themselves and claims that their appearance will provoke a response from the Celtiberians. In the portions that are directly open to comparison, then, Livy appears to have removed or at least limited the role of *opsis* that

features heavily in Polybius' version of the speech, consequently removing the most Polybian characteristic that Scipio embodies in Polybius' version of the speech.

Instead, Livy fills the speech with exemplary language. Exemplarity is a well-known feature of Livian historiography and has been a key facet of recent scholarship.<sup>23</sup> In this section, I build largely on the work of Chaplin, who has argued the young general uses some typical elements of exemplarity in his speech to demonstrate Roman *virtus* and to defend his explanation for the forthcoming events of the war.<sup>24</sup> Scipio claims to avoid the use of the old exempla, but then fills his speech with multiple examples drawn from Livy's second pentad.<sup>25</sup>

vetera omitto, Porsennam Gallos Samnites: a Punicis bellis incipiam. quot classes, quot duces, quot exercitus priore bello amissi sunt? iam quid hoc bello memorem? omnibus aut ipse adfui cladibus aut quibus afui, maxime unus omnium eas sensi. Trebia Trasumennus Cannae quid aliud sunt quam monumenta occisorum exercituum consulumque Romanorum? adde defectionem Italiae, Siciliae maioris partis, Sardiniae; adde ultimum terrorem ac pauorem, castra Punica inter Anienem ac moenia Romana posita et uisum prope in portis uictorem Hannibalem. in hac ruina rerum stetit una integra atque immobilis uirtus populi Romani; haec omnia strata humi erexit ac sustulit. uos omnium primi, milites, post Cannensem cladem uadenti Hasdrubali ad Alpes Italiamque, qui si se cum fratre coniunxisset nullum iam nomen esset populi Romani, ductu auspicioque patris mei obstitistis; et **hae** secundae res illas aduersas sustinuerunt. (26.41.10-13)

I pass over things of the far past: Porsenna, the Gauls, the Samnites. I will begin from the Punic Wars. How many fleets, how many leaders, how many armies were lost in the previous war? What, then, should I recall in

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<sup>23</sup> For example, Feldherr 1998, Chaplin 2000, 2014, Roller 2004, 2009, 2011.

<sup>24</sup> Chaplin 2000: 64-65.

<sup>25</sup> For the references to Porsenna, the Gauls, and Caudium, cf. the opening to this chapter, above. Feldherr 1998: 54, n. 12, notes that this speech is one of many instances in which a commander uses the past valor of the Romans' ancestors in a battlefield exhortation. His second chapter (pp. 51-81) deals broadly with how Livy blends the spectacles expected as part of Roman civic life with the historiographic tradition of generals' speeches.

this war? I myself was either present for all the disasters or, for those from which I was absent, I alone felt their effects most sharply. What else are Trebia, Trasimene, or Cannae than the monuments of slaughtered armies and Roman consuls? Add to that the defection of Italy, the greater part of Sicily, and Sardinia; add, too, the greatest fear and dread, a Punic camp positioned between the Anio and the walls of Rome and a conquering Hannibal seen almost at our gates. Only the excellence of the Roman people stood uninjured and immovable during this eventful disaster. This virtue lifted up and elevated all that had collapsed to the ground. You, soldiers, first of all, under the leadership and command of my father, opposed Hasdrubal as he advanced toward the Alps and Italy after the disaster at Cannae and, had he joined up with his brother, the name of the Roman people would no longer exist. **These** successes deferred those defeats.

Scipio's speech follows the tenets of Roller's exemplary loop.<sup>26</sup> Roller's loop describes exemplary discourse as containing the following elements: an action of ethical consequence for the Roman community, an audience to observe and judge the action, commemoration of the deed and its consequence through a monument, and the encouragement for imitation.<sup>27</sup> Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae serve as the acts to be remembered, and the Roman failures there convey the social value to be demonstrated: these are negative *exempla* that Scipio hopes to encourage his men to avoid repeating.<sup>28</sup> Scipio himself makes up the primary audience as he claims to be present for some of the battles.<sup>29</sup> The speech, given to a secondary audience made up of the soldiers in Spain,

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<sup>26</sup> Roller 2004: 4-6.

<sup>27</sup> cf., too, Roller 2009 and 2011, which expand further his take on exemplarity in Roman historiography. Roller 2009 uses the case of Duilius to compare the historicist and exemplary modes of Roman historical writing and how these relate to larger trends in Roman culture. Roller 2011 examines the moral complexities evident in the Fabius *exemplum* to determine how the conflicts of value and judgement in the tale of Fabius make him a useful exemplary actor for later debate.

<sup>28</sup> Pausch 2011: 100: As Scipio narrates these more recent events he provides a detailed summary and analysis of these engagements from the Roman perspectives. cf. Burck 1962: 125-27.

<sup>29</sup> Feldherr 1998: 71-72 notes that Scipio's "unique personal experience of all Rome's disasters give a particular authority to Scipio's narrative and, by extension, to the historian's" (p. 72).

memorializes these events, as does Scipio's claim to have felt the effects of these defeats.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, the deictic demonstrative *haec*, which emphatically points to their current circumstances, and Scipio's description of the situation at hand displays the results of the past events and serves as further monuments of the actions at issue here: the physical conditions in which the army finds themselves memorializes their past successes.

Additionally, Scipio extends the memorialization beyond the battles in Italy to include further his troops' past valor in Spain slightly later in his speech:<sup>31</sup>

quid igitur minus conueniat, milites, quam **cum** aliae super alias clades **cumularentur** ac di prope ipsi cum Hannibale **starent**, uos **hic** cum parentibus meis--aequentur enim etiam honore nominis--**sustinuisse** labantem fortunam populi Romani, **nunc** eosdem quia **illic** omnia secunda laetaque sunt **animis** deficere? (26.41.17)

What, then, soldiers, is less suitable than that you along with my parents—for they are made equal even by the honor of the name—**supported** the collapsing fortune of the Roman people **here when** defeats **were being heaped on** other defeats and the gods themselves were practically **standing** with Hannibal, but **now** you same men fail in **courage** because everything is favorable and prosperous **over there**?

<sup>30</sup> Scipio's mentions of the grief he felt at the deaths of his father and uncle in such a short period of time is much like the exhibition of scars as monuments in other speeches; cf. Roller 2004: 5 and Hölkeskamp 1996: 302-8 for examples of types of *monumenta* contained within the concept of "monumental memory."

<sup>31</sup> Scipio opens the speech, too, by recalling these events: *nemo ante me nouus imperator militibus suis priusquam opera eorum usus esset gratias agere iure ac merito potuit: me uobis priusquam prouinciam aut castra uiderem obligauit fortuna, primum quod ea pietate erga patrem patruumque meum uiuos mortuosque fuistis, deinde quod amissam tanta clade prouinciae possessionem integram et populo Romano et successori mihi uirtute uestra obtinuistis* (26.41.3-5), "No new general before me has been able to give his soldiers thanks so rightly and deservedly before he had made use of their works. But fortune obligated me to do so to you before I ever saw my province or my camp: first, because of the piety you had toward my father and uncle, both in life and after they died; second, because you kept intact by your courage and for the Roman people and for me, their successor, the possession of a province thought lost after such a defeat." On "fortune" in Livy, Kajanto 1957 and Levene 1993: 30-33.



Scipio's speech uses language that metaphorically hints at the construction of a physical monument: *cumularentur*, *starent*, *sustinuisse*. While Hannibal's successes are piled up (*cumularentur*), the Scipiones in Spain and their troops prop up (*sustinuisse*) Rome's fortune, which is said to be collapsing (*labantem*). Scipio contrasts physical space (*hic...illic*) and time (*cum...nunc*) to highlight the discord between the fortunes of the army before and at present. The deictic adverbs *hic* and *illic* provide points of reference for the physical venues in which the soldiers have exhibited their courage (*animis*), which is the primary ethical value the deeds commemorated through the speech are meant to embody.

Lastly, Roller's exemplary loop ends with a need for imitation. So, too, does Scipio's speech:

uos modo, milites, **faute** nomini Scipionum, **suboli** imperatorum uestrorum uelut accisis recrescenti stirpibus. **agite**, ueteres milites, nouum exercitum nouumque ducem **traducite** Hiberum, **traducite** in terras cum multis **fortibus factis saepe a uobis peragratas**. breui faciam ut, quemadmodum nunc noscitis in me patris patruisque **similitudinem** oris uoltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei uirtutisque **effigiem** uobis reddam ut **reuixisse aut renatum** sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat. (26.41.22-25)

You, then, soldiers, **grant favor** to the name of the Scipiones, the **progeny** of your commanders, as though I am growing from the stalk just cut. **Come on**, veteran soldiers, **lead this** new army and your new commander **across** the Ebro. **Lead us** into lands that **have often been traversed by you** with many **brave deeds**. Just as you now recognize in me **a likeness** of the face, appearance, and bodily features of my father and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I provide to you **a copy** of their character, loyalty, and courage in order that you each of you would say that Scipio the general **lives again or has been born a second time**.

Scipio closes the exemplary loop with a call for *imitatio*: he encourages the troops in Spain to repeat their brave deeds. A series of imperatives (*favete, agite, traducite, traducite*) enjoins the veteran soldiers to commence the action. Scipio notes that their campaign targets lands often tread by the veterans (*saepe a uobis peragratas*) and places already home to their brave deeds (*fortibus factis*). Scipio claims that his presence represents a rebirth (*suboli, reuixisse aut renatum*) of Scipionic good fortune and that his bearing comprises a physical re-manifestation (*similitudinem, effigiem*) of his uncle's and father's persons.<sup>32</sup> When Scipio conflates his identity with that of his father, he also effectively merges the identities of these soldiers as both primary and secondary audiences: they witnessed their own valorous action in the past and now hear Scipio's call for *imitatio* of these affairs in the events to come. Just as the soldiers see the elder Scipio in the younger, they ought to find a renewal and rebirth of their past courage in their forthcoming deeds.

Lastly, at the very opening of the speech, in his initial summary of the events in Spain that led to his arrival, Scipio claims that "Fortune put me in your debt before I ever saw the province or your camp" (*me uobis priusquam prouinciam aut castra uiderem obligauit fortuna*; 26.41.4). In highlighting the exemplary nature of these troops' past deeds in Spain throughout his speech, Livy has Scipio here note that the exemplary lesson exists prior to his visual inspection (*viderem*) of the land or the state of the army.

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<sup>32</sup> Compare, too, how Hannibal is said to resemble his father: Livy 21.4.2: *Hamilcarem iuuenem red-ditum sibi ueteres milites credere*, "The veteran soldiers believed that a young Hamilcar had returned to them." Levene 2010: 173-177 discusses this phenomenon as it relates to characterization in Livy's text (cf. esp. 177 n. 33). Physical appearance as a means of establishing character within Roman culture: Quint. 5.10.23-7.

The tag that opens the speech thereby prioritizes the Livian methodology of exemplarity over the Polybian emphasis on autopsy and the logical examination of affairs.

In the aftermath of the siege of New Carthage, Livy describes a speech given by Scipio that has no Polybian parallel.<sup>33</sup> The speech commemorates the capture of the city and the resulting consequences for the status of their campaign in Spain. After opening the speech by giving thanks to the gods, Scipio moves on to demonstrate the exemplary qualities his troops should gain from commemorating their victory:

**militum** deinde **uirtutem** conlaudauit quod eos non eruptio hostium, non altitudo moenium, non inexplorata stagni uada, non castellum in alto tumulo situm, non munitissima arx deterruisset quo minus transcenderent omnia perrumperentque. itaque quamquam omnibus omnia deberet, praecipuum muralis coronae decus eius esse qui primus murum adscendisset; profiteretur qui se dignum eo duceret dono. (26.48.4-5)

He then praised **the courage of the soldiers** because neither the sally of the enemy, nor the height of the walls, nor the unconquerable fords of the swamp, nor the fortification situated on the high hill, nor the most heavily defended citadel deterred them from ascending or breaking through everything. Although he would owe everything to all of them, the particular honor of the mural crown belonged to the one who had first ascended the wall and he said that he who believed that he was worthy of the honor should declare it.

Livy's narrative of Scipio's speech, like the exhortation that he offers upon his arrival in Spain, follows the tenets of Roller's exemplary loop. The soldiers themselves are an audience to the valorous act and Scipio's speech in commemoration of it. Additionally, Livy's narrative of the battle includes a mention of Scipio taking up a position on the hill in order to become a "witness and spectator of the courage and cowardice of each" (*testis*

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<sup>33</sup> Polybius immediately moves from the final capture of the city (10.15.11) to his description of the looting of the city and Scipio's treatment of the captives and distribution of the wealth gained in the sack (10.16-20).

*spectatorque uirtutis atque ignauiae cuique*; 26.44.8).<sup>34</sup> Scipio himself thereby becomes the original audience of the soldiers' deeds, while the troops are the audience for the act of commemoration. The soldiers' courage (*militum...virtutem*) is, of course, the exemplary behavior to be recalled through the exemplary loop. Two elements of Scipio's speech serve as the commemorative monuments: the physical spaces that Scipio describes as overcome by his forces and the mural crown awarded to the first soldier to mount the wall. There is an implicit call for imitation as Scipio hints at future conflicts earlier in the speech when he describes the current financial standings of the two sides.<sup>35</sup>

More significantly to Scipio's exemplary speech, however, is the dispute arising over the awarding of the mural crown. As two men, a marine and a legionnaire, each profess to deserve the honor, a conflict ensues between the army and the navy over who should receive the crown (26.48.6-13). As the debate worsens, Scipio takes action because of the potential for a negative *exemplum* to be derived from this conflict: "this matter is guided by no less detestable an example, inasmuch as an honor for courage is sought by deceit and lies" (*nihilo minus detestabili exemplo rem agi, quippe ubi fraude ac periurio decus petatur virtutis*; 26.48.11). To avoid the continuing trouble, Scipio awards both men with the mural crown in a second assembly speech, ending the conflict

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<sup>34</sup> When compared to Polybius' account of the same portion of the battle, Scipio's position has a different point of emphasis: ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἑώρα τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δ' αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος ἐνεργάζετο προθυμίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις (10.13.4), "At the same time, he saw what was happening and also was seen by all and brought about an eagerness on the part of those engaging in the fighting." For Polybius, it is Scipio's presence that encourages the bravery of the Roman troops, while Livy's Scipio is a witness of their courageous action.

<sup>35</sup> *neque hostibus quicquam relinqueretur et sibi ac suis omnia superessent* (26.48.3), "There was nothing left for the enemy and everything remained for him and his men."

and preserving the status of the mural crown as a marker of courage and avoiding its potential to provide continuing contention between the army and navy (26.48.13-14). The speech Scipio gives to the troops in the immediate aftermath of the capture of New Carthage is marked by Livian exemplary language.

In the opening of his campaign in Spain, Livy's Scipio uses exemplarity in his speeches as an internal narrator and in making decisions and pursuing various courses of action. In many instances in the Livian speeches, Scipio draws on exemplary language where the Polybian Scipio would employ *opsis* and autopsy. Upon comparison, then, each historian's version of Scipio uses a methodological approach to decision making and behavior that mirrors the author's own historiographic approach.

### Part 3: Master of Reading *Exempla*: Scipio's Exemplary Debate

In addition to Scipio's use of Livy's model of exemplary language in his speeches, Scipio shows an ability to read *exempla* properly when others attempt to cite them against him. In the second half of the Third Decade, especially, Scipio establishes a preeminent position in his use of exempla.<sup>36</sup> In a debate with Fabius, who attempts to cite an *exemplum* against him, Scipio shows that his reading is the more persuasive interpretation of the exemplary event. Thus, Scipio not only uses *exempla* in his speeches, but Livy even shows him using exemplary language more convincingly than his counterparts. Among Livy's internal narrators, Scipio best approximates Livy's own historiographic method.

After Scipio successfully completes his campaigns in Spain, he returns to Rome with a plan to pursue the war deeper into Carthaginian territory by invading Africa directly. Scipio's proposal for the invasion prompts a debate in the senate in which he is opposed by Fabius.<sup>37</sup> In his lengthy attack on Scipio's plan, Fabius attempts to use *exempla* to demonstrate the potential problems with the proposal to invade Spain.<sup>38</sup> After

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<sup>36</sup> Chaplin 2000: 61-65 and 70-72 argues that Scipio's reading of the exemplary nature of Cannae is persuasive and provides the lessons needing to be taken from the disaster. Consequently, Scipio is the last Roman to cite Cannae as an *exemplum*, closing the book for the reading of this episode. cf., too, pp. 92-97, where Chaplin compares the exemplary language of Fabius and Scipio in their debate and which I also discuss below.

<sup>37</sup> Levene 2010: 111-18 discusses further allusive practices at work for Livy behind this debate, including those made to Greek authors and figures, especially the possibility that Diodorus' version of Nicias' speech contains elements more alike to Livy's Fabius than Thucydides (cf. esp. 114, n. 71 for a discussion of how this identification would fit with Diodorus' potential sources for the passage). For a description of the Thucydidean parallels (to Nicias and Alcibiades) in this passage, Rodgers 1986. Walsh 1961: 105-6 also presents some Nician parallels to Livy's depiction of Fabius in the debate.

<sup>38</sup> Chaplin 2000: 92-97 discusses the nature and range of *exempla* employed by both Fabius and Scipio. Chaplin breaks Fabius' speech into five main sections, with the following *exempla* spread across four of these sections: C. Lutatius at the end of the First Punic War, Fulvius at Capua during Hannibal's march on

criticizing Scipio for caring too much about his reputation and the role that public opinion plays in his endeavors, Fabius summarizes his own success in stopping Hannibal in Italy and then describes other disasters in which a foreign expedition led to defeat (28.40-42). Fabius then describes what he feels is the most relevant *exemplum* for Scipio's proposed invasion of Africa: the failed campaign of M. Atilius Regulus in Africa during the First Punic War:

externa et nimis **antiqua** repeto. Africa eadem ista et M. Atilius, insigne **utriusque fortunae** exemplum, nobis documento sint. ne tibi, P. Corneli, cum ex alto Africam conspexeris, **ludus et iocus** fuisse Hispaniae tuae uidebuntur...cetera—neque ea eleuo—nullo tamen modo Africo bello comparanda, ubi non portus ullus classi nostrae apertus, non ager pacatus, non ciuitas socia, non rex amicus, non consistendi usquam locus, non procedendi; quacumque circumspexeris hostilia omnia atque infesta. (28.42.1-2 and 6-7)

I am going on about foreign and sufficiently **old** campaigns. Let us instead use as a lesson that same Africa and Marcus Atilius, a remarkable example **of each type of fortune**. Indeed, Publius Cornelius, when you first catch sight of Africa from the sea, your affairs in Spain will seem to have been **a game and a joke**...For the rest—and I do not disparage these things—it is nevertheless not to be compared with an African war in any way, where there is no port open to our fleet, no pacified land, no allied state, no friendly king, no place for making a base camp, no place for marching out. All the things that you will see are hostile and dangerous.

Fabius cites the Regulus campaign as an *exemplum* worth considering in the context of this debate and claims that it demonstrates that Scipio will find difficulty immediately upon his arrival in Africa.<sup>39</sup> While Fabius does allude to Regulus' success and failure

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Rome, the Scipiones in Spain, the Athenians at Syracuse, Regulus in Africa, the Celtiberian allies in Spain, Claudius and Livius at the Metaurus.

<sup>39</sup> O'Gorman 2011: 275-76 notes how Fabius moves from pairs of *exempla* that work smoothly to the "internally ambiguous" example of Regulus. O'Gorman briefly summarizes how Scipio turns the Regulus *exemplum* against Fabius, on which, v. below.

(*utriusque fortunae*) in his introduction of the *exemplum*, he misses the point that Regulus was successful enough in the initial stages of his campaign that he besieged Carthage and that his opponents were willing to listen to peace terms and consider capitulating to the Romans.<sup>40</sup>

The epitomizer for Livy's eighteenth book notes that a key element of the Regulus *exemplum* is that it exhibits each type of fortune, good and bad (*magnum utriusque casus exemplum in Regulo; Perioch. xviii*). Fabius' *utriusque fortunae* in the summary may recall Livy's original explanation (*utriusque casus*) of the Regulus affair in Book 18.<sup>41</sup> If Fabius intratextually recalls Livy's original narrative of the Regulus affair in his speech, he attempts to draw upon the interpretation offered in Book 18. Fabius, however, misreads and misrepresents the Regulus *exemplum* by tying it to the potential opposition that Scipio would allegedly face immediately upon his arrival in Africa. In his

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<sup>40</sup> For a narrative of Regulus' campaign, Polyb. *Hist.* 1.29-35. For an epitome of Livy's account, cf. *Periochae* xvii and xviii. The *Periochae* suggest that Livy places the onset of Regulus' campaign as the end point of Book 17 (*Attilius Regulus cos. victis navali proelio Poenis in Africam traiecit, Perioch. xvii.15-16*) and then concludes with the disastrous end to the campaign at the opening of Book 18 (*Attilius Regulus in Africa serpentem portentosae magnitudinis cum magna clade militum occidit, et cum aliquot proeliis bene adversus Carthaginienses pugnasset, successorque ei a senatu prospere bellum gerenti non mitteretur, id ipsum per litteras ad senatum scriptas questus est, in quibus inter causas petendi successoris <erat>, quod agellus eius a mercennariis desertus esset; Perioch. xviii.1-8*). The epitomizer also notes that the Regulus campaign serves as an *exemplum* of adverse fortune: *quaerente deinde fortuna, ut magnum utriusque casus exemplum in Regulo proderetur, arcessito a Carthaginiensibus Xanthippo, Lacedaemoniorum duce, victus proelio et captus est (Perioch. xviii.8-11)*, "Then, with fortune seeking to produce an extreme exemplum of each type of outcome in the case of Regulus, he was conquered in battle and captured by Xanthippus, a Spartan general, summoned by the Carthaginians."

<sup>41</sup> On the potential accuracy of the *Periochae*, Bessone 2015 in chapter one above. While Begbie 1967, Bingham 1978, and Jal 1984 create different lists of discrepancies between the surviving books and the corresponding *Periochae*, they generally point to more harmony than alteration. Chaplin 2010b points to the focus on speeches in *Perioch. 48* and *49*, perhaps suggesting a focus more on events that demonstrate the power of the word. Additionally, there is a focus in the *Periochae* on notable individuals, Bessone 2015: 434-5. All of this points to the idea that the exemplarity of a notable individual like Regulus is the sort of thing that the *Periochae* are likely to preserve and the epitomizer's *utriusque casus* is more likely to be derived from Livy's genuine text than not. On other sources for the *Periochae* and possible intermediaries: Begbie 1967, Bingham, 1978, Hellegouarc'h 1994, and Hose 1994.



subsequent response, Scipio seizes upon the discrepancy in Fabius' argument and attempts to discredit Fabius' reading of the episode and to support his own proposition for invading Africa.

When Scipio does arrive in Africa (29.28), he is met with a sight and response that is far from what Fabius claims he would encounter.<sup>42</sup> Instead of finding closed ports and hostile enemies, Scipio finds a seemingly empty land as the Carthaginians abandon the coastal fields and cities upon the Roman approach.<sup>43</sup> Contrary to what Fabius described in the debate, above, Livy claims that all the fear occurs on the part of the Carthaginians, not the Romans, who instead establish a camp at ease. Within this context, too, Livy makes reference to Regulus' prior campaign and, consequently, to the debate between Fabius and Scipio that had very recently discussed Regulus at length.<sup>44</sup> Livy's elaboration on the Carthaginian fears notes that they expect that they have no commander who is an equal to Scipio.<sup>45</sup> Even in the ensuing episodes, the Romans find success in

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<sup>42</sup> Note, too, that Livy's narrative of the crossing (29.27) is largely uneventful. There is only a brief delay due to some fog. Livy even uses this opportunity to remark on the improbable account of Coelius (F37 *FRHist* = Livy 29.27.13-15), who records how the Romans had to brave near-shipwreck only to land in Africa in great chaos and without their weapons.

<sup>43</sup> 29.28.1-3: *expositis copiis Romani castra in proximis tumulis metantur. iam non in maritimos modo agros conspectu primum classis dein tumultu egredientium in terram pauor terrorque peruenerat, sed in ipsas urbes...ut relinqui subito Africam diceret*; "After the troops had disembarked, the Romans measured out their camp in the nearest little hills. Already, such dread and fright had come into the coastal fields, at first because of the sight of the fleets and then because of the clamor made by the disembarking soldiers—and not just there but also in the cities themselves...such that you might say that Africa was suddenly left abandoned."

<sup>44</sup> 29.28.5: *nam post M. Atilium Regulum et L. Manlium consules, annis prope quinquaginta, nullum Romanum exercitum uiderant praeter praedatorias classes*; "For it was nearly fifty years since M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius were consuls and they had not seen a single Roman army apart from some marauding ships."

<sup>45</sup> 29.28.7: *eo maior tum fuga pauorque in urbe fuit. et hercule neque exercitus domi ualidus neque dux quem opponerent erat*. "Therefore, the city at that time experienced a rather large evacuation and dread. And, by god, there was not a strong enough army at home who could meet [the Romans]."

their initial encounters in Africa (e.g. 29.29 and 29.34). The easy nature of the African landing in Livy's narrative supports the interpretation of the Regulus *exemplum* that Scipio advances in his debate with Fabius. As a result, the narratorial identities and approaches of Livy and Scipio run parallel to one another as one describes events that follow from the other's analysis of Regulus' exemplary actions.

In his response to Fabius in the debate, moreover, Scipio directly addresses his opponent's failure to read the Regulus episode correctly:

Negat aditum esse in Africam, negat ullos patere portus. M. Atilium captum in Africa commemorat, tamquam M. Atilius primo accessu ad Africam offenderit, neque recordatur illi ipsi tam infelici imperatori patuisse tamen portus Africae, et res egregie primo anno gessisse et quantum ad Carthaginienses duces attinet inuictum ad ultimum permansisse. **nihil igitur me isto exemplo terrueris.** si hoc bello non priore, si nuper et **non annis ante quadraginta** ista ita clades accepta foret, qui ego minus in Africam Regulo capto quam Scipionibus occisis in Hispaniam traicerem? (28.43.17-18)

[Fabius] says that there is no approach to Africa, that there are no ports open to us. He recalls that Marcus Atilius was captured in Africa, as though Atilius met trouble upon his first approach to Africa. Nor does he recall that the ports of Africa were open to that man himself, unlucky though he was, and that he managed affairs successfully in the first year and, as far as the Carthaginian leaders were concerned, he remained unbeaten until the end. **You will not, therefore, frighten me at all with that example.** If that disaster had happened in this war, not in the previous one, or if it had happened recently and **not forty years ago**, how would I less likely cross over to Africa with Regulus captured than to Spain with the Scipios killed?

In summarizing Regulus' initial successes, Scipio directly responds to the reading of the *exemplum* offered to him by Fabius in several ways: First, Scipio points out that Regulus initially had ports at his disposal upon his arrival, thereby contradicting the claim made by Fabius that the idea that no ports are currently open to Scipio has a bearing on the

correlation between the Regulus campaign and the proposed invasion of Scipio. Second, Scipio reminds Fabius and the Senate that Regulus was unbeaten by Carthaginian opponents, which calls to mind that a Spartan mercenary, Xanthippus, was responsible for Regulus' defeat.<sup>46</sup> Third, despite Fabius' claims that he turns away from old (*antiqua*) matters when he brings up the Regulus affair, Scipio points out that the prior campaign in Africa corresponds to a previous war, now decades in the past (*non annis ante quadraginta*).<sup>47</sup> Lastly, in response to Fabius' description of Scipio's Spanish campaign as child's play (*ludus et iocus*), Scipio instead notes that his efforts in Spain better follow an *exemplum* with more immediacy and personal impact—the deaths of his father and uncle—than Regulus' now dated campaign.

Taken as a whole, the differences pointed out by Scipio suggest that the Regulus affair has no bearing on his current proposed invasion of Africa and instead corresponds best to the situation in Spain when he arrived there after the deaths of his father and uncle. In doing this Scipio suggests a new reading of the Regulus *exemplum*.

Additionally, as Scipio has previously had success in the Spanish theater,<sup>48</sup> he shows that

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<sup>46</sup> A fact highlighted by Scipio in the next line of his speech: "Nor would I grant that it is more fortunate for Carthage that the Spartan Xanthippus was born than that I was born for my country" (*nec felicius Xanthippum Lacedaemonium Carthagini quam me patriae meae sinerem natum esse*; 28.43.19). According to the *Periocha* describing book 18, Livy notes this too: "He was conquered in battle and captured by Xanthippus, a Spartan general, summoned by the Carthaginians" (*arcessito a Carthaginensibus Xanthippo, Lacedaemoniorum duce, victus proelio et captus est*; *Perioch.* xviii.9-11).

<sup>47</sup> Chaplin 2000: 121-31 on the differences in old and new *exempla* in the speeches of Fabius and Scipio, respectively, in this debate as it relates to their ages and a larger trend in the *AUC* that younger speakers use more recent *exempla* and generally have more forward-looking readings of the past.

<sup>48</sup> In fact, Scipio has just recently in the narrative reported his success to the Senate (28.38.2-3): *et senatu extra urbem dato in aede Bellonae quas res in Hispania gessisset disseruit, quotiens signis conlatis dimicasset, quot oppida ex hostibus ui cepisset, quas gentes in dicionem populi Romani redegisset; aduersus quattuor se imperatores, quattuor uictores exercitus in Hispaniam isse; neminem Carthaginiensem in iis terris reliquisse*. "And with the Senate convened outside the city in the temple of Bellona, he described what he had accomplished in Spain, how often he had fought in open battle, how

he can already respond the new take on this precedent of Regulus, which prompts his claim that Fabius cannot scare him with this *exemplum* (*nihil igitur me isto exemplo terrueris*). In effect, Scipio hints that Fabius uses the Regulus campaign at the wrong debate, where instead he should have brought this up before Scipio's invasion of Spain.

In the narrative surrounding the impetus for his Spanish Campaign (26.18), however, there was no mention of the Regulus affair. In fact, there was no opposition at all to the idea of sending another commander to Spain; the debate only arose about who should be sent (26.18.2-4).<sup>49</sup> After Scipio appears suddenly at a high vantage point during the election for the proconsulship in Spain, he wins a unanimous election, though, with Livy's comment on the lack of opposition (*nemo audeat in Hispaniam imperium acciperet*; 26.18.6), this should serve as no surprise.<sup>50</sup> The people's fears that arise after this election instead highlight the idea that the history of Scipio's family should have played a role in determining their choice:

ceterum post rem actam ut iam resederat impetus animorum ardorque,  
silentium subito ortum et tacita cogitatio quidnam egissent; **nonne fauor  
plus ualisset quam ratio**. aetatis maxime paenitebat; quidam fortunam

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many towns he had captured from the enemy by force, what peoples he had brought back under the authority of the Roman people; he said that he had advanced to Spain against four generals, against four victorious armies and that he had left no Carthaginian behind in those lands."

<sup>49</sup> 26.18.2-4: *et Romae senatui populoque post receptam Capuam non Italiae iam maior quam Hispaniae cura erat. et exercitum augeri et imperatorem mitti placebat; nec tam quem mitterent satis constabat quam illud, ubi duo summi imperatores intra dies triginta cecidissent, qui in locum duorum succederet extraordinaria cura deligendum esse. cum alii alium nominarent, postremum eo decursum est ut proconsuli creando in Hispaniam comitia haberentur.* "And at Rome, after Capua was recovered there was not a care for Italy on the part of the Senate and people as much as there was for Spain. They decided that it would be best for the army to be augmented and a commander to be sent out. There was less agreement about whom they should send than there was that this ought to happen, when two high commanders had fallen within thirty days of each other, it ought to be chosen with extraordinary care who would take the place of two commanders. After a few nominated someone or another, it was at last decided that a comitia be held for creating a proconsulship for Spain."

<sup>50</sup> Levene 2010: 314 on Scipio's youth, inexperience, and self-promotion, and Livy's interpretation of the election.

etiam domus horrebant nomenque ex funestis duabus familiis in eas  
prouincias ubi inter **sepulcra patris patruique** res gerendae essent  
proficiscentis. (26.18.10-11)

But, after the election, as their burst of high spirits and fervor had at once receded, a sudden silence arose and there was an unspoken reflection on what they had done. **Had their goodwill been stronger than reason?** His age was the most vexing. Some were even afraid of the fortune of his family and his name as he was proceeding from two grief-ridden families into those very provinces where he would be conducting campaigns among **the tombs of his father and uncle**.

The people's fears arise before his Spanish campaign due to his family's history in the region. His father's and uncle's defeat and deaths serve as a negative *exemplum* of which the people fear a repeat. Livy highlights the exemplary nature of this fear by describing the entire account of the election through the focalization of the Roman *populus* as an audience reacting to the events in Spain. The tombs of Scipio's family (*sepulcra patris patruique*) serve as a physical monument commemorating the Roman defeats in Spain. As the people fear Scipio's campaign marching among the sepulchers, they envision the soldiers on the new Spanish campaign becoming an audience to the monuments and thereby being encouraged to imitate the defeats of past Roman armies. Scipio's reaction to the people's fear, however, breaks the exemplary loop and its potential disastrous effects on his campaign. He responds directly by calling a *contio* and turns their concern on its head by addressing his age and command.<sup>51</sup> Scipio's speech at this meeting renews

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<sup>51</sup> 26.19.1-2: *Quam ubi ab re tanto impetu acta sollicitudinem curamque hominum animaduertit, **aduocata contione** ita de aetate sua imperioque mandato et bello quod gerundum esset magno elatoque animo disseruit, ut ardorem eum qui resederat excitaret rursus nouaretque et impleret homines certioris spei quam quantam fides promissi humani aut ratio ex fiducia rerum subicere solet.* "When [Scipio] noticed the anxiety and care the people had from such a rash act, **he called together a contio** and spoke about his age and the command entrusted to him and the great war which had to be fought. He lifted the spirits such that he reawakened again and renewed the eagerness which had resided and he filled men with a more certain

the vigor felt by the *populus* upon his first appearance and demonstrates that *ratio* can be overcome by ardor and hope (26.19.2), a direct answer to the people's concern mentioned above (*nonne fauor plus ualuisset quam ratio*; 26.18.10). Scipio's subsequent success in Spain and his exemplary speeches while there demonstrate how he has broken the exemplary loop and overcome the negative *exemplum* of his father's and uncle's defeat. When Scipio recalls the exemplary power of his family's troubles in Spain during his debate with Fabius about the invasion of Africa, he creates a hierarchy of exemplary foreign invasions: Regulus had an easier time in Africa than Scipio's father and uncle did in Spain; Scipio, conversely, pursued his own Spanish campaign in more difficult circumstances than his relatives. Consequently, Scipio undermines Fabius' most direct negative *exempla* to suggest that the proposed invasion of Africa is the correct course of action for himself, specifically, to take.

To return to the remaining portions of the debate against Fabius before the invasion of Africa, however, Scipio suggests other *exempla* the Senate should consider in making their decision. He first responds to Fabius' mention of the Athenian invasion of Sicily during the Peloponnesian War by recalling his own Greek example:

at etiam Athenienses audiendi sunt temere in Siciliam **omisso domi bello** transgressi. cur ergo, quoniam Graecas fabulas enarrare uacat, non Agathoclem potius, Syracusanum regem, cum diu Sicilia **Punico bello** ureretur, **transgressum in hanc eandem Africam auertisse eo bellum unde uenerat** refers? (28.43.20-21)

And [he discusses] even how the Athenians dared to rashly cross to Sicily **with the war neglected at home**. Why, then, since there is time to

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hope than what the faith in the promise of a man or rational consideration or confidence in the matters at hand is accustomed to adduce.”

describe Greek stories, do you not instead recall Agathocles, the King of Syracuse, when Sicily was long burning with **a Carthaginian war**, that he **crossed to this same Africa** and **turned back the war to the place whence it had come?**

While Scipio does little to directly address the *exemplum* of the Sicilian Expedition, in his loose quotation of Fabius' recollection, Scipio makes a key change to Fabius' language: Where Fabius claimed that the expedition left the war "abandoned at home" (*bello domi relicto*; 28.41.17), Scipio slightly heightens the claim with the war "neglected" or "ceased" at home (*omisso domi bello*). Scipio thereby hints that the real problem with the Sicilian Expedition was that there was no one left to defend Athens after the fleet left.<sup>52</sup> Later in his speech, Scipio reminds the Senate that regardless of the outcome of this debate, his colleague P. Licinius Crassus has to remain with an army in Italy due to his position as Pontifex Maximus.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, no matter what happens with Scipio's proposed African invasion, the war will never be completely stopped or neglected at home.

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<sup>52</sup> There are, of course, other differences between the Sicilian Expedition and Scipio's proposed invasion, most notably the fact that Sicily was not the seat of power of Athens' primary opponent, Sparta, but rather an attempt to expand the Athenian empire's footprint in the Western Mediterranean by lashing out at a powerful state of Doric descent.

<sup>53</sup> 28.44.10-11: *ne quid interim dum traicio, dum expono exercitum in Africa, dum castra ad Carthaginem promoueo, res publica hic detrimenti capiat, quod tu, Q. Fabi, cum uictor tota uoligaret Italia Hannibal potuisti praestare, hoc uide ne contumeliosum sit concusso iam et paene fracto Hannibale negare posse P. Licinium consulem, uirum fortissimum, praestare, qui ne a sacris absit pontifex maximus ideo in sortem tam longinquae prouinciae non uenit.* "As for whether or not the state take any harm here while I am crossing over, while I disembark my army in Africa, and move my camp toward Carthage, that at which you, Quintus Fabius, were able to excel when Hannibal as victor was flying around all of Italy, see to it that it is not insulting to deny that the consul Publius Licinius, a very courageous man and one who did not come to the allotment of a province so far away lest he as pontifex maximus be absent from his religious duties, is able to overpower Hannibal, shaken for so long and now almost broken."

In place of the Athenian Sicilian Expedition, Scipio instead recalls Agathocles, the Syracusan King who undertook his own invasion of Africa in 310-307 BCE when faced with a Carthaginian war on his own soil.<sup>54</sup> Scipio creates several strong indications that the Agathocles *exemplum* is more apposite to his proposed invasion than the Sicilian Expedition: First, Agathocles was at war with Carthage (*Punico bello*), just like Rome at Scipio's present. Second, Agathocles invaded Africa, just as Scipio proposes (*transgressum in hanc eandem Africam*), so the geographical parallel heightens the applicability of the *exemplum*. Additionally, by invading Africa during a war with Carthage, Agathocles was able to achieve Scipio's own goal: to return the war to its source (*auertisse eo bellum unde uenerat*). Lastly, Agathocles' home of Sicily would be the province allotted to Scipio in order to achieve his intended invasion. Scipio therefore proposes to imitate Agathocles' *exemplum* in a very precise fashion.

As a final model to bring up in response to Fabius, Scipio describes how Hannibal's invasion of Italy is an *exemplum* that the Romans—and specifically Scipio himself—should seek to emulate.<sup>55</sup> In a similar way as he did by reframing the Regulus *exemplum* with its applicability to a more recent situation, Scipio calls on the immediacy of a recent exemplary act to trump others that are dated and, by consequence, less relevant:

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<sup>54</sup> Diodorus Siculus' *Univ. Hist.* (xix and xxi) describes the rise and death of Agathocles. cf., too, the brief note on his character in Polyb. 9.23.2. Like Regulus, however, Agathocles found initial success in his campaign before ultimately meeting his end in Africa. Importantly, however, Agathocles achieved his goal of taking the war out of his homeland and returning the theater of operations to Africa.

<sup>55</sup> The parallelism between Scipio and Hannibal is felt strongly in this passage, as it will be in their meeting before Zama. cf. Rossi 2004 on the parallelism between these two figures in their career trajectories in the Third Decade.



'Sed quid, ultro metum inferre hosti et ab se remoto periculo alium in discrimen adducere quale sit, ueteribus externisque exemplis admonere opus est? **maius praesentius**ue ullum exemplum esse quam Hannibal potest? (28.44.1-2)

“But why, then, is there need to call to mind old and foreign examples, to show how great it is to bring fear to a distant enemy and, by removing the danger from oneself, to put another at risk? Can there be any **better** or **more present** *exemplum* than Hannibal?

Scipio's reference to Hannibal as an *exemplum* to emulate cuts to the heart of his response to Fabius' opposition of his proposed invasion. Hannibal is a more immediate (*praesentius*) and better (*maius*) example that best fits with the key purposes behind his planned expedition: to take the war to the enemy. Immediacy and relevance represent the core of Scipio's rejection of Fabius' *exempla* throughout the speech. He replaces the Regulus example first with his father's and uncle's campaign in Spain and second with his own, each subsequent exchange being more recent and a better fit than what Fabius originally proposes. Similarly, in his rejection of Fabius' proposal of Athens' failed Sicilian Expedition, Scipio counters with the more recent and more apposite campaign of Agathocles in Africa.

Near the conclusion of his speech, Scipio turns the final analysis of the Hannibal *exemplum* into a call for action based upon the past deeds of both the Romans and their enemy that demonstrates the benefits that could be derived from his suggestion, even if he ultimately fails in his invasion of Africa:

si hercules nihilo maturius hoc quo ego censeo modo perficeretur bellum, tamen ad **dignitatem populi Romani famamque apud reges gentesque externas** pertinebat, non ad defendendam modo Italiam sed ad inferenda etiam Africae arma uideri **nobis animum esse**, nec hoc credi uolgarique quod Hannibal ausus sit neminem ducem Romanum audere, et priore

Punico bello tum cum de Sicilia certaretur totiens Africam ab nostris exercitibusque et classibus oppugnatam, nunc cum de Italia certetur Africam pacatam esse. requiescat aliquando uexata tam diu Italia: uratur euasteturque in uicem Africa. castra Romana potius Carthaginis portis immineant quam nos **iterum uallum hostium ex moenibus nostris uideamus**. Africa sit reliqui belli sedes; illuc **terror fugaue, populatio agrorum, defectio sociorum, ceterae belli clades**, quae in nos per quattuordecim annos ingruerunt, uertantur. (28.44.12-15)

If, by god, this war is brought to an end in a fashion not at all more timely than by what I just recommended, nevertheless it would be fitting with **the dignity of the Roman people and their standing among kings and foreign peoples** to be seen that **we have the courage** not just to defend Italy, but even to take the war to Africa. We, too, do not want to have it believed or spread abroad that no Roman commander would dare to do what Hannibal dared and that Africa was rather often attacked by our armies and fleet in the First Punic War, which was fought over Sicily; instead, Africa is now left in peace when we are now fighting over Italy. Let Italy, troubled for so long, finally be at rest. Let Africa be burned and be devastated for her turn. Let a Roman camp threaten the walls of Carthage rather than that **we see again an enemy siege work from our walls**. Let Africa be the seat of the war that remains. Let **the terror and flight, let the plundering of the fields, the defection of allies, and the other devastations of war**, which have assailed against us for fourteen years, be turned to there.

In his peroration here, Scipio frames his analysis of the action to be taken from the Hannibal *exemplum* and the war in Italy with the tenets of the Livian exemplary loop. He notes the dignity, reputation, and courage of the Roman people as the characteristics to be illustrated (*dignitatem populi Romani famamque... nobis animum esse*).<sup>56</sup> Multiple levels of audiences are noted: the reputation of Rome is seen through the eyes of foreigners

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<sup>56</sup> Additionally, just before this passage, Scipio had described the strength of Rome as the Roman soldier: *uiribus nostris milite Romano stetimus*, 28.44.5. Rome's power as derived from her soldiery is another characteristic that Scipio draws upon as an exemplary quality to be emulated. As he claims in his surrounding comments (28.44.4-7), Scipio contrasts the fortune that Carthage will endure when facing his invasion with what the Romans have faced during Hannibal's invasion of Italy. He claims that the two sides will suffer different fates because of the disparate treatment each takes with its allies.

(*apud reges gentesque externas*), and, in order for the comparison to be made that Scipio fears, an audience must be aware of their past actions in the First Punic War. Additionally, the Romans themselves have been the spectators of the devastation of Italy through Hannibal's assault on their homeland (*iterum uallum hostium ex moenibus nostris uideamus*). In the closing lines to his explanation, Scipio lays out both the memorialization of the exemplary deeds and the call for *imitatio*. He asks that the various types of destruction wrought on Italy over the last fourteen years be turned against Africa now. The images of the ruin of Italy (*terror fugaque, populatio agrorum, defectio sociorum, ceterae belli clades*) call to mind Hannibal's actions and the Romans' inability to expel him from their homeland. Hannibal's devastating campaign in Italy becomes both a positive and negative *exemplum* for the Romans in Scipio's reading. They ought to emulate the bold move to take the war to their enemy's homeland and, in so doing, follow the exemplary deeds of their forefathers in the First Punic War and avoid the problems that have arisen from their earlier lack of action. As Scipio closes his speech with an exhortation to action that is based upon previous exemplary deeds, he employs the Livian historiographic methodology of exemplarity in his role as an internal narrator.

After the debate with Fabius, Scipio struggles to receive permission from the Senate to undertake his campaign in Africa, though Livy claims that this is due to the senators' fear of his use of the popular assembly to circumvent the Senate's decision if his debate failed (28.45).<sup>57</sup> After some exchanges between the two sides, Scipio is

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<sup>57</sup> 28.45.1: *minus aequis animis auditus est Scipio quia uolgatum erat si apud senatum non obtinisset ut prouincia Africa sibi decerneretur, ad populum extemplo laturum*. "Scipio was heard with less friendly dispositions because it had been spread around that he would immediately take it before the people if he did

confirmed in the allotment of Sicily as his province and permission to invade Africa, “if he thought it best for the state” (*permissumque ut in Africam, si id e re publica esse censeret, traiceret*; 28.45.8). The turn of phrase in the Senate’s decree recalls Scipio’s recent claim that “he would do whatever was best for the state” (*cum Scipio respondisset se quod e re publica esset facturum*; 28.45.3). The repetition of “*e re publica esse*” suggests that Scipio’s reading of the exempla in support of his invasion of Africa corresponds to the lesson Livy feels should be taken from the debate.<sup>58</sup> An internal audience has come to the same conclusion as the speaker. Scipio has brought about on the part of the Senate a realization of the need for the invasion of Africa by taking up a Livian interpretation of the *exempla* seen in Regulus’ African campaign and the efforts of all three Scipiones in Spain (as well as several other examples from the remote and recent past). Through the debate about the proposed invasion of Africa, therefore, the identities and purposes of Livy, *qua* external narrator, and Scipio, in his role as internal narrator, converge.

After he makes preparations to undertake his invasion of Africa, Scipio offers the following prayer before setting out:

'diui diuaeque' inquit 'qui maria terrasque colitis, uos precor quaesoque **uti** quae in meo imperio **gesta sunt geruntur postque gerentur**, ea mihi populo plebique Romanae sociis nominique Latino qui populi Romani

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not obtain from the Senate that Africa would be decreed his province.” Importantly, Livy does not suggest that Scipio’s words or speech were less persuasive or effective, but merely that the Senate was less disposed to grant Scipio’s request because they were aware of his possible circumvention; *contra* Chaplin 2000: 96, who suggests that the Senate’s negative reaction (as an internal audience to the speeches), supports an interpretation that Livy claims that Fabius won the debate. Compare, too, however Livy’s initial comments about the Senate’s reaction to Fabius’ speech: 28.43.1.

<sup>58</sup> Chaplin 2000: 96: “Only the repetition of Scipio’s language in the senatorial decision shows that he has won.” Rather than read Livy’s comments at 28.43.1 as suggesting the appearance that Fabius won the debate, the Senate’s reaction immediately after Fabius’ speech sets up their hesitation to Scipio’s proposal.

quique meam sectam imperium auspiciumque terra mari amnibusque sequuntur bene **uerruncent**, eaque uos omnia bene **iuuetis**, bonis auctibus **auxitis**; saluos incolumesque uictis perduellibus uictores spoliis decoratos praeda onustos triumphantesque mecum domos reduces **sistatis**; inimicorum hostiumque ulciscendorum copiam **faxitis**; quaeque populus Carthaginiensis in ciuitatem nostram facere molitus est, ea ut mihi populoque Romano in ciuitatem Carthaginiensium **exempla edendi** facultatem **detis**.' (29.27.1-4)

“Gods and Goddesses,” he says, “you who rule the lands and seas, I beg and beseech you **that whatever things have been done, are being done, and will be done afterwards** under my command will **turn out well** for me, for the people and plebs of Rome, for our allies, and for the Latin name, those who follow the path, command, and authority of me and the Roman people on land, on sea, and on the shores. I ask that **you favor** all these things and **foster** them with good fruits, that **you allow** the victors to be brought back home with me safe and sound, with our enemies conquered, and adorned with spolia, burdened by loot, and celebrating a triumph. **That you make** an abundance of enemies to be avenged and that whatever the Carthaginian people have strived to do against our state, I ask **that you give** to me and to the Roman people the opportunity of **making exempla** of the Carthaginian state.”

Scipio’s prayer is an expected practice for a general as part of the *profectio* before setting out on a campaign.<sup>59</sup> Though the prayer for the most part, and as expected, focuses on the future assistance of the gods, as evidenced in the mixture of future imperatives (*auxitis*, *faxitis*) and substantive clauses of purpose (*uti...uerruncent...iuuetis... sistatis...detis*), Scipio also mentions his deeds of the past and present with the phrase: *gesta sunt geruntur postque gerentur*. Scipio here blends together past, present, and future in the way that exemplarity functions more broadly in Livy’s *AUC*. The full exemplary loop

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<sup>59</sup> cf. Hannibal’s vows recounted by Livy: 21.21.9, on which Levene 1993: 45; or the departure of P. Licinius Crassus in 171 to campaign against the Macedonian King Perseus (42.49.1-8). Livy comments extensively here on Crassus’ departure and the Romans’ thoughts about the importance of this practice and its relation to the outcome of the battle. On prayers and offerings before setting out on military campaigns, Koepfel 1969. On the *profectio* and the Romans’ reaction to it, Kajanto 1957: 78-79 and Feldherr 1999: 51-52.

comprises a past deed, a present (for the narrative) commemoration of the deed, and a call for future behavior or lessons to be gained from the act of commemoration.<sup>60</sup> Scipio then closes the prayer with an explicit request that the gods grant him the opportunity to perform exemplary deeds (*exempla edendi*) through his campaign. Scipio's invasion of Africa is allowed to proceed because he demonstrates his ability to read *exempla* properly in his debate with Fabius and then begins with a prayer that both mirrors and requests the production of exemplary acts. Livy's account of the prayer and the debate before the campaign suggests that the ensuing narrative should be read in light of its use of exemplarity. If Scipio continues reading *exempla* correctly and demonstrates his knowledge through sustained use of exemplary language, he will find the success he requests of the gods.

In the second half of the Third Decade, Scipio takes center stage as an internal narrator who both exhibits Livy's model of exemplary narrative and also demonstrates the ability to read *exempla* correctly when compared to other characters. A comparison of Polybius' and Livy's versions of Scipio's speech upon his arrival in Spain reveals that Livy removes the elements of autopsy and manipulating *opsis* that were present in Polybius' version and replaces these with a thorough treatment of exemplary language, replete with several notable Livian *exempla*. Livy limits the elements of Polybian historiographic methodology that I argue is present in the speech in Polybius' *Histories*

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<sup>60</sup> v. Part 2 of this chapter, above on Roller 2004.

and instead inserts language and themes that mirror his own historiographic approach. In other speeches throughout the decade, Scipio continues to show his command of Livian exemplarity by reading *exempla* properly when others attempt to turn them against him. After successfully debating with Fabius the merits of his proposed campaign to Africa, Scipio offers a prayer upon his departure that uses Roller's exemplary loop while also asking the gods that his troops are able to perform exemplary deeds. In comparing the two accounts of Scipio examined in the first two sections of this chapter, Scipio stands in Polybius' *Histories* as an analogue of Polybian methodology, Scipio in the *AUC* represents and serves as a mouthpiece of the Livian historiographic method of exemplarity.

## Chapter Four

### A Battle of Narratorial and Authorial Self-Reference at Zama

#### Part 1: *Opsis* and Exemplarity Compared

In the previous two chapters, I examined how Polybius and Livy use Hannibal and Scipio as mouthpieces for various historiographic methods in their narratives. Polybius uses both generals during their initial invasions of enemy lands as internal narrators that demonstrate his own approach that relies on *opsis*, spectacle, and pragmatic reasoning. Livy integrates the Polybian elements into his portrayal of Hannibal, while he explicitly avoids doing so with his take on Scipio's speeches. Instead, Scipio demonstrates a proficiency in the Livian historiographic model of exemplarity during his campaign and his preparation for his invasion of Africa. For Livy, the figures of Hannibal and Scipio serve as Contean *modelli-esemplari* of Polybius' and his own texts and representatives of their historiographic methods.<sup>1</sup>

At the heart of the differences between Livy's presentations of Hannibal and Scipio is the distinction between the Polybian *opsis* that Hannibal uses and the exemplarity evident in the Livian portrayal of Scipio. Both *opsis* and exemplarity involve sight and audience on various levels, and Feldherr has shown the central role played by the visual qualities of Livy's narrative and his approach to exemplary monumentality.<sup>2</sup> Still, *opsis* and exemplarity diverge in several ways despite the overlap between them in

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<sup>1</sup> For the term and a description of Conte's *modelli*, cf. Chapter 2, Part 4, above.

<sup>2</sup> On the interconnected concepts of vision, spectacle, *exempla*, and *monumenta* for Livy: Feldherr 1999: 1-50.



their reliance on some sort of visual act. *Opsis* functions on many levels of Polybius' text. It is the central feature of his pragmatic approach to historiography. As I argued in Chapter Two, above, Polybius uses *opsis* and autopsy to gauge the accuracy of the events he records; he has his characters use *opsis* and autopsy in their actions within the narrative; and he uses *opsis* as a key feature in the speeches given by his internal narrators. Polybian speeches engage their internal audiences by modeling *opsis* as a heuristic tool that gives the external audience a pragmatic lesson to take from Polybius' narrative. This last use of Polybian *opsis* is of interest to the student of Livy's *AUC*. Although *opsis* operates widely within Polybius' historiographic methodology, exemplarity serves a narrower, though still vital role for Livy's *AUC*. Livy does not use exemplarity to gauge the truth behind the events he narrates or the veracity of his source texts, as Polybius does with *opsis*. Instead, exemplarity operates as a heuristic tool exploited by both the external and internal narrators to provide a meaningful interpretation of the events that Livy records. While *opsis* is, for Polybius, an apparatus for pragmatic didacticism, exemplarity for Livy is a device that is a foundation of his moralistic didacticism, as he describes in his general preface.<sup>3</sup> The discussion below focuses on the parallel roles of Polybian *opsis* and Livian exemplarity as heuristic tools

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<sup>3</sup> Livy *praef.* 10: *Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites.* "This is the especially advantageous and fruitful quality in studying history: that you look upon evidence of every kind of *exemplum*, as though they are set out on a famous monument. From this it is on you and on your state to pick out what you ought to imitate, and, from that, what is shameful in both the attempt and in the outcome and ought to be avoided."

for internal and external audiences to determine how to behave: practically for Polybius' audiences and morally for Livy's.

Another difference between these two historiographic tools is the capability or even need to interpret the events explored by each. Polybian *opsis* is clear-cut and not open to interpretation. The unequivocal nature of *opsis* provides Polybius the opportunity to assert his authority over his predecessors based on his autopsy of the passes across the Alps (3.48.12).<sup>4</sup> In Polybius' *Histories* Hannibal, too, relies on autopsy whenever possible, as he does when catching sight of an ambushing force during his own crossing of the Alps (3.50). In passages where the *opsis* of a character fails to provide a clear-cut representation of the events before them, one of two possibilities occurs: Either the character's sight is diminished in some fashion, as happens in the fog at the Battle of Lake Trasimene that causes Flaminius and his troops to fail to see the Carthaginians before being ambushed (3.84.1-5),<sup>5</sup> or another character has purposefully constructed a false appearance to guide their intended audience to a mistaken understanding of the events, as happens when Hannibal uses the torch-bearing oxen to fool the Romans (3.93-94) or masks and wigs to fool would-be assassins (3.78).<sup>6</sup> Livy follows suit and has his Hannibal use *opsis* to determine the cause of a holdup in his marching column (21.36.3-5). The result of the sight he encounters is described as *haud dubia* (21.36.4), a

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<sup>4</sup> cf., too, his attack of Timaeus for his lack of visual inspection (12.25g.1-4) or his claim to have found an inscription of Hannibal (3.33.17-18). For discussion of these passages, Chapter 2, above.

<sup>5</sup> On which, Chapter 2, Part 3, above.

<sup>6</sup> Polybius refers to Hannibal's trick with the wigs as an example of "Punic subterfuge" (3.78.1 Φοινικικῶν στρατηγίῃματι τοιοῦτῳ), perhaps suggesting that this behavior—and consequently the larger ability to confound others' *opsis*—is limited to Carthaginian actors or even Hannibal himself, though this is his only use of said term.

designation that matches Polybius' take on the authority granted by *opsis*. Additionally, as *opsis* for Polybius provides a straightforward account of what is occurring, it can lead its recipient unequivocally to a particular course of action. Hannibal in the *Histories* demonstrates the clear-cut nature of *opsis* in his battlefield exhortation at Cannae (3.111.1-3). Polybius' Scipio, too, does so in his claim that the sight of the Roman troops in Spain will provoke an easily predictable response from the native Spanish tribes (10.6.4).

Livian exemplarity, on the other hand, is built upon discourse and based upon contextual interpretation. Acts of various types become meaningful *exempla* through the interpretive process that underlies the presentation and discussion of the deeds. This becomes evident in Livy's recurring use of various *exempla*. Cannae, for instance, is recalled by Tiberius Sempronius following the death of Postumius as an *exemplum* to demonstrate Roman resilience (23.25), by Fabius Maximus in the elections of 214 to show the need for choosing an experienced leader (24.7.10-9.5), by Scipio in Spain, as discussed in the previous chapter, to show how the tables have now turned against Carthage (26.41), by Hannibal on multiple occasions as a means of encouraging his newly acquired Italian allies (23.43) and his troops (23.45 and 27.12.11-12).<sup>7</sup> In each of these instances the exemplary lesson to be drawn from the Battle of Cannae is determined based on the discourse that ensues as the speaker expounds on the qualities of the battle that he deems apropos to that situation. Significantly, the internal narrators that use the

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<sup>7</sup> On Cannae as an *exemplum*, Chaplin 2000: 53-72. Chaplin notes, in total, ten instances of the use of Cannae as an *exemplum*: 23.18.7, 23.25.3, 23.43.4, 23.45.8, 24.8.20, 25.10.8, 25.22.1-3, 26.12.14, 26.41.11, 27.12.11 (Appendix, p. 205).

exemplary power of Cannae are each able to draw their own conclusions about the lesson to be drawn from the battle. Livy, as external narrator, weighs in as appropriate by suggesting the reactions of various internal audiences (such as the Senate: 23.25.6-11; the Centuriate assembly: 24.9.4-6; the Carthaginian army: 23.46.1-2 and 27.12.13-14; and Scipio's troops in Spain: 26.42.1). The interpretive act formed by the internal narrator's description and the audience's reaction is integral to the construction of the *exemplum*.<sup>8</sup>

The central importance of the interpretation by an internal narrator and the internal audience makes Livian exemplarity context-dependent. Each *exemplum* can take on various lessons in different contexts. The possible interpretations of the Battle of Cannae just mentioned, for example, demonstrate how the context of the recollection of a particular exemplary act changes depending on the context in which it is recalled.<sup>9</sup> So, too, does the Regulus *exemplum*, as noted by Scipio and Fabius in their debate over the former's proposed invasion of Africa, as discussed in the previous chapter.<sup>10</sup> After Fabius attempts to argue that the failure of Regulus in Africa demonstrates the folly of Scipio's

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<sup>8</sup> See also Roller 2004, 2009, 2011. Roller 2009 uses the case of Duilius to compare the historicist and exemplary modes of Roman historical writing and how these relate to larger trends in Roman culture. 2009: 216-17 stresses the discursive nature of exemplarity. Roller 2011 examines the moral complexities evident in the Fabius *exemplum* to determine how the conflicts of value and judgement in the tale of Fabius make him a useful exemplary actor for later debate. Roller shows how the discourse surrounding Fabius' actions demonstrate a shift in the meaning as they change over time. Chaplin 2000: 50-72 also establishes the role that the internal speakers within Livy's text construct meaning for the internal and external audience. On speakers and exemplary spectacles in general in Livy, Feldherr 1998.

<sup>9</sup> Langlands 2011 argues that this phenomenon is integral for the larger use of exemplarity in Roman culture, as exhibited in the works of Valerius Maximus and Cicero (*de Off.*). Ethical decisions described by Valerius and Cicero demonstrate that behaviors are to be judged depending on the circumstances in which they are performed: what is right for one person in a given situation may be different for someone else, even in a similar situation. cf., too, Langlands 2008, where she explores the discursive practices at work in Valerius' treatment of the theme of *severitas*.

<sup>10</sup> For the full account of the meeting and the speeches of Fabius and Scipio: Livy 28.40-45. For my brief analysis, cf. Chap. 3, Part 3, above. cf., too, Chaplin 2000: 92-97, which discusses the wider range of *exempla* used by each speaker.

planned campaign, Scipio replies that his own operations in Spain, which were ultimately successful, are a better analogue for Regulus' disastrous invasion of Africa (28.43.17-18). Scipio's retort demonstrates that contextual clues larger and more significant than parallel situations must be read in any attempt to apply an exemplary deed to future behavior: "How would I less likely cross over to Africa with Regulus captured than to Spain with the Scipios killed?" (*qui ego minus in Africam Regulo capto quam Scipionibus occisis in Hispaniam traicerem?*; 28.43.18).<sup>11</sup> Scipio instead proposes that his own campaign in Spain is a more applicable parallel for Regulus' invasion of Africa, although his victory there ultimately trumps the exemplary power of Regulus' defeat as an impediment to a proposed attack.<sup>12</sup> Scipio's reading of the exemplary lesson found in the Regulus episode demonstrates how the applicability of *exempla* and the meaning to be derived from them are interpreted by the speaker to suit the context in which they are displayed.

Another key distinction between *opsis* and exemplarity is the perspective from which each operates: *opsis* is performed by an audience (the viewer) while exemplarity is defined and explored by a speaker to an audience. Polybius claims that only by travelling along Hannibal's path through the Alps himself can he gain a sure understanding of the march (3.48.12). His need for autopsy underscores the importance of the viewer-based perspective required for Polybian *opsis* to be accurate: he could not rely on others' accounts of the campaign and, as he tells it, his act of autopsy is what gives him greater

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<sup>11</sup> Scipio's retort is the culmination of a larger demonstration of Fabius' misapplication of Regulus to the current situation: 28.43.17-18. Scipio notes that some of the specific elements described by Fabius are not accurate (such as his claims of Regulus' lack of initial success, or the defeat at the hands of the Carthaginians) or less applicable than more recent events.

<sup>12</sup> On which, Chapter 3, Part 3, above.

authority over his predecessors. For Polybius' characters, too, *opsis* is performed from their perspective. Hannibal, for instance, uses *opsis* to give himself an advantage over his enemy as he crosses the Rhone (3.43) or when his troops encounter a difficult path along their crossing of the Alps (3.51.6). Even when Hannibal as an internal narrator prepares a spectacle for his troops to provide the proper lesson for them to learn before a battle, as he does before the Battle at the Ticinus River (3.62.11-63.1), Polybius focalizes the description of the scene from reaction of the audience.<sup>13</sup> Although the speech associated with the duel provides Hannibal the opportunity to explain the purpose behind the spectacle that he sets up, Polybius highlights that the troops learned the lesson upon seeing the combat themselves. Hannibal's words only reiterate the same message. In Scipio's initial engagements in Spain, Polybius notes how carefully the general ensures that his position on the field allows him to see what is occurring and to be seen by his troops (ἄμα μὲν γὰρ ἑώρα τὸ γινόμενον, ἄμα δ' αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος; 10.13.3-5), who are encouraged by the sight of their general.<sup>14</sup>

Livy, too, includes the focus on the audience-based perspective in his incorporation of Polybian *opsis*. Livy's Hannibal performs autopsy (*ipse...visendum*) on a pass in the Alps before determining how his army should pass through (21.36.3-5) and, nearer the end of their crossing, Hannibal encourages his troops to perform a visual

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<sup>13</sup> On this passage, Chapter 2, Part 3, above.

<sup>14</sup> On which, Chapter 3, Part 1, above. Though Scipio's placement on the field is, in part, a way of achieving an expected or planned behavior from his troops, the perspective of the *opsis* is focused on the soldiers: they gather the intelligence through their own sight and determine the course required without the need for an interpretive exemplary debate.

inspection themselves of the lands in which they are about to campaign (21.35.8-9).<sup>15</sup>

Hannibal's speech here only reinforces the point that the view from the promontory yields on its own; the *opsis* performed by the Carthaginian army gives them the lesson that they need to incorporate to find success in their forthcoming campaign.

Livian exemplarity, conversely, is built primarily from the speaker's perspective. While an audience is necessary to receive the lesson and ensure the survival of the exemplary acts, the moral to be drawn from the deeds only gains significance when expounded upon by a narrator.<sup>16</sup> Fabius and Scipio's debate over the proposed invasion of Spain (28.40-44), for example, shows how the *exempla* of Regulus and Agathocles in Africa or the Athenians in Sicily take on different lessons when explained by each speaker. The Senate's various reactions to these points (28.43.1 and 28.45.1) demonstrate how the speaker's interpretation of the exemplary acts helps determine the meaning an internal audience should draw from them.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, when Scipio addresses the remnants of his father's and uncle's army in Spain, he explains to them how their past valor suggests a way for their campaign to move forward (26.41). His call for action relies on the Carthaginians and Spaniards seeing and knowing how the Romans intend to advance by exhibiting their presence to the Carthaginian and Spanish forces to encourage them to splinter.<sup>18</sup> Lucius Marcius, however, who steps up in the immediate aftermath of

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<sup>15</sup> On these passages, Chapter 2, Part 4, above. Hannibal's encouragement of autopsy from the perspective of his troops is key to the overall focalization of the crossing of the Alps from the Carthaginian point of view: Feldherr 2009b: 317-18, esp. n. 9, and Pausch 2011: 151-52.

<sup>16</sup> In laying out his "Exemplary Loop," Roller 2004 notes the necessity of both the primary and secondary audiences to the construction of exemplarity.

<sup>17</sup> On these remarks, Chapter 3, Part 3, above and Chaplin 2000: 96.

<sup>18</sup> On this passage, Chapter 3, Part 2, above and Chaplin 2000: 64-65.

the Scipios' deaths to take command of their fractured forces, recalls the same deeds to suggest that the army should be wary of the Carthaginian forces regrouping (25.39).

There is considerable overlap between these two situations: the internal audience is largely the same (though Scipio's new forces have augmented those that had survived in Spain), the situations are parallel (largely being trapped by three Carthaginian and allied armies), and the deeds recalled (the feats of the elder Scipios' armies in Spain) are similarly repeated. Unlike Polybian *opsis*, which is clear upon its receipt, identical exemplary acts gain distinct interpretations when recounted from the perspectives of different speakers even to the same audience in similar situations.

The shift in perspective between Polybian *opsis* and Livian exemplarity is even subtly hinted at in the parallel descriptions that Hannibal and Scipio each resemble their father.<sup>19</sup> Hannibal, the representation of Polybian *opsis* in Livy's text, is said by his troops to resemble his father Hamilcar: "The veteran soldiers believed that a young Hamilcar had returned to them." (*Hamilcarem iuuenem redditum sibi ueteres milites credere*; 21.4.2). The correlation is made from the perspective of the troops: they notice and draw meaning from the parallel appearance of their new commander. Scipio, however, notes the similarity between his appearance and his father's in his speech in Spain:

breui faciam ut, quemadmodum nunc **noscitatis** in me patris patruisque similitudinem oris uoltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei uirtutisque effigiem **uobis** reddam ut reuixisse aut renatum sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat. (26.41.24-25)

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<sup>19</sup> Levene 2010: 173-77 notes how these descriptions fit into larger patterns of characterization in Livy's text.



Just as **you now recognize** in me a likeness of the face, appearance, and bodily features of my father and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I provide **to you** a copy of their character, loyalty, and courage in order that each of you would say that Scipio the general lives again or has been born a second time.

For Scipio, the exhibitor of Livian exemplarity, the description of the parallel and the exploration of its significance originates from the perspective of the speaker of the *exemplum*. The second person forms (*noscitatis, vobis*) and the call for action demonstrate how exemplarity is still delivered to and for an audience, but it is the internal narrator who explains these parallels in Scipio's case.

This chapter pushes on the limits of Polybian *opsis* and Livian exemplarity by exploring how each author incorporates notes of their respective historiographic method into their accounts of the Battle of Zama. As Hannibal and Scipio meet on the battlefield in the conclusive action of the war, Livy and Polybius each use the opportunity to demonstrate the value and efficacy of their own historiographic approaches. Livy includes a notice of the battlefield exhortations given by Hannibal and Scipio that alludes to the generals' prior campaigns and the meeting they had to discuss options for peace before the battle:

Poenus sedecim annorum in terra Italia **res gestas**, tot duces Romanos, tot exercitus occidione occisos et **sua cuique decora** ubi ad insignem alicuius pugnae memoria militem uenerat referebat: Scipio Hispanias et **recentia** in Africa **proelia** et confessionem hostium quod neque non petere pacem propter metum neque manere in ea prae insita animis perfidia potuissent. ad hoc conloquium Hannibalis in secreto habitum ac liberum **fingenti qua uolt** flectit. **ominatur**, quibus quondam auspiciis patres eorum ad Aegates pugnaverint insulas, ea illis exeuntibus in aciem portendisse deos. adesse finem belli ac laboris; **in manibus** esse praedam Carthaginis, reditum domum in **patriam** ad **parentes liberos**

**coniuges penatesque deos.** celsus haec corpore uoltuque ita laeto ut uicisse iam crederes dicebat. (30.32.6-11)

Hannibal was recalling **the things they accomplished** for sixteen years in Italy, that they had killed so many Roman leaders in the slaughter, and so many armies, and, when he had come to a soldier distinguished for a memorable action in some battle, he recalled **to each man his glories**. Scipio was recalling the Spanish provinces, the **recent battles** in Africa, and the confession of their enemy that they were not able to avoid asking for peace due to their fear, but they were not able to keep the peace because of the innate treachery of their character. Given that his meeting with Hannibal was held in secret and therefore free for **suiting** it to his needs, he spins it **in whatever way he wants**. **He makes a prediction** that, as the Carthaginians are heading out to battle, the gods have given them the portents that their fathers had once had for the auspices as they fought at the Aegates Isles. He also predicts that they had come to the end of the war and their labor, that the spoils of Carthage were **in their hands**, their return home to **their country, their parents, children, wives, and household gods** was at hand. He was speaking these things with his head held high and with his face so joyous that you would have thought that he had already conquered.

As Livy narrates the battlefield exhortations of Hannibal and Scipio, each of them return to themes that were established in prior speeches of these two generals and the debate leading up to Scipio's departure for Africa. Each starts his speech with a recollection of their past successes (*res gestas; recentia...proelia*) to encourage their men to pursue similar behavior. Hannibal makes a point to refer to his troops' former victories and accomplishments throughout Livy's and Polybius' narratives: at the foot of the Alps (21.30.2-5; cf. Polyb. 3.44.10-13), before the Ticinus (21.44.1-2; cf. Polyb. 3.63), at Cannae (Polyb. 3.111.6-7).<sup>20</sup> Scipio similarly refers to the veterans' experience upon his

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<sup>20</sup> Livy makes no mention of Hannibal's exhortation before the Battle of Cannae. Polybius' account of the speech centers around the idea that *paradeigmata* and words of encouragement are no longer necessary given the troops' personal experience: on which, Chapter 2, Part 3, above. Perhaps Livy buys into the claim Hannibal advances in Polybius' version of the speech.

arrival in Spain (26.41.17; cf. Polyb. 10.6.1-6) and relates his troops' successes in Spain as part of his debate against Fabius (28.43.17-18).<sup>21</sup>

As Hannibal and Scipio repeat their typical recitation of their armies' past deeds before the Battle of Zama, they each attempt a different take on the exemplary recollection of prior acts of valor. Hannibal singles out individuals and recalls their deeds (*sua...decora*) to them individually (*cuique*). The term *decora*, which can refer to both the physical decorative honors and the deeds through which the soldiers earned them, effectively bridges the gap between the action itself and the physical commemoration of those acts. However, Hannibal falls short of making the link between these deeds and a collective call to action for his troops and instead recalls the valorous soldiers one by one. Additionally, Hannibal only recalls his troops' deeds in Italy, with a retrospective focus only on those past events. Hannibal does not make an explicit exhortation to future behavior and thereby fails to bridge the gap between the past action and the potential repetition of that action.

Scipio, however, makes the move to collectivize the response of the troops to his speech. As part of the prediction (*ominatur*) that he proposes, Scipio claims the plunder of Carthage is in their grasp (*in manibus*) and that the victory will enable them to return home.<sup>22</sup> To accompany his expectation of their homecoming, Scipio points them to consider things that they share in common: their families (*parentes, liberos, coniuges*),

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<sup>21</sup> Note, too, Scipio's report to the Senate of his success in Spain just prior to his debate with Fabius over the proposed invasion of Spain: 28.38.2-3.

<sup>22</sup> Levene 2010: 291 notes that Scipio's somewhat prophetic claim in this speech is part of "a more general sense of moral endorsement on the divine level," which is ultimately tied to Scipio's response to Hannibal in their meeting, on which, Chapter 4, Part 3, below.

gods (*Penates...deos*), and their mutual country (*patriam*). The shared experience of his troops encourages a collective response. Scipio also recalls the deeds of the previous generation at the Aegates Isles—the decisive conflict of the First Punic War. The mention of the final battle of the previous war—when coupled with the reference to the Penates, family, and household, which may call to mind for the soldiers the domestic cult, including the *imagines* of their ancestors—monumentalizes for the troops their ancestors' exemplary deeds.<sup>23</sup> Scipio thereby blends together the exemplary nature of the actions of Romans past, present (with his mention of the troops' recent skirmishes in Africa), and future (by predicting the successful end to their campaign and their victorious return home). In comparison to Hannibal's exhortation that is narrower in scope, less prospective, and more limited in its use of collective encouragement, Scipio's battlefield speech exhibits a far more effective instance of the exemplary loop.

Additionally, Livy notes how Scipio recognizes the opportunity to manipulate his secret meeting with Hannibal in whatever way he wishes (*qua volt*), highlighting Scipio's ability to apply a particular exemplary reading to the event.<sup>24</sup> As noted above, Livian exemplarity requires an interpretation by a speaker (often an internal narrator) to an audience, unlike Polybian *opsis* which is performed by the audience and provides a clear-cut explanation of events. Livy's aside that Scipio can fit (*fingenti*) the event to his purposes strengthens the sense that the general is performing an exemplary speech to his

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<sup>23</sup> On the *imagines* and their important religious, familial, social, and political functions: Flower 1996; v. esp. pp. 209-11 on the domestic cult and the role of the Penates and *imagines* in that practice.

<sup>24</sup> On Scipio's manipulation of the meeting and its relation to Livy's own manipulated version of the speeches: Moore 2010: 162.

troops in order to encourage them to achieve success in the battle like they have in Spain and, more recently, since landing in Africa, and like their ancestors did in the previous war with Carthage.

In this chapter I examine the lengths to which Livy pushes his incorporation of Polybian *opsis* in his portrayal of Hannibal and Scipio's mastery of exemplarity to add further interpretive significance to the Battle of Zama and the conclusion to the Third Decade. As in the previous chapter, however, I will first return to Polybius' *Histories* to examine the precedent for the narrative surrounding the battle of Zama and the speeches shared between the two generals before returning directly to Livy's account.

## Part 2: The Polybian Battle of Zama

The figure of Scipio pursues a methodology of investigation and communication in Polybius' narrative of his affairs in Spain that mirrors the function of Polybius as an external narrator, as I argue in the previous chapter. So too, did Hannibal in his campaign in Italy, as I argue in Chapter Two. As the methodologies employed by the generals usually indicate their success in their endeavors, Polybius has the chance to explicate the soundness of his methodology more fully as he describes an encounter between the two Polybian generals, namely the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio and the ensuing engagement at Zama. In the narrative that Polybius creates surrounding the Battle of Zama, the generals on each side of the conflict demonstrate their abilities to manipulate *opsis* to their advantage. In his actions prior to the battle, Scipio Africanus shares many of the elements of Polybian historiographic language that Hannibal employed in his campaign in Italy. Scipio controls the *opsis* of the Carthaginian envoys that visit his camp and gives a battlefield exhortation that recalls that of Hannibal before Cannae and which brings about similar success. As Scipio and Hannibal each take the opportunity to speak to their troops before the battle, they use language that parallels the historiographic comments of Polybius, as I argued in Chapters Two and Three, above.<sup>25</sup> In this particular instance, however, the speeches made on each side create a range of effects and outcomes on the internal audiences that the external audience can use to compare the rhetorical techniques described.

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<sup>25</sup> Rumpf 2006 analyzes the lengths to which these orations serve narratorial purposes within Polybius' and Livy's accounts of the battle, which I address further, below.

A lengthy and seemingly complete narrative of the Battle of Zama survives among the remaining fragments of the fifteenth book of Polybius' *Histories*.<sup>26</sup> After the initial skirmishes that result in the complete abandonment of the temporary armistice, Scipio and Hannibal move their armies in response to one another.<sup>27</sup> Hannibal prepares for the coming battle by attempting to determine the layout and disposition of the Roman army:

κάκειθεν ἐξέπεμψε τρεῖς **κατασκόπους**, **βουλόμενος ἐπιγνῶναι** ποῦ στρατοπεδεύουσι καὶ πῶς χειρίζει **τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς** ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός. (15.5.4)

And from there, [Hannibal] sent out three **scouts**, **wanting to find out** where they were camping and how the Roman general was conducting **the affairs in the camp**.

As he did in the narrative of the Italian campaign discussed above, Hannibal sends out scouts (κατασκόπους) to view what he himself cannot. The participle βουλόμενος, with its object infinitive ἐπιγνῶναι and the subsequent indirect questions, marks Hannibal as the ultimate recipient of the knowledge gained through the reconnaissance. Though the scouts will perform the visual act, Hannibal directs their exploits and therefore controls the information gathered by them.

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<sup>26</sup> On the manuscript tradition of Polybius: Moore 1965 and the introduction to Walbank's 1967 *Commentary*. On the fragments for Book 15: Foulon 1995.

<sup>27</sup> The section of Polybius' narrative that describes the creation of the armistice does not survive, but 15.1.2 notes that the Carthaginians' actions violate a sworn truce: παραβεβηκέναι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. Scipio also mentions the terms of the treaty in his personal meeting with Hannibal before the battle (15.8.7-8). For Livy's account of the truce: 30.16. cf. Diod. 27.12. The historicity of the treaty is suspect: Mantel 1991: 125-28, Hoyos 2003: 167-70; *contra* Gerhold 2002: 111-40. Levene 2010: 326-31 discusses the relationship between the violation of this treaty and the larger issue of moral causation in Livy.

Though Hannibal attempts to gain the knowledge necessary to determine the course of action he would pursue against the Roman army, the scouts are discovered and led to the camp of their enemy. Polybius marks Scipio's reaction to the capture of these scouts as something outside the norm of military operations:

Πόπλιος δ', ἐπαναχθέντων ὡς αὐτὸν τῶν κατασκόπων, τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε τοῦ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐαλωκότας, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς τοῦναντίον συστήσας αὐτοῖς χιλιάρχον ἐπέταξε πάντα καθαρῶς ὑποδεῖξαι **τὰ κατὰ τὴν παρεμβολήν.** (15.5.5)

But Publius, after the scouts were brought before him, held off from punishing the captured men, as is their usual custom, so much so that he contrived the opposite and placed the tribune in charge of them to point out clearly **everything around the camp.**

While the Romans' custom in these situations dictates that the captured scouts should be punished, Scipio instead gives orders to ensure that they fulfill their assigned task. The near repetition of the phrase “τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς” from above, here in the singular “τὰ κατὰ τὴν παρεμβολήν,” creates a connection between Hannibal's original orders and Scipio's demand that the scouts be shown the elements of the encampment. Since the scouts were captured, their mission was completed only through the agency of Roman general, who commanded that they be shown the camp. In effect, Scipio has taken control of the *opsis* of these scouts and, consequently, the information gained through their exploits.

Scipio's control over the knowledge of the Roman encampment is strengthened as he continues to manage the action that follows the grand tour of the camp. He ensures that the scouts received the information they set out to learn:



γενομένου δὲ τούτου **προσεπύθετο** τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ πάντα φιλοτίμως αὐτοῖς ὑποδέδειχεν ὁ συσταθείς· **τῶν δὲ φησάντων**, δοὺς ἐφόδια καὶ παραπομπὴν ἐξαπέστειλε **προστάξας ἐπιμελῶς** Ἀννίβα διασαφεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀπηντημένων αὐτοῖς. (15.5.6-7)

After this was done, [Scipio] **inquired** of the men whether the one appointed to them pointed out everything with care. **After they agreed**, he gave them supplies and an escort and sent them off, **having ordered** them to explain to Hannibal **carefully** what happened to them.

Scipio's management of the information that the scouts have gathered through autopsy reaches its maximum extent in the passage. His inquiry (*προσεπύθετο*) verifies that they gained the desired knowledge and he forces their assent to the fact (*τῶν δὲ φησάντων*) that they did. He then orders them (*προστάξας*) to pass the knowledge on to Hannibal and to do so with care (*ἐπιμελῶς*). Scipio even supplies them with the provisions and escort necessary to ensure their safety on their return.<sup>28</sup>

Scipio's ploy succeeds and more. Hannibal is so overcome by admiration for Scipio that he requests a meeting with his Roman counterpart.<sup>29</sup> Scipio agrees to the request and responds that he will to arrange a time and place to meet at a later time: "he said that he would send to him indicating the time and place when he would meet with him" (*ἔφη δὲ πέμψειν πρὸς αὐτὸν διασαφῶν, ἐπειδὴν μέλλη συμπορεύεσθαι, τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν*; 15.5.10). Through his response Scipio maintains the control he has over

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<sup>28</sup> De Sanctis 1968: 2.594 notes that this passage is likely to be fabricated, due to its similarity to an account by Herodotus of Xerxes' treatment of some Greek scouts (Hdt. 7.146.7) or the tale of Laevinus' treatment of Pyrrhus' scouts (Dion. Hal. 19.11, e.g.). Walbank 1967: 450, however, notes that this story may, in fact, be true if Scipio himself is aware of such stories and models his behavior off of them.

<sup>29</sup> 15.5.8: *ὧν παραγεννηθέντων θαυμάσας ὁ Ἀννίβας τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν τάνδρὸς οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἰς ὄρμην ἔπεσε τοῦ βούλεσθαι συνελθεῖν εἰς λόγους τῷ Ποπλίῳ*. "After [the messengers] returned, Hannibal was amazed at the generosity and daring of the man and somehow came to the impulse of wanting to come to a meeting with Scipio."

the information that was established earlier in his interactions with the scouts.

Additionally, immediately after Scipio sends his response to Hannibal's request, two events occur that neutralize any possible advantage that the scouts' report may have granted to the Carthaginian general. First, the arrival of Masinissa adds ten thousand troops to the Roman force;<sup>30</sup> second, Scipio breaks camp and moves to a favorable and well-watered location near Naragara.<sup>31</sup> Hannibal may not have been familiar, as Polybius' audience is, with the concept that the Roman army always constructs its camp according to the same layout.<sup>32</sup> His initial plan to reconnoiter the layout and management of the camp (πῶς χειρίζει τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς; 15.5.4) suggests a lack of knowledge or at least a vague awareness of the encampment on his part.<sup>33</sup> His unfamiliarity with the Roman camp and the sudden addition of Masinissa's ten thousand troops negate any potential benefit derived from the knowledge provided to Hannibal through the scouts as facilitated by Scipio. While Hannibal attempts to rely on *opsis* as he has done in the past,

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<sup>30</sup> 15.5.12: τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἦκε Μασαννάσας, ἔχων πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ περὶ τετρακισχιλίους.

<sup>31</sup> 15.5.14: ἀνέξευξε, καὶ παραγενηθεὶς πρὸς πόλιν Ναράγαρα κατεστρατοπέδευσε, πρὸς τε τᾶλλα τόπον εὐφυῆ καταλαβόμενος καὶ τὴν ὕδρεϊαν ἐντὸς βέλους ποιησάμενος. The actual site is uncertain, as is the manuscript tradition here. For a full discussion of the potential sites: Walbank 1967: 446-49. In the text given here, I follow the well-accepted reading of Schweighauser of Ναράγαρα for MS Μάργαρον: Walbank 1967: 451.

<sup>32</sup> Polybius discusses the consistency of the construction of the Roman military camp (6.26.10-12 and 6.27-34) as part of his larger description of Roman customs in the sixth book of the *Histories*. The extended ethnographic digression serves as the introduction to the *symplokē* and an explanation of the success that Rome finds in the rest of Polybius' work.

<sup>33</sup> Similarly, Nero's and Livius' ability to fool Hasdrubal about the arrival of the second consular army at the Battle of the Metaurus River may also suggest a larger unawareness of Roman camp practices on the part of the Carthaginians (Livy 27.46-7). Though the fragments of Polybius' eleventh book do not contain the precursor actions to the Battle of the Metaurus, the phrase that opens his description of the battle suggests the conclusion of these details: Ἀσδρούβα δὲ τούτων μὲν ἤρεσκεν οὐδέν (11.1.2). The issues that caused concern for Hasdrubal likely included the unexpected appearance of a second consular army.

Scipio manipulates the situation, takes command of Hannibal's ability to gain knowledge, and neutralizes the value of the visual information that the Carthaginians acquire.

When the two generals do meet, Hannibal speaks first. His remarks (15.6.6-7.9) read the past and present situations faced by the two states with a focus on the fickleness of fortune and he warns Scipio not to be excessively proud but instead to consent to Hannibal's proposed terms for peace.<sup>34</sup> Scipio's response (15.8), however, offers his own reading of the current circumstances taking into account more recent events than what Hannibal had mentioned.<sup>35</sup> In his reply, Scipio reproaches Hannibal for misreading the situation: "It is clear that the matters have undertaken a drastic change. Indeed, the greatest concern is what end we have reached." (δῆλον ὥς μεγάλην εἴληφε τὰ πράγματα παραλλαγὴν. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον ἦλθομεν ἐπὶ τί πέρας; 15.8.5-6). Scipio's remarks make it clear that Hannibal has proposed terms for peace that are no longer valid given the current circumstances. While the Carthaginians' proposition may have found traction before both armies crossed to Africa, as Scipio explains, the events that have transpired since their arrival have made an equitable peace impossible.<sup>36</sup> The conversation shared between these two generals demonstrates that Scipio has used a superior ability to perceive the suitable course of action in the situation at hand.

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<sup>34</sup> Adler 2011: 72-76 discusses the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio before Zama at length and stresses how Hannibal's focus on fortune in this exchange fits in with Polybius' larger historiographic methods.

<sup>35</sup> Champion 2004: 150 notes how Scipio's reading of the situation and the Carthaginian's responsibility as the aggressors in this war fits in with the larger narrative of Books One through Five.

<sup>36</sup> 15.8.4: ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν εἰς Λιβύην αὐτὸς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἐκχωρήσας προὔτεινας τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας, οὐκ ἂν οἴομαι σε διαψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος. "But if you yourself had departed from Italy and offered these terms before the Romans crossed to Africa, I do not think that you would have had false hope." On this argument: Walbank 1967: 452.

As Polybius continues his narrative, he notes that the meeting ends in a state that leaves no chance for reconciliation (ἀσύμβατον ποιησάμενοι τὴν κοινολογίαν; 15.9.1). Consequently, he makes a brief aside to remark on the significance of the outcome of the engagement (15.9.2-6) and then moves to his description of the battle.<sup>37</sup> Polybius describes in detail the position and arrangement of the Roman lines, noting how Scipio creates unusually large gaps in the line to allow the enemy's elephants to pass through.<sup>38</sup> After the troops have been arranged, Scipio addresses his men using themes and language that recall Hannibal's speeches before the Battles at the Ticinus River and at Cannae.<sup>39</sup> To begin, Scipio's oration takes the opportunity to remind his troops of their previous experiences: "for he thought it good for them to be brave men, worthy of themselves and their country, by recalling their past travails" (ἡξίου γὰρ μνημονεύοντας τῶν προγεγονότων ἀγώνων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι, σφῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίους; 15.10.2). Before the engagement at Cannae, Hannibal similarly reminds his men to focus on their recent battles to gain courage:

ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τρισὶ μάχαις τηλικαύταις ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου νενικήκατε Ῥωμαίους, ποῖος ἂν ἔτι λόγος ὑμῖν ἰσχυρότερον παραστήσαι θάρσος αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; (3.111.6-7)

<sup>37</sup> cf. Livy 30.32.1-3. Levene 2010: 11-12 notes how the suggestion of the potential outcome of this engagement shows how Livy points to later stages of Roman history in his narrative.

<sup>38</sup> 15.9.7: πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἀστάτους καὶ τὰς τούτων σημαίας ἐν διαστήμασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς πρίγκιπας, τιθεὶς τὰς σπείρας οὐ κατὰ τὸ τῶν πρώτων σημαιῶν διάστημα, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀλλὰ καταλλήλους ἐν ἀποστάσει διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐλεφάντων. "First he placed the hastati-their standards placed at intervals, after them the principes, placed not in the gaps behind the standards of the front line as is the custom for the Romans, but behind them at a distance because of the large number of their opponents' elephants." On Hannibal's use of elephants at Zama—and in his earlier campaigns: Charles and Rhodan 2007.

<sup>39</sup> Adler 2011: 78-79 also connects Hannibal's speech before Zama with those before Cannae and the Ticinus, noting that there is a discontinuity between claims that Hannibal makes in his Italian campaign and those he later makes at Zama. Adler provides a thoughtful explanation for the effects this disconnect may have had on Polybius' ancient audience.

Since you have by all accounts beaten the Romans successively in three large battles, what sort of speech would render your courage still stronger than your deeds themselves?

Both Scipio and Hannibal call their men to rely on their own knowledge and experience. Hannibal, as discussed in Chapter Two above, explains to his men that these past battles negate the need for a lengthy speech or didactic spectacles (ὕποδείγματα).<sup>40</sup> Scipio, too, avoids the use of contrived scenes in the rest of his oration and instead relies on the ability of his troops to adequately use *opsis* to read the situation.

Beyond the call for recollection of past military engagements found in the battlefield speeches of Hannibal at Cannae and Scipio at Zama, each of the generals notes the significance of the imminent battle for their current campaign. For each army, the battle they are about to face in enemy territory may grant them complete dominion over their opponents' lands. At Cannae, Hannibal makes the point at the conclusion of his battlefield exhortation:

οὗ κρατήσαντες κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε παραχρῆμα πάσης Ἰταλίας,  
ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῶν νῦν πόνων, γενόμενοι συμπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς  
Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας, ἡγεμόνες ἅμα καὶ δεσπότης πάντων γενήσεσθε  
διὰ ταύτης τῆς μάχης. (3.111.9)

**Having conquered here, you will straightaway be masters of all of Italy, and be freed from your present toils, coming into possession of all the prosperity of the Romans; at the same time you will become the leaders and masters of everything** through this battle.

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<sup>40</sup> For further discussion of this passage, Chapter 2, Part 3, above.

Scipio, however, includes near the beginning of his speech at Zama the thought that a victory provides control over their opponents' lands, using language that is parallel to and, for Polybius' external audience at least, reminiscent of Hannibal's oration at Cannae:

ἡξίου... καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὅτι **κρατήσαντες μὲν** τῶν ἐχθρῶν οὐ μόνον **τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ πραγμάτων ἔσονται κύριοι** βεβαίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ **τῆς ἄλλης οἰκουμένης τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον** αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι περιποιήσουσιν· (15.10.2)

He also thought it good for them to take before their eyes that **after their victory** over their enemies not only **will they certainly be masters of affairs in Libya**, but that they will also acquire for themselves and their country possession of **the leadership and uncontested dominion of the whole inhabited world**.

Direct verbal and semantic parallels resound in these two passages: Scipio's *κρατήσαντες μὲν...ἔσονται κύριοι* recalls Hannibal's *κρατήσαντες κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε*. While the Carthaginians at Cannae are on the verge of domination of all of Italy (*πάσης Ἰταλίας*) and all the fortune of the Romans (*συμπάσης...τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας*), the Romans at Zama have within their grasp dominion over the affairs in Libya (*τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ πραγμάτων*). While Hannibal's men are trying to become leaders and masters of all (*ἡγεμόνες ἅμα καὶ δεσπότης πάντων*), the Romans can possess the abstractions leadership and dominion (*τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ δυναστείαν*). Scipio's remarks demonstrate a sense of one-upmanship over Hannibal's in two ways: first, the potential (and achieved) dominion of Rome will be uncontested (*ἀδήριτον*)—a point never raised by Hannibal; second, Roman rule will stand over the whole *oikoumenē* (*τῆς ἄλλης οἰκουμένης*), a catchphrase

for Polybius that incorporates the entire scope of his *Histories*.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, Polybius had just described in an aside the potential outcome of the engagement in similar terms:<sup>42</sup>

οὐ γὰρ τῆς Λιβύης αὐτῆς οὐδὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἔμελλον κυριεύειν οἱ τῇ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὅσα νῦν πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τὴν ἱστορίαν. (15.9.5)

For, those who would conquer in this battle would not be masters just of Libya, nor of Europe, but even of all the parts of the inhabited world, the very thing that has now happened in the course of history.

As an internal narrator, Scipio's estimation of the situation, as described to his troops, mirrors that of the external narrator. Just as Hannibal had in his campaign in Italy, Scipio serves a role in his exhortation before Zama that functionally and semantically parallels that of Polybius.

Additionally, Scipio's speech at Zama incorporates themes that Hannibal had previously employed in the narrative in his battlefield exhortation at the Ticinus River. After considering the consequences of victory or death, Scipio briefly considers the fate of those who flee from battle:

ἀσφάλειαν γὰρ τοῖς φυγοῦσιν οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς περιποιῆσαι τόπος τῶν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ· πεσοῦσι δ' ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων χεῖρας οὐκ ἄδηλα [εἶναι] τὰ συμβησόμενα **τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις**. (15.10.4)

For no place of those in Libya is sufficient to provide safety for those that flee: but it is not unclear what will happen for those that fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, **if they consider it correctly**.

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<sup>41</sup> cf., e.g., his many mentions of the term in his methodological passages: 1.1.5, 1.3.3, 1.4.1, 2.37.4-5, 3.1.4, 3.3.9, 3.37.1, 3.58-59, and 4.2.4, among others.

<sup>42</sup> Levene 2010: 11, n. 19, notes that Livy takes up this sentiment in his version of Hannibal's and Scipio's speeches.

Before the Battle at the Ticinus River, Hannibal's estimation of his army's present circumstances contains a plea much like Scipio's at Zama:<sup>43</sup>

οὐδένα γὰρ οὕτως ἀλόγιστον οὐδὲ νωθρὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ὃς μνημονεύων μὲν τοῦ μήκους τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς διηυσμένης ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων, μνημονεύων δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν μεταξὺ πολεμίων, εἰδὼς δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ποταμῶν ὧν διεπέρασεν, ἐλπίσαι ποτ' ἂν ὅτι φεύγων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφίξεται. (3.63.7)

**For there is not any one of them who is so irrational** or dimwitted, who would ever hope that he would reach home by flight, after he calls to mind the length of the road traversed from their country and the number of enemies in between, and knowing the size of the rivers which he crossed.

In each of these battlefield speeches, then, the general warns his troops that there is no escape should they flee from the battle. Both speakers, too, note that the fact can be recognized through good sense, as Scipio suggests they ought to reason it out properly (τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις), while Hannibal observes that none of them is so unreasonable (οὐδένα γὰρ οὕτως ἀλόγιστον) as to miss his point.

Consequently, the battle becomes a matter of victory or death, as each general notes to his troops. Scipio ends his speech by contrasting these two extremes: “therefore he thought it best for them, considering that there are two possibilities, either to conquer or die, to advance forward to meet the enemy” (διόπερ ἡξίου δύο προθεμένους, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἢ νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν, ὁμόσε χωρεῖν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους; 15.10.6). At the Ticinus, Hannibal uses the spectacle of the Gallic captives (3.62) to illustrate the same fact.<sup>44</sup> In order to be sure that the recognition is not lost on his troops, Hannibal also provides the

<sup>43</sup> On this speech and Hannibal's less-than-convincing use of this rationale, Adler 2011: 64-69.

<sup>44</sup> For a discussion of this passage: Chapter 2, Part 3, above. For a comparison of these two passages in Polybius: Adler 2011: 61-76.



potential explanation of the demonstration for them: “he was thinking it necessary for all of them to go to battle to conquer in the best case, but if that should not be possible, then to die” (ᾧετο δεῖν...πάντας ἰέναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, μάλιστα μὲν νικήσοντας, ἂν δὲ μὴ τοῦτ' ἢ δυνατόν, ἀποθανουμένους; 3.63.9). In each of these scenarios—the Romans at Zama and the Carthaginians at the Ticinus—the present circumstances have left them only two possible outcomes, victory (νικᾶν; νικήσοντας) or death (θνήσκειν; ἀποθανουμένους). Scipio’s battlefield speech before Zama combines elements and themes employed by Hannibal before two of his own successes, at the Battle of the Ticinus River and at Cannae. In the exhortation, Scipio lays out before his troops the potential outcomes that they will personally suffer should the battle turn against them. Just as Hannibal’s speeches spur the Carthaginians to victory in Italy, Scipio encourages the success of his men in the decisive engagement.

After Polybius concludes his narrative of the preliminary arrangement and encouragement of the Roman forces, he addresses the same matters for the Carthaginian army, noting their layout for the battle in detail (15.11).<sup>45</sup> The battlefield speeches delivered on the Carthaginian side of the engagement, however, allow for a contrast of approaches with those delivered to the Romans. First, Hannibal orders the individual commanders of the mercenary forces to each address their own forces separately.<sup>46</sup> He

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<sup>45</sup> On the position of Hannibal’s various troops at the start of the battle and Livy’s rearrangement of Polybius’ description: Walsh 1961: 157-58, Walbank 1967: 458, and de Sanctis 1968: 636.

<sup>46</sup> 15.11.4: παρήγγειλε δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους στρατιώτας ἕκαστον παρακαλεῖν, ἀναφέροντας τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰς μεθ’ αὐτοῦ παραγεγενημένας δυνάμεις (15.11.4), “He ordered each of them to address their own soldiers, calling to mind the hope of victory that rests on him and the forces that he brought back with him.” Hannibal’s strategy represents the last of a string of attempts to communicate with the polyethnic forces that make up his mercenary troops: v., e.g. 11.19.3-5. Levene 2010: 239-44 ties the

also instructs his fellow Carthaginian commanders to point out to their men the probable suffering of others:

τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἡγουμένους τὰ συμβησόμενα περὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι καὶ τιθέναι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἐὰν ἄλλως πῶς ἐκβῇ τὰ τῆς μάχης. (15.11.5)

As for the Carthaginians, he ordered their leaders to count out and to place before their eyes the consequences for their children and wives if the matters of the battle should turn out any other way.

Although Scipio, as noted above, reminds his troops of the potential consequences that will befall them personally, Hannibal orders the Carthaginian leaders to place the focus for their troops on the possible suffering of their relatives. While Polybius, in a passage described above, notes that learning from the misfortunes of others is preferable because these are “without harm” (χωρὶς βλάβης: 1.35.8), he also describes the experience of learning through one’s own hardships as “more evident” (ἐναργέστερον: 1.35.7).<sup>47</sup> Hannibal, then, chooses to follow the course laid out by Polybius as preferable as a means of historiographic didacticism, while Scipio opts for the more apparent, direct, and, evidently, more effective approach.

Hannibal reserves his battlefield exhortation at Zama only for his seasoned veterans, those that had campaigned with him for the previous seventeen years, encouraging them to recall their past success against the Romans.<sup>48</sup> He notes,

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multiethnic composition of Hannibal’s army noted here (and in Livy 30.35.5-9) to a larger admonitory lesson for Livy’s audience.

<sup>47</sup> For a discussion of these passages: Chapter 2, Part 1, above.

<sup>48</sup> 15.11.6: Ἀννίβας δὲ τοὺς μεθ’ αὐτοῦ παραγεγονότας ἐπιπορευόμενος ἡξίου καὶ παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑπτακαίδεκάτους συνηθείας, μνησθῆναι δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν προγεγονότων αὐτοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγώνων

specifically, the battles at the Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae as examples that they should recall (15.11.8). In addition to his focus on their past experience, Hannibal also: “bids his men to cast their eyes at their opponents and to examine their ranks” (ἀναβλέπειν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευε <καὶ> τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων κατοπτεύειν τάξιν; 15.11.10). In this way, he uses his usual visually charged language (ἀναβλέπειν, κατοπτεύειν) to turn the focus of his troops to the present makeup of the Roman army.

Hannibal suggests that the total number of opponents that they presently face is much less than those that they had in past battles.<sup>49</sup> While his numerical accounting holds true at the beginning of the battle, the outcome of the engagement shows a miscalculation on his part. After the initial skirmishes commenced and the Carthaginian elephants had been subdued by the gaps arranged in the lines by Scipio (15.12.1-4; for the plan, cf. 15.9.7), the mercenaries engage with the Roman forces. As the mercenaries are overwhelmed, they turn back toward the Carthaginian lines and begin to kill them.<sup>50</sup> The retreat and betrayal by the mercenary forces show the failure of Hannibal’s serialized approach to the battlefield speeches before Zama. The mercenaries collapse onto the main Carthaginian line, who fight vigorously at first but are ultimately overwhelmed by the combination of their former comrades and the Roman forces (15.13.5-8). Thus, the bulk of the Carthaginian forces only retreat when they oppose the combination of their own fleeing mercenaries and the Roman army. As the main Carthaginian line eventually

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<sup>49</sup> 15.11.10: οὐ γὰρ οἶον ἐλάττους, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν μέρος εἶναι τῶν τότε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀγωνισαμένων. For estimates of the number of combatants in each engagement: Walbank 1967: 449-50 and 456-58.

<sup>50</sup> 15.13.4: πέρας ἐνέκλιναν οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ δόξαντες ἐγκαταλείπεσθαι προφανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, ἐπιπεσόντες κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας ἔκτεινον τούτους.

flees, they turn against even Hannibal's seasoned veterans, who wisely force them away (15.13.9). Though Hannibal suggests before the battle that the number of combatants on each side would be in the Carthaginians' favor, the totals are tipped in the favor of the Romans as the succession of desertions by the mercenaries and then their fellow Carthaginians turns against Hannibal's body of men, who eventually fall after a vigorous defense (15.14). Thus, Hannibal's insistence that his veteran troops rely on an autopsy of their opponents' lines before the battle fails after their allies turn against them.

Polybius concludes his narrative of the battle of Zama with a lengthy digression exculpating Hannibal from blame for the defeat (15.15-16).<sup>51</sup> Polybius claims that the Carthaginian general did all that he could to prepare and was even aware of the role that Fortune plays in determining the outcome of events. Instead, Polybius suggests that a proverb (παροιμίαν) best summarizes the cause of Hannibal's defeat: "A brave man comes upon one still stronger than him" (ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν; 15.16.6).<sup>52</sup> The stronger man obviously refers to Scipio, but the implication of Polybius' use of the proverb is most apparent when the roles of Hannibal and Scipio as internal narrators in their campaigns at Zama are compared. At every turn, Scipio demonstrates his ability to outwit and outmaneuver his Carthaginian counterpart. Just as Hannibal as an

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<sup>51</sup> While Hannibal survives the battle by fleeing to Hadramentum, Polybius' encomiastic account describing the truth behind the Carthaginian general's defeat has many of the markers of the death notices in the *Histories*, on which: Pomeroy 1986.

<sup>52</sup> On the possible sources of this line, Walbank 1967: 464; cf. Suidas s.v. ἐπιβολή; possibilities include Theognis, Simonides, or some unknown Hellenistic poet. ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν is Homeric: *Il.* 11.471, 11.665, 16.627, 16.837, 23.546; *Od.* 8.582, 15.557. Levene 2010: 286-87 discusses this appraisal and Livy's incorporation of it (30.35.5-9) in light of the importance of fortune stressed in the run-up to the battle. On Livy's comment and the possible identification of Polybius as one of the authors with military knowledge that Livy mentions: de Sanctis 1968: 636.

internal narrator had earlier played a role that was parallel to Polybius' guise as external narrator, Scipio reads the situation before Zama and responds in a Polybian fashion as well, a fact made evident in his treatment of the Carthaginian scouts and in the speech he delivers before the battle. Scipio is able to condense into his actions and exhortation surrounding a single, decisive battle the tropes and techniques employed by Hannibal throughout his campaign in Italy.

In the narrative surrounding the Battle of Zama, Polybius continues to portray his leading generals, Hannibal and Scipio, as internal narrators that serve roles parallel with his own. In their exchange before the battle, however, Scipio demonstrates his superiority to his Carthaginian counterpart by managing and manipulating Hannibal's scouts and the information that they gain for the situation. Scipio's bold move, however, impresses Hannibal and encourages him to seek a meeting with the Roman general. Over the course of their exchange Scipio shows a superior ability to use *opsis* in reading the circumstances that the armies face. In the battlefield exhortations employed by each general, Polybius demonstrates a contrast in styles. Scipio uses themes and language that recall issues addressed by Hannibal in his speeches at the Ticinus and Cannae. Hannibal, meanwhile, allows his subordinate officers to address each group of the army individually and only addresses his veteran troops himself. While his words encourage these men to valiant action, the outcome of the encounter demonstrates that his larger reading of the situation was inferior to his counterpart's, just as he did in his meeting with Scipio, when the tide of the battle ultimately turns against him. Polybius' narrative of the events surrounding the Battle of Zama and the actions and speeches of the leading

generals on each side therefore shows the danger of failing to recognize the circumstances faced in a given situation. Hannibal ultimately has *opsis* turn against him as Polybius allows Scipio to see the world through his eyes in the narrative surrounding Zama.

### Part 3: Decisive Encounter: Hannibal, Scipio, and their Historians at Livy's Zama

Livy's narrative of the Battle of Zama comprises the pivotal episode of the final book of the Third Decade.<sup>53</sup> Livy includes many of the same episodes in the lead-in to the Battle, including the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio. The similarities between Livy's and Polybius' narrative of the preliminary actions and the meeting between the general are enough that even the fiercest sceptics regarding Livy's use of Polybius in the Third Decade admit that Polybius was likely a source for Livy in composing this episode.<sup>54</sup> More recently, scholars who have examined the two narratives of the Battle of Zama have started from the premise that Livy was likely using Polybius as a source for his account.<sup>55</sup> A comparison between the speeches in each author shows, among other

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<sup>53</sup> On the structure of Livy's individual books in the Third Decade: Levene 2010: 25-33. While Luce 1977: 33-38 notes that many Livian books have a tripartite structure, Levene notes that Book 30 has closer to a bipartite structure, finding two halves in the defeat of Syphax (and the subsequent attempt at a truce) and the Battle of Zama and its aftermath (p. 26); cf. Burck 1962: 102-3.

<sup>54</sup> Nissen 1863: 83-85; Walsh 1961: 124-32; Treptow 1964: 209; de Sanctis 1968: 168-73; Burck 1971: 26-27; Luce 1977: 178-80. Briscoe 1993: 39 explores the impact of "Nissen's Law" on the question of Livy's use of Polybius in the Third Decade. More specifically, several scholars point to the likelihood of Livy's pre-Zama speeches as derived from Polybius: Hoffmann 1942: 99; Cavallin 1947: 27; Treptow 1964: 209.; Edlund 1967. The most vocal holdout to this idea is Tränkle 1977: 193-241 (on Zama specifically: 238-41) who argues vehemently that Livy does not begin to use Polybius until the Fourth Decade. The strong similarities to Polybius' narrative in Livy's account of Zama Tränkle posits are due to a common source, due to his belief that the additions could not be Livy's own, so an intermediate author must have introduced those elements. Levene 2010: 128-35 summarizes the main issues with Tränkle's argument.

<sup>55</sup> e.g.: Rumpf 2006, Adler 2011, and Billot 2014. Rumpf 2006 compares Polybius and Livy on the meeting at Zama to describe how the focus and structure of speeches differ between the two in an effort to uncover differences between the modes of thought in each author's attempt at historiographic speechifying. Broadly speaking, Rumpf concludes that Polybius' speeches are more agonal, aim at determining the best line of argument, and provide a clearer determination of the winner, while Livy's are often more practical and reflect changing attitudes over time (a fact Rumpf links back to the nature of the Roman constitution). Adler 2011: 98-107 notes how closely Livy follows Polybius in this exchange and argues that, among other things, Scipio's need to spin Hannibal's speech as he reports it to his soldiers (30.32.8) suggests that Livy "implicitly concedes the power of Hannibal's appeal" (p. 106). Billot 2014 argues that Polybius, Livy, and Silius each pattern their narratives of the Battle of Zama to fit into their larger claims about the significance of the Second Punic War. While Polybius notes that the battle is a contest for total hegemony of the Mediterranean—in line with his comments at the start of his *Histories*, Silius instead claims that the battle serves as a cultural turning point, paving the way for the coming principate. Billot notes that Livy claims that the battle is the most memorable ever fought, alluding to and linking Zama back to his superlative

things, that Hannibal relies on fortune more so than does Scipio.<sup>56</sup> Hannibal's emphasis on fortune corresponds to Polybius' frequent remarks on *tychē*. The correlation between Livy's Hannibal and Polybius extends further and is an extension of the function that Hannibal fulfills as a *modello-esemplare* to Polybius in his role as an internal narrator. For Livy's narrative of the Battle of Zama this allows him to show his own historiographic method in direct competition with Polybius' as Scipio and Hannibal on and off of the battlefield.

In the run-up to the battle, however, Livy describes the prevailing moods at Rome and Carthage, as each city suffers anxiety and fear from their expectations for the impending conflict. This description has no direct Polybian parallel, so it is possible that it is a Livian addition.<sup>57</sup> Livy's account of the dispositions on each side shows a contrast between Livian exemplarity and Polybian *opsis*:

sed cum Hannibale, prope nato in praetorio patris fortissimi ducis, alito  
atque educato inter arma, puero quondam milite, uixdum iuvene  
imperatore, qui senex uincendo factus Hispanias Gallias Italiam ab  
Alpibus ad fretum **monumentis ingentium rerum** compleret. ducere  
exercitum aequalem stipendiis suis, duratum omnium rerum patientia quas  
uix fides fiat homines passos, **perfusum** miliens **cruore Romano**,

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claim in the preface to the Third Decade: *bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint* (21.1.1).

<sup>56</sup> For brief remarks on Polybius' account of their meeting, Chapter 4, Part 2, above. Levene 2010: 286-87 discusses the role of fortune in Hannibal's and Scipio's speeches in Livy and how these compare to Polybius' versions. One result of this comparison is that Hannibal appears to appeal to fortune—in perhaps a Polybian fashion—more so than does Scipio.

<sup>57</sup> Unless, of course, it was added by an intermediary source, such as Coelius. However, no notice of such an account in another author survives. Polybius does briefly note how each side feels about their relationship to the cause of the war: 15.3.2: οἱ τε γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι δοκοῦντες παρεσπονδῆσθαι φιλοτίμως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸ περιγενέσθαι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἱ τε Καρχηδόνιοι συνειδότες σφίσι τὰ πεπραγμένα πρὸς πᾶν ἐτοιμῶς εἶχον πρὸς τὸ μὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑποχείριοι γενεθῆναι. “For the Romans, thinking that there had been a breach of faith, were eagerly fixed on prevailing over the Carthaginians. And the Carthaginians, recognizing what they had done, were willingly holding on for anything not to become subjects of their enemies.”



**exuuias** non militum tantum sed etiam imperatorum portantem. multos occursuros Scipioni in acie qui praetores, qui imperatores, qui consules Romanos sua manu occidissent, **muralibus uallaribusque insignes coronis**, peruagatos capta castra captas urbes Romanas. non esse hodie tot fasces magistratibus populi Romani quot captos ex caede imperatorum prae se ferre posset Hannibal. (30.28.4-7)

But [the Roman people were thinking that the fight would be] with Hannibal, who was very nearly born in the camp of his father, a very courageous commander, nourished and educated among arms. As a boy he was formerly a soldier, a commander when scarcely a young man, and who now, as an old man, had filled up Spain, Gaul, and Italy from the Alps to the strait with **monuments of his distinguished deeds**, accomplished with his victories. He led an army equal to him in military experience, and made strong by their endurance of all matters which there would hardly be belief that men suffered, **drenched with Roman blood** on a thousand occasions, carrying with them **the spoils** not just of soldiers but even of generals. They thought that many men would encounter Scipio in the battle line who had already killed praetors, generals, and Roman consuls with their own hands; **men awarded mural crowns and vallar crowns**; men that had wandered around captured camps and captured Roman cities. They thought that the magistrates of the Roman people would not have today as many fasces as those which Hannibal was able to carry before him, having taken them after the slaughter of generals.

Livy's description of the Roman people's outlook on the war mirrors in several ways the exemplary process so often exhibited in the *AUC*. First, they are concerned about actions of consequence to the Roman people: Hannibal's numerous victories at their expense. Second, there are multiple audiences of these deeds: the Roman armies who fought and lost to Hannibal and the Carthaginian troops, whom we follow from Hannibal's earliest days to the present. The Roman people themselves serve as a secondary audience of these deeds as they are rehearsing them in their concerns about the impending battle. Third, the fears of the Roman people here are most marked in Livy's description by the memorialization of Hannibal's deeds: Hannibal leaves monuments (*monumentis*

*ingentium rerum*) in his wake as he progresses along his campaign; his army is stained by Roman blood (*perfusum...cruore Romano*) and carries spoils (*exuuias*) taken from the defeated Romans;<sup>58</sup> some of his soldiers have won the mural and vallar crowns (*muralibus uallaribusque insignes coronis*), rewards that are themselves offered in an overt act of exemplarity to encourage other soldiers to behave in a similar fashion; the Romans fear that Hannibal's captured fasces, which are displayed in front of him as monuments of his victory, will outnumber their own fasces, the markers of the authority of the Republic.

All of these monuments serve as physical reminders of Hannibal's exemplary deeds. Lastly, there are multiple ways in which the exemplary deeds here are encourage future repetition or are already fulfilled as such: Hannibal is seen to inherit his military prowess in his father's camp as he is brought up there;<sup>59</sup> he repeats his victories across Italy (and earlier on his way to Italy), suggesting the ability to imitate his success on future occasions. Even the trepidation felt by the Roman people is a result of their anticipation that Hannibal's exemplary acts are able to be repeated. Livy's description of their fears before Zama shows the Roman people thinking in terms of exemplarity when they analyze a situation and process information. They are reading the monuments left

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<sup>58</sup> In fact, these very spoils might include those with which Hannibal's army armed themselves during their campaign leading up to Cannae, a fact that led Livy to remark that one could hardly tell the Romans and Carthaginians apart they were armed so similarly: 22.46.4: *Afros Romanam [magna ex parte] crederes aciem; ita armati erant armis et ad Trebiam ceterum magna ex parte ad Trasumennum captis*. "You would have believed that the Africans were a Roman battle line, they were armed in such a fashion with weapons captured, for the most part, at the Trebia and Trasimene." cf. Polybius 3.114.1-4.

<sup>59</sup> This reference is just one of many that link the narrative of Zama back to the opening of the Third Decade. For a discussion of some other ways that Livy uses parallels to Book 21 as a closural device: Levene 2010: 16-17, Jaeger 2006: 202-03, Walsh 1973: 207, Wille 1973: 52, Burck 1962: 50.

behind by the Carthaginian advance through Italy and becoming fearful of further examples of those sorts of deeds.

Conversely, Livy's description of the anxiety of the Carthaginian people before Zama shows them thinking in terms of Polybian *opsis*:

haud dispar habitus animorum Carthaginiensibus erat quos modo petisse pacem, **intuentes** Hannibalem ac rerum gestarum eius magnitudinem, paenitebat, modo cum **respicerent** bis sese acie uictos, Syphacem captum, pulsos se Hispania, pulsos Italia, atque ea omnia unius uirtute et consilio Scipionis facta, uelut **fatalem** eum ducem in exitium suum natum horrebant. (30.28.10-11)

The mental disposition was not at all different for the Carthaginians. As **they look at** Hannibal and the greatness of his accomplishments, at one moment it was distressing them that they had sought peace, at another, when **they were looking back** at the fact that they were twice beaten in battle, and that Syphax was captured, that they were driven from Spain and from Italy, and that all these things were accomplished by the courage and plan of one man—Scipio—they were terrified that he was a leader born for the purpose of their destruction, just as **was fated**.

While Livy first notes that similar sentiments are felt on the Carthaginian side of the conflict, his description of the observations that led them there has a different force from that of the Roman people above. They see (*intuentes*) Hannibal before them and look back on (*respicerent*) their recent losses and setbacks. As was noted above as part of *opsis*, the interpretation of the events comes directly from these visual actions and is focalized through the audience. Rather than reading monuments as do their Roman counterparts, the Carthaginians examine the events and figures directly in front of them. Polybian *opsis* leads to a sure reading of the expected action to follow. Here, the Carthaginians' expectation that Scipio is fated (*fatalem*) to bring on their destruction supports the inevitability of their interpretation coming to fruition.

Livy's contrast of the hopes and fears of the two sides of the conflict demonstrates how each group analyzes events as they unfold. The Romans think in terms of Livian exemplarity, considering the monuments of exemplary deeds left behind and the precedents of behavior that should be drawn from the lessons given by the memorials. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, embody Polybian *opsis*: they examine the acts immediately apparent before their very eyes. Livy's contrast between these two methods immediately before the start of the battle calls to mind for his audience both *opsis* and exemplarity and suggests that the subsequent narrative might best be read in terms that contrast the two approaches to historical thought.

After the notices of the disposition of the Romans and Carthaginians, Livy describes the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio (30.29-31). Like Polybius (15.5.4-10), Livy narrates how Scipio receives and enables the scouts sent out by Hannibal to reconnoiter the Roman camp (30.29). In Polybius' account, Masinissa arrives after the scouts have reported back to Hannibal (15.5.12-13). As argued above, the arrival of Masinissa subsequent to the scouts' efforts effectively negates the benefit gained from the scouted information.<sup>60</sup> Livy, however, has Masinissa arrive on the day the scouts are in Scipio's camp (30.29.4) and Livy explicitly notes that this information was passed on to Hannibal.<sup>61</sup> While the Polybian Scipio takes control over and ultimately exploits the *opsis* of his counterpart, Livy's Scipio has no such advantage. The Livian Hannibal proceeds

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<sup>60</sup> Chapter 4, Part 2, above.

<sup>61</sup> 30.29.4: *nam et Masinissam cum sex milibus peditum quattuor equitum uenisse eo ipso forte die adferebant*. "For they also reported that Masinissa had arrived with six thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry by chance on that very same day."

with accurate knowledge about the size of Scipio's troops. Rather than advancing with a false sense of confidence, as does the Polybian Hannibal, Livy's Hannibal knows the complete truth, which gives his method of Polybian *opsis* its full ability to grant him the knowledge of how best to proceed.

After the scouts return to Hannibal with the news of the happenings in the Roman camp, Hannibal requests a meeting with Scipio, as he does in Polybius' text. The explicit impetus for Hannibal's invitation, however, is markedly different between the two accounts. Polybius attributes the request to Hannibal's admiration of Scipio's generosity and boldness:

ὧν παραγενηθέντων θαυμάσας ὁ Ἀννίβας **τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν** τάνδρῳς οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἰς ὀρμὴν ἔπεσε τοῦ βούλεσθαι συνελθεῖν εἰς λόγους τῷ Ποπλίῳ. (15.5.8)

After [the messengers] returned, Hannibal was amazed **at the generosity and daring** of the man and somehow came to the impulse of wanting to come to a meeting with Scipio.

For Livy, however, this meeting stems from Hannibal's impression that he could achieve a more favorable chance at peace if he met with Scipio:

itaque quamquam et ipse causa belli erat et aduentu suo turbauerat et pactas indutias et spem foederum, tamen si integer quam si uictus peteret pacem **aequiora impetrari** posse ratus, nuntium ad Scipionem misit ut conloquendi secum potestatem faceret. (30.29.5)

And so, although he himself was the cause of the war and had disturbed both the agreed upon truce and the hope for treaties with his arrival, he nevertheless thought that he could **achieve more favorable terms** if he sought peace with his troops intact than after he is beaten. So, he sent a messenger to Scipio to make an opportunity for meeting with him.

These two summaries of Hannibal's rationale in requesting the meeting with Scipio suggest a different focus for each of the two historians in their subsequent accounts of the meeting between the generals. For Polybius, Hannibal's motivation for the meeting revolves around two of Scipio's positive traits (τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν). As a consequence, the meeting stems from Hannibal's desire to investigate Scipio's character more fully and suggests that the entire episode can be interpreted through a reading that focuses on Scipio's positive behavior. Hannibal's comment also encourages the episode to be treated as a comparison between Scipio and Hannibal. According to Livy, on the other hand, Hannibal's desire to obtain more favorable peace terms (*aequiora impetrari*) motivates his request. Livy's audience is thereby encouraged to focus on Hannibal's arguments in favor of making an agreement for peace. As I argued above, Polybius' version of the meeting and the ensuing battle stresses the differences between Hannibal's and Scipio's approaches to Polybian *opsis*. How, then, does Livy's account of the meeting between the two generals follow through on the suggestion that coming to peace terms is at the heart of this episode?

As they begin their meeting, Hannibal speaks first. He opens his speech by summarizing the situation for Scipio and himself (30.30.3-11). Hannibal then describes his earlier campaigns and suggests to Scipio how their situations are reversed, with Scipio being at the point of his story arc that Hannibal was after Trasimene and Cannae.<sup>62</sup> As

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<sup>62</sup> *quod ego fui ad Trasumennum, ad Cannas, id tu hodie es. uixdum militari aetate imperio accepto omnia audacissime incipientem nusquam fefellit fortuna. patris et patrui persecutus mortem ex calamitate uestrae domus decus insigne uirtutis pietatisque eximiae cepisti; amissas Hispanias reciperasti quattuor inde Punicis exercitibus pulsus; consul creatus, cum ceteris ad tutandam Italiam parum animi esset, transgressus in Africam* (30.30.12-14). "What I was at Trasimene and at Cannae, that is what you are

part of his summary, Hannibal encourages Scipio to recall a moment of autopsy: “You have seen the standards and arms of the enemy” (*signa armaque hostium uidistis*; 30.30.8). Livy’s Hannibal, therefore, recalls the Polybian historiographic method, just as he has in other instances in which he serves as an internal narrator, as I argue above. He then points to his own appearance and presence as a lesson for Scipio that he should be mindful of fortune’s grasp on life:

ut omnium obliuiscaris aliorum, satis ego documenti in omnes casus sum quem modo castris inter Anienem atque **urbem uestram** positis signa inferentem ac iam **prope scandentem moenia Romana uideris, hic cernas** duobus fratribus, fortissimis uiris, clarissimis imperatoribus orbatum ante **moenia prope obsessae patriae** quibus terrui **uestram urbem** ea pro mea deprecantem. (30.30.16-17)

You should forget everything else, I am enough proof of all types of misfortunes. I just had my camp set up between the Anio and **your city** and **you saw me** advancing my armies and just now **nearly scaling the walls of Rome**, but **here you see** me deprived of two brothers, very brave men and very celebrated commanders, and you see me before **the walls of my city—which is practically besieged**—begging to ward off from it those things with which I terrorized **your city**.

Hannibal requests that Scipio use Polybian *opsis* as he considers his words. At the center of his appeal, Hannibal reiterates Scipio’s visual ability with two sight verbs, surrounding a deictic adverb to concretize and direct his view (*videris, hic cernas*). The proximity of

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today. When you were scarcely at the age of military service you accepted command. At no point did fortune deceive you as you were attempting all your endeavors. After you took vengeance for the deaths of your father and uncle and from the calamity of your house you gained a notable reputation for courage and exceptional devotion to duty. You recovered the lost Spanish provinces and drove four Carthaginian armies from there. After you were made consul, when there was too little spirit for protecting Italy among everyone else, you crossed to Africa.” On this passage and the parallels between Hannibal and Scipio’s careers to this point, Rossi 2004 and Levene 2010: 234-5. Note that for “*uixdum militari aetate...fefellit fortuna*” it is unclear who the subject of this description is. Levene accordingly translates: “I/you received command...” and notes that this increases the parallelism between Hannibal’s and Scipio’s careers: Levene 2010: 234, n. 194.

the two verbs highlights the emphasis placed here on Scipio's *opsis*. Hannibal points to his own visible presence here in Africa, as a man now bereaved and scrambling to defend his homeland after so much success in enemy territory.<sup>63</sup> He also notes the state of Carthage, as a city practically under siege. Livy's Hannibal marks his exhortation with parallels to continue his suggestion to Scipio that the two are on similar paths: *urbem vestram* is repeated, in a chiastic word order, near the beginning and the end of Hannibal's comparison. In each instance Hannibal references the walls of their respective cities, with an associated participle and *prope*—again, in a chiastic formation: *prope scandentem moenia Romana...moenia prope obsessae patriae*. The chiastic patterns emphasize how Scipio's and Hannibal's roles are reversed as their fortunes reverse. Livy's Hannibal notes the loss of his brothers, just as he has just reminded Scipio of the loss of his father and uncle in Spain above (30.30.12-14). By highlighting their parallel situations, Livy's Hannibal hopes to invoke a response from Scipio that will render peace possible. He does so by encouraging Scipio to undertake Polybian *opsis* and to plan for the same reversals of fortune that he suffered.

Hannibal then attempts to convince Scipio that there is still an opportunity to make peace before committing to battle. He calls to mind the Romans' last invasion of Africa, the disastrous campaign of M. Atilius Regulus in the First Punic War:<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> The Polybian Hannibal makes a similar attempt in his appeal to Scipio (15.7.2-4).

<sup>64</sup> For Regulus' campaign, cf. Polybius 1.29-35 and Livy *Periochae* xvii and xviii. The *Periochae* suggest that Livy places the onset of Regulus' campaign as the end point of Book 17 (*Atilius Regulus cos. victis navali proelio Poenis in Africam traiecit*, *Perioch.* xvii.15-16) and then concludes with the disastrous end to the campaign at the opening of Book 18 (*Atilius Regulus in Africa serpentem portentosae magnitudinis cum magna clade militum occidit, et cum aliquot proeliis bene adversus Carthaginienses pugnasset, successorque ei a senatu prospere bellum gerenti non mitteretur, id ipsum per litteras ad senatum scriptas*



omnia in pace iungenda tuae potestatis sunt, P. Corneli: tunc ea habenda fortuna erit quam di dederint. inter pauca **felicitatis uirtutisque exempla** M. Atilius quondam in hac eadem terra **fuisset**, si uictor **pacem petentibus** dedisset **patribus nostris**; sed non statuendo felicitati modum nec cohibendo efferentem se fortunam quanto altius elatus erat, eo foedius corruit. est quidem eius qui dat, non qui petit, condiciones dicere pacis; sed forsitan non indigni simus qui nobismet ipsi multam inrogemus. (30.30.22-24)

Everything is in your power, Publius Cornelius, in making a peace agreement: otherwise, your fortune will be to have that which the gods will give you. Among the few **examples of good fortune and courage** in this same land **would have** formerly **been** Marcus Atilius if he, while he was victorious, had given **peace to our fathers when they asked for it**. But by not setting up a limit to his success and by not restraining the good fortune that was carrying him along, however much higher he was lifted up, that much more disgracefully he fell. Indeed, it is on the part of the one who offers peace, not the one who asks for it, to dictate the terms of peace. But perhaps we would not be unworthy to propose a punishment on ourselves.

Hannibal invokes the exemplary power of Regulus in an effort to convince Scipio that he should consider making peace with Carthage. According to Polybius' account of the First Punic War, Regulus offered peace terms to Carthage, but the proposal was overly harsh due to Regulus' expectation of continued success (1.31.4-8). The Punic envoys reject the terms of the agreement and, ultimately, after Xanthippus' intervention, turn the tables on the Romans and defeat and capture Regulus (1.32-35). Hannibal recalls the scenario but claims that Scipio ought to consider allowing Carthage to propose terms, contrary to the expectation that it should be Rome—as the side potentially offering peace—that sets the

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*questus est, in quibus inter causas petendi successoris <erat>, quod agellus eius a mercennariis desertus esset; Perioch. xviii.1-8).* The epitomizer also notes that the Regulus campaign serves as an *exemplum* of adverse fortune: *quaerente deinde fortuna, ut magnum utriusque casus exemplum in Regulo proderetur, arcessito a Carthaginensibus Xanthippo, Lacedaemoniorum duce, victus proelio et captus est (Perioch. xviii.8-11).*

conditions of the treaty. Hannibal notes here, too, that the Carthaginians were the ones seeking peace in Regulus' time as well (*pacem petentibus... patribus nostris*). By connecting his narrative of the Regulus *exemplum* to his own shift in the side expected to propose terms, Hannibal fails to take into account both sides of the Regulus *exemplum* and consequently misses out on the part of Regulus' exemplary lesson most apposite to their current debate.

Hannibal also manipulates other facets of Regulus' exemplary nature. Though the situation warrants Regulus as a negative *exemplum*, in that Scipio should not follow the precedent Regulus set, Hannibal mentions the possibility that Regulus would have been (*fuisset*) an *exemplum* of good fortune and courage (*felicitatis uirtutisque exempla*) had he come to terms with Carthage when they first offered. The counterfactual condition implies that Regulus never, in fact, reached exemplary status for *felicitas* and *virtus*. The epitomizer who compiled the *Periocha* for Book 18, however, regards Regulus as an <sup>65</sup>*exemplum* of both good and bad fortune:

quaerente deinde fortuna, ut magnum utriusque casus exemplum in Regulo proderetur, arcessito a Carthaginensibus Xanthippo, Lacedaemoniorum duce, victus proelio et captus est (*Perioch.* xviii.8-11)

Then, with fortune seeking to produce an extreme *exemplum* of each type of outcome in the case of Regulus, he was conquered in battle and captured by Xanthippus, a Spartan general, summoned by the Carthaginians.

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<sup>65</sup> Overall, Regulus' story and his nature as an *exemplum* extends beyond his campaign in Africa. He is perhaps better known for the exemplary power of his willingness to keep an oath to return to Carthage to his torture and death after a visit to the Senate to extend an offer of prisoner exchange from the Carthaginians: e.g. Cic. *de Off.* 3.99-115 and *Orat. in Pis.* 43, and Hor. *Odes* 3.5. The debates between Hannibal and Scipio, here, and Fabius and Scipio, above, surround only Regulus' actions during his campaign in Africa. cf., too, Valerius Maximus' treatment of Regulus as an *exemplum* under three different headings: *de Religione* (1.1.14), *de Paupertate* (4.4.6), and *de Crudelitate* (9.2.4).

While Hannibal does assert that Regulus suffered from a change in fortune, he does not suggest that Regulus represents an *exemplum* of both types of fortune. Though the loss of Book 18 makes it impossible to examine exactly how Livy characterized the exemplary nature of Regulus and his campaign in Africa, the *periocha* suggests that Hannibal has misread the exemplary qualities of the Regulus narrative and is, in fact, misconstruing in his speech to Scipio the lessons to take from the *exemplum*. As I described in the previous chapter, above, Scipio had already in the narrative dismissed the Regulus *exemplum* in his debate with Fabius.<sup>66</sup> Hannibal's failure to use Regulus for Livy's intended exemplary lessons places him in the same category as Fabius before him: each attempts to draw upon the Regulus affair in an exchange with Scipio and each misreads and misconstrues the situation in the endeavor.

Scipio, on the other hand, replies to Hannibal both by showing his awareness of the circumstances surrounding the First Punic War and by redefining the aspects of that war to which Hannibal should pay attention. After some initial comments about Hannibal's arrival and the Punic perfidy exhibited in the Carthaginians' recent actions to break the truce (30.31.1-4), Scipio explains to Hannibal why he expects to find success in the conclusion of their current war:

neque patres nostri priores de Sicilia neque nos de Hispania fecimus  
bellum; et tunc Mamertinorum sociorum periculum et nunc Sagunti  
excidium nobis pia ac iusta induerunt arma. uos lacessisse et tu ipse fateris

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<sup>66</sup> Chapter 3, Part 3, above. There I argue that Scipio rejects Fabius' reading of the Regulus *exemplum* based on its inaccurate portrayal of Regulus' defeat and its inappropriateness to the current situation. Scipio instead proposes that the precedents established by Regulus' campaign in Africa were best counteracted by his own campaign in Spain and that Hannibal's invasion of Italy is the best exemplum for him to follow in his proposed invasion of the Carthaginian homeland.

et **di testes sunt** qui et **illius belli exitum secundum ius fasque** dederunt et huius dant et dabunt. (30.31.4-5)

Our fathers before us did not bring about the war for Sicily, nor did we bring about the war for Spain. In that earlier instance it was the danger of the Mamertine allies and for this one it was the destruction of Saguntum that brought on us a pious and just cause for arms. The fact that you provoked this war you yourself admit and **the gods are witnesses** of this, the gods who both provided **a just and proper favorable outcome for that war** and are currently providing one and will, in the end, provide one for this war, too.

Scipio responds to Hannibal's attempt to invoke the Regulus affair as a lesson by reframing the aspects of the First Punic War that should be considered in their current debate. As an internal narrator, Scipio had already in his debate with Fabius (28.40-44) argued why the Regulus *exemplum* has no bearing on his own invasion in Africa, so there is no need to address the issues with Hannibal's mention of the Regulus *exemplum* directly. Instead, Scipio points out how Carthaginian aggression influenced the outbreaks of both Punic Wars. As part of this defense, Scipio claims that the gods themselves bring divine retribution back on Carthage for their unjust acts at the start of these wars.<sup>67</sup> In his description, Scipio makes an appeal to the exemplarity of these deeds: The victorious campaigns of the Romans in the first war (*illius belli exitum secundum ius fasque*) are the actions worth repeating. The gods are the audience of the deeds (*di testes sunt*). Spain and Sicily, currently possessions of the Romans due to their successes in these wars (as noted

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<sup>67</sup> The direct attribution of the Carthaginians' defeat coming from divine vengeance is made by Livy in a few places, but always—as it is here—in the mouth of an internal narrator: 21.10 (Hanno), 21.40.11 (Publius Scipio), 26.8.5 (Fabius), 28.44.7 (Scipio Africanus), and 30.42.21 (Hasdrubal Haedus): Levene 2010: 345. On the unpredictability of *fortuna* in dictating gods' interaction with men's affairs: Davies 2004: 121-23; cf. Levene 1993: 75. On moral causation more broadly in Livy's Third Decade: Levene 2010: 339-53.

by Scipio just above as in their power for a long time already: *ea quae iam pridem in nostra potestate sunt*; 30.31.2), serve as monuments in commemoration of these exemplary deeds. Lastly, the repetition of the action is represented in Scipio's claim that he and his troops will prevail in the current war due to their past success. Scipio rejects Hannibal's use of the Regulus *exemplum* by using exemplary language itself and, in so doing, he suggests that the completion of the events he proposes will be realized and achieve the fulfillment of an exemplary loop.

In another section of his speech, Hannibal contrasts his own situation with Scipio's. Hannibal proposes that Scipio has, until now, experienced continuous good fortune (*perpetuam felicitatem*; 30.30.11). He then furthers the notion by citing a proverbial statement about the limits of a man who knows only good luck: "The one whom fortune has never deceived does not easily reflect on the uncertainties of events" (*non temere incerta casuum reputat quem fortuna nunquam decepit*; 30.30.11). After Scipio responds to Hannibal's reading of the Regulus episode, he contradicts Hannibal's claim that he has no experience with misfortune:

**Quod ad me attinet**, et humanae infirmitatis memini et uim fortunae **reputo** et omnia quaecumque agimus subiecta esse mille casibus scio; ceterum quemadmodum superbe et uiolenter me **faterer** facere **si** priusquam in Africam traiecissem te tua uoluntate cedentem Italia et imposito in naues exercitu ipsum uenientem ad pacem petendam **aspernarer**, sic nunc cum prope manu conserta restitantem ac tergiuersantem in Africam attraxerim nulla sum tibi uerecundia obstrictus. proinde si quid ad ea in quae tum pax conuentura uidebatur, quasi multa nauium cum com metu per indutias expugnataram legatorumque uiolatorum, adicitur, est quod referam ad consilium: sin illa quoque grauia uidentur, **bellum parate quoniam pacem pati non potuistis**. (30.31.6-9)

**As far as it pertains to me, I am mindful** of the infirmity of mankind and I reflect on the power of fortune and I know that everything we accomplish is subject to a thousand misfortunes. But, just as **I would confess** that I would act arrogantly and impetuously **if I would have rejected** you coming to ask for peace yourself and leaving Italy of your own volition and with your troops embarked on your ships before I crossed over to Africa, but now, since I have dragged you back to Africa as you were resisting and refusing to the point that we nearly came to blows, I am bound by no sense of shame toward you. Therefore, if anything is added to the terms on which peace seemed about to be agreed at that time, like a fine for the transport ships seized during the armistice and the injury done to the legates, then there is something which I can take back to the council. But if these things seem too burdensome, **prepare for war since you cannot abide by peace.**

Scipio uses additional verbal parallels to counter Hannibal's allegation: he marks his response to Hannibal by repeating the phrase that Hannibal uses to open the comparison between their situations (*quod ad me attinet*; 30.30.10 and 30.31.6). By connecting their two speeches with recurring language, Scipio strengthens his direct contradiction of Hannibal's claim that he is unfamiliar with misfortune. He also "reflects on" (*reputo*) the power of fortune, which Hannibal asserts is difficult (*non temere...reputat*; 30.30.11) without knowledge of misfortune. Among the personal hardships that Hannibal mentions for his part is the loss of his brothers (30.30.16-17). Scipio, similarly, had lost his father and uncle in this war, as both he (26.41 and 28.43.18) and Hannibal admit (30.30.13). Hannibal even refers to the deaths of the elder Scipios as a "catastrophe" (*calamitate*; 30.30.13). By making reference to and contradicting Hannibal's claim that Scipio is unaware of misfortune, Scipio undermines the rest of Hannibal's argument that their situations (here at Zama and after Cannae, respectively) are parallel. Scipio has now already suffered the hardships that Hannibal endures and learns from after his string of

victories leading up to Cannae. If Hannibal's assertion that Scipio should better consider the possibility of misfortune in his decision is not sound, then the premise that underlies his suggestion for making peace too becomes unpersuasive. As Scipio continues, he describes the situation necessary to lead to the kind of peace terms Hannibal suggests. A contrafactual condition (*faterer... si...aspernarer*) confirms that Hannibal has not met the circumstances that would lead Scipio to agree to his proposed conditions of peace.

Overall, Scipio shows in his meeting with Hannibal an ability to mobilize past actions and experiences to his gain in an explanation of future events. He rejects and counteracts Hannibal's attempts to invoke the Regulus episode as a means of pushing for an agreement of peace. While Hannibal invokes aspects of Polybian *opsis* in his reference to the visual qualities that suggests a potential course of action, Scipio instead interprets a string of past events that demonstrate the power of misfortune (Regulus, Hannibal, and himself) and exhibits an approach that reflects Livy's own exemplary model of historiography. Scipio closes his speech with an exhortation for future behavior (*bellum parate*) noting that Hannibal cannot tolerate peace (*pacem pati non potuistis*). Hannibal's own aggression, as confirmed by both men in their speeches (30.30.3 and 30.31.4-5), becomes the exemplary behavior upon which Scipio bases his call to action. Scipio consequently uses exemplary language to make Hannibal himself the *exemplum* which disproves his own claims. Scipio therefore uses exemplarity to outdo Hannibal's argument and to advance his own reading of the situation instead.

As the two commanders leave their meeting, each goes to his camp and advises their soldiers to prepare for battle. Livy conflates the two exhortations into a single

report, recording the words these generals spoke to their troops on the eve of the decisive battle:

In castra **ut est uentum**, pronuntiant **ambo arma expedirent** milites animosque ad supremum certamen, non in unum diem sed in perpetuum, **si felicitas adesset**, uictores. Roma an Carthago iura gentibus daret ante crastinam noctem scituros; neque enim Africam aut Italiam sed **orbem terrarum** uictoriae praemium fore; par periculum praemio quibus **aduersa** pugnae **fortuna fuisset**. nam neque Romanis effugium ullum patebat in aliena ignotaque terra, et Carthagini, supremo auxilio effuso, adesse uidebatur praesens excidium. (30.32.1-3)

**As they went** into their camps, **both** announced that the soldiers **should prepare their arms** and their courage for the decisive struggle, to be the victors not just for a single day, but for all time, **if fortune were present for them**. They said that they would know before the following night whether Rome or Carthage would make laws for the world, for the reward for victory would not be Africa or Italy but **the whole earth**. They said that there was a danger equal to the prize for those whom **the fortune** of battle **turned against**. For there was no place of refuge for the Romans in a foreign and unknown land and, for Carthage, since the final defense was already sent out, destruction seems to be at hand.

The impersonal passive in the *ut* temporal clause (*ut est uentum*) and the subject of the main clause, *ambo*, collectivize the two speeches into one. Livy's report gives the impression that the two generals speak verbatim exhortations synchronously in their own encampments. The conflation of their speeches implies that they each took away from their meeting the same interpretation of the events and debates they shared. The fact that they left their conference having the same opinion of how matters stood suggests that one of the generals convinced the other of their reading of the events: so, which of them came off the victor in their debate?

First, the ostensibly mutual speech after the meeting makes no reference to any chance at peace, instead telling the soldiers to ready their arms (*arma expedirent*).



Scipio's final suggestion to Hannibal was to "prepare for war, since you cannot abide by peace" (*bellum parate quoniam pacem pati non potuistis*; 30.31.9). Second, the speech offered by both generals also describes the presence (or absence) of both good and bad fortune (*si felicitas adesset...adversa...fortuna fuisset*). While both generals discuss the nature of fortune in their meeting, Hannibal attempts to encourage Scipio to expect his fortune to change given the recent success he has had: "The greatest fortune is that which must be trusted the least" (*maximae cuique fortunae minime credendum est*; 30.30.18). In his reference to Regulus, too, Hannibal suggests that Scipio should soon expect to find bad fortune in his campaign. Scipio, instead, informs Hannibal that he is already aware of the vicissitudes of fortune in his reply (30.31.6, quoted above). Since the ostensibly mutual speech includes possibilities of both the positive and negative outcomes, Scipio's rejection of Hannibal's claim to expect a reversal of fortune has found traction in the minds of the two generals.

Additionally, the mutual speech by the two commanders describes the fate of the "whole world" (*orbem terrarum*) as being at stake. The equivalent term for Polybius, οἰκουμένη, also appears in his text before the battle. As an external narrator, Polybius claims that the inhabited world is at stake at Zama (15.9.2-5).<sup>68</sup> So, too, does Scipio as internal narrator in a speech to his troops (15.10.2). As argued above, Polybius, qua external narrator, and Scipio, qua internal narrator, have their roles converge by offering an interpretation of the situation that is lexically and semantically parallel before the

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<sup>68</sup> Levene 2010: 11 also notes that Livy takes up the general sentiments of Polybius on the stakes for which they fight at Zama.

battle. In fact, the joint speech by Hannibal and Scipio after their meeting in Livy has several thematic parallels to Scipio's battlefield exhortation in Polybius (15.10): the potential rewards for victory, the lack of an escape route for the Romans, the possibility of both good and bad fortunes, and a claim of the equivalency of the two potential outcomes.<sup>69</sup>

As he does in instances that I analyzed in Chapters Two and Three above, Livy mediates the Polybian text through the guise of his internal narrators. He thereby encourages an interpretation of the events that looks back on Polybius' text. Just as Scipio demonstrates the correct reading of the events in Polybius' text by copying the interpretation of the external narrator, Livy's integration of this same reading in the mutual speech shared by Hannibal and Scipio shows that Hannibal comes over to Scipio's explanation of the circumstances in Livy's text. By showing that Scipio has "won" the debate in this manner, Livy demonstrates that Scipio's rejection of Hannibal's attempted use of the *Regulus exemplum* is, indeed, correct. Scipio is a proficient interpreter of *exempla* in his role as internal narrator, successfully reinterpreting the *Regulus exemplum* (among others) on two different occasions: here at Zama and in his debate with Fabius in Book Twenty-Eight. Additionally, Scipio rejects Hannibal's explanation of the meaning of his physical appearance and, in so doing, rejects an interpretation based on Polybian *opsis*.

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<sup>69</sup> The claim of equivalency for success and failure: Polyb. 15.10.5: πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴημεν ἀγεννέστατοι καὶ συλλήβδην ἀφρονέστατοι πάντων, εἰ παρέντες τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐλοίμεθα τὰ μέγιστα τῶν κακῶν διὰ φιλοζωίαν; "How would we not be totally base and, in short, totally foolish—more so than anyone—if we passed up the greatest of goods and chose the greatest of evils because of our love of life." Livy 30.32.2: *par periculum praemio*; "the danger is equal to the prize."

As Livy presents the meeting between Scipio and Hannibal before Zama, the debate revolves around a contrast between the power of a visual spectacle—Hannibal’s demonstration of the visible clues of his person and the land around Carthage—and exemplarity—the Regulus *exemplum* and its reflection of the power of both good and bad fortune. As the two generals leave the meeting and take the same lessons back to their troops—lessons that are drawn from Scipio’s reading of the situation—Livy demonstrates which practical methodology is more effective. Scipio, whose efforts and speeches throughout the second half of the Third Decade demonstrate his ability to read *exempla* effectively and convey the appropriate lessons from the *exempla* to his internal audience, comes off the better of Hannibal, whose efforts remain mired in attempts at Polybian rationales based on autopsy. The meeting of these two generals allows Livy to contrast the historiographic methodologies of himself—through Scipio’s exemplary readings—and his predecessor Polybius—through Hannibal’s reliance on autopsy and visual spectacle. As the forces of Hannibal and Scipio then clash in the Battle of Zama, they effectively stand as analogues of the Polybian and Livian methods of historiography, respectively.

#### Part 4: Looking Forward and Back: The End of Third Decade

After the battle concludes, Livy continues his narrative by describing episodes that both bring the Hannibalic War to a close and also prefigure events to come in his later books:<sup>70</sup> the pillaging of the Carthaginian camp and a subsequent engagement with Syphax's cavalry (30.36), Hannibal's flight to Antiochus (30.38), the agreement of terms of peace (30.37-38, 40, 43-44), the assignment of provincial commands for the coming year (30.40), and a meeting between the Senate and Philip's ambassadors from Macedon (30.42), an exchange that effectively forecasts the soon-to-follow Second Macedonian War.<sup>71</sup> Finally, Livy brings the book and decade to a formal close with a description of Scipio's triumph (30.45).<sup>72</sup> As part of the account of the triumph, Livy notes that Syphax, the defeated king of the Masaesulii who should have been led in chains as part of the triumph, died shortly after arriving in Italy (30.45.4-5). Livy uses this report as the opportunity to include the only direct reference to Polybius that he makes in the Third Decade: a note that Polybius claims that Syphax lived to be led along in the triumph: "Polybius—an author not at all to be rejected—records that this king was led in the triumph" (*hunc regem in triumpho ductum Polybius, haudquaquam spernendus auctor, tradit*; 30.45.5).<sup>73</sup> The reference to Polybius comes in the midst of an example of explicit

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<sup>70</sup> On these episodes as both a closure for the decade and also a connection to what follows in the rest of the *AUC*, Levene 2010: 10-13.

<sup>71</sup> In particular, the Senate informs the Macedonian ambassadors: "Your king is seeking war and if he continues on that path he will find it very soon" (*bellum quaerere regem et si pergat propediem inuenturum*; 30.42.7).

<sup>72</sup> On the triumph as the closure of the war and Livy's Third Decade: Levene 2010: 10-12. cf., too, his note on "closure" (p. 10, n. 14). On the triumph as a closural elements in literary works more broadly: Westall 2014.

<sup>73</sup> Polybius' report of the triumph, with Syphax present as Livy claims: 16.23. cf., too, Chapter 2, Part 4, above. On the citation: Moore 2010: 148 notes how this fits with Livy's larger pattern of source criticism

source criticism, comparing the account of his predecessor, which, in this instance, contains information Livy concludes is wrong. Despite his misgivings about Polybius' mistake about Syphax, Livy offers clear, albeit litotic, praise of his predecessor.<sup>74</sup> The reputation of Polybius' method as an author (*auctor*) is of particular importance to Livy here, not just the factual basis of this particular piece of information.

Immediately after this reference to Polybius, Livy concludes the Third Decade with a prospective look at the impact that Scipio has on future generations of Roman commanders:<sup>75</sup>

Africani cognomen **militaris** prius **fauor an popularis aura** celebrauerit an, sicuti Felicis Sullae Magnique Pompeii patrum memoria, coeptum ab adsentatione familiari sit parum compertum habeo; primus certe hic imperator nomine **uictae ab se gentis** est nobilitatus; **exemplo** deinde huius **nequaquam uictoria pares insignes imaginum titulos** claraque cognomina familiarum **fecerunt**. (30.45.6-7)

I have too little knowledge to say whether **his popularity with the army or the popular favor** first honored him with the cognomen “Africanus” or if it began from friendly flattery, just like “Felix” for Sulla and “Magnus” for Pompey did in the memory of our fathers. Certainly, however, he is the first general to be celebrated with the name **of a nation that he had conquered**. In his *exemplum*, then, **did men not at all equal in victory gain famous titles for their images** and renowned names for their families.

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and how it casts further negative light on Livy's Roman sources. Levene 2010: 161-62 notes how this sudden citation reveals what might have been suspected by an attentive reader earlier in the narrative, namely that Polybius was a major source for Livy's account of the Hannibalic War. Levene's argument is in response to Tränkle's position that Livy only turns to Livy at the start of Book 31: Tränkle 1977: 193-241.

<sup>74</sup> The only other example of Livy's praise for his sources also concerns Polybius: 33.10.10; cf. Moore 2010: 148 and Luce 1977: 141, n. 3.

<sup>75</sup> On Livy's use of prospective and retrospective narrative comments in his triumphal notices: Pausch 2011: 98.

In the closing lines of the Third Decade, Livy notes that Scipio becomes an *exemplum* himself in taking the cognomen “Africanus,” as later Roman generals, too, take the names of cities they conquer as honorific cognomina. While Livy often records exemplary characteristics exemplified by Roman triumphs, his mention of the Scipionic *exemplum* is a rare moment where he as external narrator editorializes on the exemplary behavior of a character.<sup>76</sup> Livy’s description of Scipio’s precedent includes nearly the full complement of the exemplary loop: First, the valorous behavior to be celebrated is the conquering of an enemy people (*uictae ab se gentis*). Second, the requirement for an internal audience to the action or its commemoration is met by the army, who witnessed and participated in the victory, and the Roman people, who celebrated Scipio’s triumph: Livy notes both the army and the Roman people as possible sources for the cognomen (*militaris...fauor an popularis aura*). Third, the physical commemoration of the act is demonstrated both by the actual triumph that Livy has just described and, more permanently, in the portrait busts and attached titles that these future Roman generals engender (*insignes imaginum titulos*). Finally, although Livy, as the narrator of this *exemplum*, does not make an explicit call for imitation, he clearly describes that such an appeal has already been fulfilled by future Romans (note the perfect tense *fecerunt*, suggesting a completed action). Consequently, Scipio’s adoption of the *cognomen* and Livy’s description of the same fulfill the exemplary loop and establish a model behavior for future Roman generals to attempt to follow, although, as Livy claims, the ones who

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<sup>76</sup> On these two points, cf. Chaplin 2000: p. 50 nn. 1-2 and pp. 140-42. On Scipio’s triumph and its impact on Rome and later triumphs: Pittenger 2008: 165-67 and 188-89.

have done so do not meet the bar set by Scipio for the magnitude of his victory over Hannibal.

On the grounds that Scipio stands as an analogue for Livy's own historiographic method, as argued above, his exemplary status here leverages Livy's reputation as a historian in several ways: Retrospectively, the citation to Polybius made just above—notable for being the only direct reference to Polybius in the decade—allows Livy to suggest his own superiority to his Greek counterpart. On the one hand, Livy's other source contradicts Polybius about the detail of Syphax's presence in the triumph, so Livy can claim a direct advantage in the one and only detail he directly attributes to Polybius in the Third Decade. But that is a detail of little consequence and mitigated by the fact that, despite dying before the triumph itself, Syphax's death did receive public attention with a state funeral given for him.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, Livy also notes that, despite the purported factual blunder regarding Syphax, Polybius is not an author that should be dismissed (*haudquaquam spernendus*). Given that Hannibal functions as a *modello-esemplare* for Polybius throughout the Third Decade, Scipio's celebration of a triumph over Hannibal is analogically equivalent to Livy celebrating a victory over Polybius. Additionally, Syphax's absence from the triumph allows more focus to be placed on Scipio's victory over Hannibal. Livy's abrupt—and perhaps unexpected—reference to Polybius in such a pivotal moment in his narrative only strengthens the connections between Hannibal and Polybius in the mind of Livy's audience. Prospectively, Scipio's

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<sup>77</sup> 30.45.4: *conspecta tamen mors eius fuit quia publico funere est elatus*; "His death was, however, made public because he was buried with a public funeral."

status as *modello-esemplare* for Livy's historiographic method allows Livy to suggest that future historians may not achieve a feat on par with him. Although Scipio here sets an *exemplum* that others attempt to follow, no one matches up to him in their accomplishment (*nequaquam uictoria pares*). Livy's successors too may attempt to follow in his footsteps but they too will find themselves unequal in their endeavors.

The Battle of Zama for both Polybius and Livy becomes an opportunity for them to demonstrate the value and utility of their respective historiographic methods. Polybius has Hannibal and Scipio both display *opsis* in their actions before and during the battle. Additionally, each of the generals represents one of the two types of pragmatic didacticism that he suggests are useful for encouraging the proper political and military action: learning through seeing others' misfortunes or experiencing them for oneself. In the battlefield exhortations to their armies, Hannibal encourages his men to consider the potential harm that others would receive should they fail, while Scipio asks his men to consider the consequences for themselves in defeat. Ultimately, Scipio's victory in the ensuing battle represents a demonstration of the effectiveness of his approach over Hannibal's. His narrative of the Battle of Zama therefore allows Polybius to represent the two sides to his pragmatic approach to historiographic writing and to demonstrate which of those methods his audience should aim to undertake in their own military and political endeavors.

Livy, too, reflects in his narrative of the Battle of Zama the utility of his approach to historiographic writing. Over the course of his account of the war leading up to the



conclusive battle, Livy uses the figures of Hannibal and Scipio in their roles as internal narrators as the *modelli-esemplari* for Polybius' and Livy's historiographic approaches, respectively. Hannibal frequently employs *opsis* and incorporates Polybian language into his speeches. Scipio instead uses exemplarity in his role as internal narrator. As Hannibal and Scipio meet before the battle and on the battlefield at Zama, then, their competition allows Livy to reflect on the value of his historiographic methodology vis-à-vis Polybius' through the roles of their analogues, Scipio and Hannibal, respectively. As Livy uses self-reference and intertextuality to create a polemical relationship with one of his predecessors and source texts, he also participates in larger Augustan literary practices, in which contemporary poets especially are well known to use similar techniques to put their works on par with or in a position superior to their predecessors and models. Livy, then, uses Hannibal and Scipio as internal narrators in the Third Decade to narrativize his place in the development of Greco-Roman historiography and to demonstrate how his work and his method is superior to that of one of his predecessors, the "not-to-be-despised" Polybius.

## Chapter Five

### Fragments of the Roman Historiographic Tradition in Livy's Third Decade

In the previous chapters I analyzed how Livy uses internal narrators in the *AUC* to integrate and interact with the text of Polybius, one of his source texts. In particular I examined how comments made by the external narrator of Polybius' *Histories* were moved into the voices of internal narrators in Livy's text. The integration of his sources creates a complex intertextual relationship that stresses Livy's distinction from his predecessors and asserts Livy's authority over them, as I argued occurred in the decisive exchange between Hannibal and Scipio who serve as *modelli-esemplari* of Polybius and Livy, respectively, in their roles as internal narrators in the *AUC*. Polybius is, of course, just one of a handful of known sources Livy used in composing his Third Decade. Unfortunately, a majority of Livy's source texts survive only in fragmentary forms.<sup>1</sup> A similar type of analysis of integration and analogous narratorial identity across wide sections of Livy's and his sources' texts is not possible with these fragmentary predecessors. In the extant fragments, it is often difficult to determine what, if any, portions are derived from comments made by external or internal narrators. In general, when working with prose fragments the problem of distinguishing between narratorial levels is compounded and it even becomes difficult to conclude whether the words provided by the cover texts are citations, paraphrases, or some combination of the two.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Levene 2010: 126ff. on the fragmentary sources that Livy uses in the Third Decade.

<sup>2</sup> Brunt 1980 lays out some of the pitfalls of working with citations, epitomes, and other notices of now lost works in cover texts and the potential for inaccuracy. To demonstrate his point, Brunt compares notices of

For example, the text quoted, ostensibly verbatim, for the opening of Cato's *Origines* (F1a, F1b *FRHist*) appears in a different word order in each of two cover texts.<sup>3</sup> While a slight variation in word order is a small issue, a problem arising from two attestations of a line likely as famous as the opening of a work demonstrates the potential for inaccuracy likely to be exacerbated for longer quotations,<sup>4</sup> less significant portions of the work, or when no point of comparison from a parallel attestation can be had.<sup>5</sup>

This chapter analyzes the fragments of these lost works and argues that Livy incorporates facets of the fragmentary texts into acts of internal narration, just as he does with Hannibal's speeches, which contain elements from the narrative text of Polybius. The fragmentary nature of Livy's major sources makes a sustained comparative framework—of the type I argued was present with Hannibal as the *modello-esemplare* for Polybius—impossible. I therefore focus primarily on Livy's two most-cited sources in the Third Decade, Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias, to create a similar but narrowed version of that framework.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the editorial decisions that lie behind the ordering of the fragments often revolve around a chronological placement by comparison

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extant texts to the corresponding surviving sections (Plutarch on Polybius, e.g.) to show how often the reports can be misleading. Cf., too, Cornell 2014, vol. I: 15-16 on how this results in difficult editorial decisions for editions of fragments. For a similar demonstration of the limits of relying on citations to poetic fragments, Dover 2000.

<sup>3</sup> F1a *FRHist* = Serg. *GL* 4.502: *si ques sunt homines*; F1b *FRHist* = Pomp. *GL* 5.208: *si ques homines sunt*, and also continues the citation of the line.

<sup>4</sup> Even opening lines, however, are also not immune to textual issues: the first line of Livy's general preface is notably misquoted in the manuscript tradition, but preserved in Quintilian (9.4.74). On this, Moles 1993: 141 and n. 3. Luce 1965:234-37 believes the emendation is Livy's own; *contra* Moles 1993: 162-63, n. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Consider, for example, Fabius F4a and b *FRHist* = DH 1.75.4-84.1 and Plut. *Rom.* 3-4, 6-8, in which Dionysius and Plutarch each cite an extended narrative of Romulus' childhood, with several parallel sections, each interspersed with additional material that can only be extracted upon comparison.

<sup>6</sup> Levene 2010: 126 lists the citations for Coelius and Antias, totaling eleven and eight citations, respectively.

with a full surviving narrative, such as Livy's Third Decade.<sup>7</sup> The result is that a scholar who asserts that a surviving historical narrative incorporates or intertextually makes reference to a fragment drawn from another cover text, makes an argument bordering on circularity from the onset. To avoid such potential circularity, I will consider fragments that have non-Livian cover texts and that can be ordered or contextualized without reliance on Livy's narrative.<sup>8</sup>

To begin, I return to a speech I first explored in Chapter One to examine how Livy combines a speech and source criticism into a shared narrative act.<sup>9</sup> After Hannibal's victory at Cannae, he sends his brother Mago to report to Carthage the status of his campaign. As Livy describes the embassy (23.11-13), after Mago narrates the success that Hannibal has had in Italy, he then provides the following display in the middle of the speech:

ad fidem deinde tam laetarum rerum effundi in uestibulo curiae  
iussit anulos aureos, qui tantus aceruus fuit ut metientibus  
dimidium supra tres modios explesse sint **quidam auctores: fama**  
tenuit quae **propior uero** est, haud plus fuisse modio. adiecit  
deinde uerbis, quo maioris cladis indicium esset, neminem nisi  
equitem, atque eorum ipsorum primores, id gerere insigne. summa  
fuit orationis, quo propius spem belli perficiendi sit, eo magis omni  
ope iuuandum Hannibalem esse (23.12.1-3)

To add to the confidence of such successful endeavors, he ordered  
the golden rings to be poured out in the entrance of the Senate

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<sup>7</sup> The chronological ordering of fragmentary editions based on a known narrative is a tradition that goes back to the earliest editions of *Reliquiae*: e.g. Peter [1870] 1914 and 1906 and Roth 1852. On the ordering of fragmentary editions and the issues that arise with chronological ordering, Cornell 2014, vol. I: 16-19.

<sup>8</sup> In separating the Livian and non-Livian fragments of these authors for my analysis, I follow the methodology of Elliot 2013, whose recent work on Ennius' *Annales* distinguished between fragments drawn from or associated with Vergil's *Aeneid* and those from other cover texts. This allows me to minimize the potential for circularity in arguing that Livy incorporates these narratives by first establishing what trends are present in the non-Livian fragments.

<sup>9</sup> cf. Part 3 in Chapter 1, above.

chamber. This made such a heaping pile that **some authors** claim that they filled more than three and a half measures when counted. **A report** which is **nearer to the truth** holds that it was not more than a single measure. He then added these words, in order that the significance of the disaster be more clear, that no one outside the equestrian order—and even then just the chief among them—wears this as a token of honor. The gist of the speech was that by as much as they were closer to the hope of finishing the war, there was that much more need of providing help to Hannibal.

The anonymous citation (*quidam auctores*) at the heart of the speech highlights other accounts of the speech and its associated scene and brings these variant traditions to the awareness of the external audience. The vast total for the rings claimed by these anonymous sources ties into the preceding oration, which focuses on the overwhelming quantity of foes defeated by Hannibal (23.11.7-12). While the total of three *modii* seems supported by the speech at first glance, Livy then makes reference to another surviving version of the story. Although he describes the alternate tale as a *fama*, he notes that it comes closest to the truth (*propior uero*). After Livy's brief aside, Mago finishes his speech with further emphasis of Hannibal's successes so far. Comments made by both the external and internal narrators—Livy and Mago—and the content of the speech itself surround and undermine the purported truth value of the *fama* claiming the smaller measure for the number of rings. The overall effect of the narrative surrounding Mago's speech to the Carthaginian assembly is that the version of the display that is regarded as less likely by the historian is the one whose consequences are meant to be felt as the narrative continues.

Livy's use of citation and source criticism blends seamlessly with an act of internal narration. The text of an internal narrator and an inaccurate variant tradition

holds more power over the effect of the narrative than the historical truth analyzed by the external narratorial voice of the historian. This chapter explores how Livy uses acts of internal narration as a means of giving voice to the larger historiographic tradition of his predecessors. I argue that we gain additional insight into the now fragmentary works of Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias by considering how Livy integrates elements of their accounts into acts of internal narration. Livy either includes their words in the speech act directly or incorporates aspects of their works through the focalization of internal audiences.

## Part 1: The Texts of Coelius and Antias

A few words about the texts of Coelius and Antias and the details of them that can be gleaned from the surviving fragments will ground the discussion that follows. Coelius Antipater broke from his predecessors in the tradition of historical writing in Rome and composed a monograph on a single topic: the Second Punic War.<sup>10</sup> This monograph has survived in sixty-two certain fragments, eleven of which are cited by Livy, and likely comprised seven books.<sup>11</sup> Several features found in the fragments provide some details of the general characteristics of his narrative. First, Coelius is said to have made use of the text of Silenus as a source (F8 *FRHist*).<sup>12</sup> The connection to Silenus has been noted as an explanation for the origin of the fantastical elements of Coelius' narrative (e.g., F32, F36, and F52 *FRHist*).<sup>13</sup> Second, the surviving fragments indicate that Coelius made frequent use of speeches in his text.<sup>14</sup> Coelius is, as Peter argues, the first Roman historian for

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<sup>10</sup> On how Coelius fits into the larger historiographic tradition at Rome, Badian 1966: 15-17 and 32-33; Chassignet 1999: 2.xli-xlix, 50-70, and 134-50; Kierdorf 2003: 35-38; and Cornell 2014: 1.257-63. The definitive standalone treatment of Coelius remains Herrmann 1979.

<sup>11</sup> There are, in addition to the sixty-two definite fragments, six of doubtful origins: Cornell 2014: 2.420-23. Fragments are cited from each of seven books, the last of which deal with the years 203-201, thus likely confirming that the work was divided into only seven books: Cornell 2014: 1.258-60.

<sup>12</sup> F8 *FRHist* = Cic. *de Div.* 1.49 = Silenus F2 *FGrHist*: *hoc item in Sileni, quem Coelius sequitur, Graeca historia est (is autem diligentissime res Hannibalis persecutes est)*, "This, likewise, is in the Greek History of Silenus, whom Coelius follows. Silenus very carefully related the deeds of Hannibal." Nepos *Hann.* 13.3 also notes how Silenus was a close comrade of Hannibal's and careful chronicler of his actions. Other likely sources for Coelius include Fabius Pictor and Polybius: Cornell 2014: 1.261. Peter 1914: ccxxxi argues against Polybius being a source for Coelius on the dubious assertion that a serious source like Polybius would have been out of place for an author of an account as sensationalized as Coelius'.

<sup>13</sup> F32 *FRHist* = Cic. *de Div.* 1.48; F36 *FRHist* = Livy 29.25.3-4; F52 *FRHist* = Pliny *NH* 31.21 each deal with fantastical elements such as divine dreams, unusual omens and portents, or other *adynata*. Notably, however, the religious and sensationalized aspects of these fragments are not out of place compared to the texts of Herodotus and, to a lesser extent, Livy.

<sup>14</sup> F 3, 4, 5, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 40, 44, 45, 55, and 59 *FRHist* all certainly or likely are derived from speeches in Coelius' text. The identification of these fragments as oratorical comes from the presence of second person forms, the testimony of the cover text, or content that suggests a speech act. Servius records a citation that seems to be derived from a speech in *oratio obliqua* (F59 *FRHist* = Serv. *Aen.* 4.390-91).

whom we have evidence that he followed the Greek convention of using invented speeches in his narrative, but this could be an accident of the survival of Coelius' predecessors.<sup>15</sup> The sheer volume of the surviving fragments of Coelius of an oratorical nature suggest that the speeches were a notable enough part of his monograph to warrant later authors to comment on and record elements drawn from Coelius' speeches. Third, the Carthaginian point of view that features heavily in Silenus' text provides Coelius with a source that allows him to frame his narrative from the Punic perspective. For instance, Coelius includes among his speeches one delivered by a Carthaginian general after the Battle of Cannae (F22 *FRHist*).<sup>16</sup> Coelius also shows Carthaginian characters acting positively. For instance, he describes Hannibal's pious reaction to a dream in which Juno appeared to him by returning and improving a statue of the goddess (F32 *FRHist*).<sup>17</sup>

Livy directly incorporates the Carthaginian point of view from Coelius' histories through variant citation, as he does with the story of Publius Scipio's rescue at the Battle of the Ticinus (21.46.7-10). The direct narrative portion of Livy's account of the Ticinus gives the future Africanus the honor of saving his father (21.46.8). Coelius, instead, claims that the elder Scipio is saved at Ticinus by a Ligurian slave (F12 *FRHist*).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Peter 1914: ccxviii asserts that Coelius is the first to have made use of invented speeches. Cornell 2014: 1.262 provides strong evidence that other earlier Roman historians included invented speeches as well. The issue at stake here is only the use of *invented* speeches: Cato, for one, certainly included at least his own speeches in his *Origines*: e.g., his speech for the Rhodians: F 87-93 *FRHist*. = Gell. 6.3 *passim*. This speech also circulated in an independent text (Gell. 6.3.7). On the speech: Astin 1978: 137-39 and 2773-82; Calboli 2003.

<sup>16</sup> F22 *FRHist* = Gell. 10.24.6-7, on which, cf. Part 2, below.

<sup>17</sup> F32 *FRHist* = Cic *de Div.* 1.48.

<sup>18</sup> F12 *FRHist* = Livy 21.46.7-10: [10] *servati consulis decus Coelius ad servum natione Ligurem delegat; malim equidem de filio verum esse, quod et plures tradidere auctores et fama obtinuit*. "Coelius assigns the glory of saving the Consul to a slave that is Ligurian by birth; Indeed, I prefer the version about the son to be true, because very many authors hand this down and popular rumor has maintained the same."



Coelius' version removes the bravery exhibited by Scipio in his youth and consequently diminishes the positive angle that Scipio is said to have later used to his advantage (e.g. Polyb. 10.3). The enduring power of the story of the son saving his father is demonstrated in Livy's comment in support of it (*fama obtinuit*; 21.46.10) and by the fact that all subsequent accounts, except for Macrobius, bestow the glory on Scipio Africanus.<sup>19</sup> As Livy notes, even before him most authors (*plures tradidere auctores*; 21.46.10) had included the version that Publius Scipio is saved by his son. Coelius therefore represents a break from the Roman historical tradition of the events at the Ticinus. His discontinuity from his native predecessors may, in fact, stem from his use of Silenus.

Valerius Antias, on the other hand, wrote an annalistic history, from the foundation of the city to perhaps the death of Sulla in 78 BCE.<sup>20</sup> Of the 68 fragments of Antias, 35 are cited by Livy, including eight from the Third Decade.<sup>21</sup> A large number of the Livian fragments attack Antias' penchant for exaggerating and inflating numbers in his text (e.g. T1-4, F23, 28, 36, 43, 45, 48, 54, and 62).<sup>22</sup> Despite his distrust of Antias'

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<sup>19</sup> Val. Max. 5.4.2, Sen *Benef.* 3.33, Sil. It. 4.456-79, Flor. 2.6.10, Oros. 4.14.6, and Zon. 8.23.9. Macrobius (*Sat.* 1.11.26) is the only version subsequent to Livy that follows Coelius' attribution of the rescue to a slave. Polybius, too, tells how Scipio saved his father in the introduction to the man's character (10.3). Polybius does not, however, place this account in his narrative of the battle itself, which bears no mention of the danger faced by Publius Scipio (3.46). Polybius further grounds the story in an aura of truth by attributing it to the account of Laelius, a close personal friend of Scipio Africanus. On Polybius' use of Laelius here: Walbank 1967: 2.198-99. Livy's note of the tradition (*fama obtinuit*) recalls the phrase used in his analysis of the various measures of rings poured out in Mago's speech (*fama tenuit*; 23.12.1-3), which also receives further support from the external narrator that it is more accurate (*propior vero*).

<sup>20</sup> On the structure, range, and dating of Antias' work: Chassignet 2004: lxiii-lxxv, Forsythe 2002, Cornell 2014: 1.294-98. On annalistic historiography in general, Walter 2003.

<sup>21</sup> In addition to the 68 fragments, Cornell gives eleven testimonia and three doubtful fragments. In addition to the 35 fragments cited by Livy, two additional fragments (F 65 and 66) that are ultimately derived from Livy.

<sup>22</sup> T1 = Livy 26.49.3: *adeo nullus mentiendi modus est*, "There is truly no limit to his lying"; T4 = Livy 38.23.8: *Valerius Antias, qui magis immodicus in numero augendo esse solet*, "Valerius Antias, who is accustomed to being very unrestrained in augmenting his numeric data."

numerical reports, Livy made wide use of Antias and likely owes to him the larger organizing principles for his narrative.<sup>23</sup> Rich has argued that the structure of Antias' work provided Livy with the shape of the annalistic framework as well as the material covering the Middle Republic.<sup>24</sup> Citations to Antias describing domestic material are often found in Livy's annalistic notices (e.g. F24, F44, and F59 *FRHist*). Antian fragments from non-Livian cover texts, too, contain material like the accounts in the annalistic notices, such as portents (and their expiation), the appointment of offices, or the origins of games or religious practices (e.g. F14 and F64 *FRHist*). Antias' interest in the ominous and strange and Livy's frequent criticism of his numerical data have contributed to the scholarly consensus that Antias made widespread use of plausible invention in composing his text.<sup>25</sup> His use of invention led to a drastic expansion of material, which resulted in Antias' text having a larger scope than his predecessors and a particular focus on expanding the narrative on more recent history.<sup>26</sup>

As Livy integrates the texts of Coelius and Antias into his own narrative of the past, the general characteristics of their works play a role in the elements that Livy adds to the *AUC*. Just as he did with his incorporation of Polybian language and themes, Livy uses acts of internal narration to draw intertextual relationships with his predecessors. As

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<sup>23</sup> Cornell 2014: 1.299-304 summarizes the scholarly opinions of how and to what effect Livy made use of Antias.

<sup>24</sup> Rich [1997] 2009: esp. 133-40.

<sup>25</sup> Badian 1966: 21, Wiseman 1979: 22, and Cornell 2014: 1.300.

<sup>26</sup> Cornell 2014: 1.297-98 summarizes the arguments for and against Antias' drastic change of pace and compares it to that of other historians.

I argue in the examples below, Narrators and focalizers preserve elements of Coelius' and Antias' texts in Livy's narrative.

## Part 2: Speaking in Fragments

At times, Livy directly integrates the texts of his predecessors into the voices of his internal narrators. I argue in Chapter Two that Hannibal's speeches in his opening campaign of the war draw upon and incorporate Polybian language into the *AUC*. In a well-known example, a portion of Hannibal's speech given before he crosses the Alps (21.30.5-8) directly echoes a digression from Polybius' *Histories* (3.47.6-48.12).<sup>27</sup> Livy includes elements that correspond to the fragments of Coelius and Antias in a similar fashion.

In a section of the *Noctes Atticae* discussing various archaic and elegant expressions of time that are no longer in use, Gellius transmits fragments of Coelius and Cato in which each use the term *diequinti*, as opposed to the two-word phrase *die quinto* common in Gellius' day (Gell. 10.24). The two fragments are drawn from the narrative discussing Carthaginians' reaction to the Battle of Cannae. In Coelius' monograph, one of Hannibal's advisors claims that the cavalry alone will be sufficient for him to take Rome:

Suppetit etiam Coelianum illud ex libro historiarum secundo: '**Si uis mihi equitatum dare et ipse cum cetero exercitu me sequi, diequinti Romae in Capitolium curabo tibi cena sit cocta.**' (Coelius F22 *FRHist* = Gell. 10.24.6)

There is also that example from Coelius in the second book of his histories: "**If you are willing to give me the cavalry and, for your part, to follow behind me with the rest of the army, I will make sure that dinner is cooked for you in Rome on the Capitol on the fifth day from now.**"

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<sup>27</sup> For Livy's echo of Polybius' digression, cf. Chapter 2, Part 4, above, and Girod 1982: 1206-8, Doblhofer 1983: 142-44, Händl-Sagawe 1995: 196-7, Feldherr 2009b, Levene 2010: 148-55 and 2014: 208.

Gellius' report of the fragment notes that Cato's *Origines* is Coelius' source for the speech and also cites Cato's version of the commander's words:

Et historiam autem et **uerbum hoc** sumpsit Coelius ex origine <IV> M. Catonis, in qua ita scriptum est: 'Igitur dictatorem Carthaginiensium **magister equitum** monuit: "**Mitte** mecum Romam **equitatum**; **diequinti in Capitolio tibi cena cocta erit.**" (Cato F78 *FRHist* = Gell. 10.24.7)

Coelius took both the story and **this word (*diequinti*)** from <fourth book<sup>28</sup> of> the *Origines* of M. Cato, in which it was written: 'Therefore, the **master of horse** warned the Carthaginian dictator: "**Send the cavalry** with me and **on the fifth day from now dinner will be cooked for you on the Capitoline.**"'

Beyond Gellius' testimony and the verbal echo of *diequinti*, Coelius also nearly copies a conditional version of the promise that the commander makes to Hannibal: (*curabo*) *tibi cena sit cocta* replaces Cato's simple future *tibi cena cocta erit*. In each of these reports the unnamed commander puts forward a suggestion that the cavalry pursue this course of action (*mitte...equitatum*; *equitatum dare*). Coelius' version, however, has the Carthaginian officer both show more deference to Hannibal in asking for command (*si uis...*) and assert more responsibility for the action that follows (*curabo*).

Livy too notes the commander's offer in his narrative of the immediate aftermath of Cannae. He first describes the suggestions offered by the other Carthaginian officers, who believe that Hannibal should rest for a day to recuperate after his significant victory

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<sup>28</sup> The attribution of the fragment to Book Four, as well as Hertz's emendation to include the numeral in the fragment, comes from another citation found in Gellius (Cato F79 *FRHist* = Gell. 2.19.9) that provides the follow up to this exchange and names Book Four as the source for this account. On the emendation and the narrative structure for Book Four, Cornell 2014: 1. 1.199-205 and 3.126-27.

(22.51.1).<sup>29</sup> Livy then records a speech as being given by Maharbal, the *praefectus equitum*. Livy here names his officer, in contrast to the anonymous officer of at least one of his predecessors. The fragment of Coelius contains only the direct quote of the speech and, as such, there is no indication in the surviving text of the identity of the speaker. While Cato's *Origines* famously described military and political officers only by their titles, not their names, Coelius names commanders and statesmen when the information is available to him, so Coelius may or may not have introduced the speech with the name of the officer making the offer.<sup>30</sup> As Livy names Maharbal, then, he demonstrates additional knowledge about these events that his predecessors possibly lacked or, at least in the case of Cato, decided not to share.

Livy's report of the speech demonstrates how he integrates elements from both of his predecessors' accounts:

Maharbal **praefectus equitum**, minime cessandum ratus, 'immo ut quid hac pugna sit actum scias, die quinto' inquit, 'uictor **in Capitolio** epulaberis. **sequere**; **cum equite**, ut prius uenisse quam uenturum sciant, **praecedam**.' (Livy 22.51.2)

Maharbal, **the master of the horse**, believed that there should be the least delay and said: "On the contrary, in order for you to know what was accomplished in this battle, you will dine **on the Capitol** as the conqueror on the fifth day. **Follow me! I will proceed with**

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<sup>29</sup> The episode of Hannibal's plan immediately after Cannae is of great interest to the Romans, who often used it as one of the counterfactual questions at the heart of a favorite *suasoria*: "What would happen if Hannibal marched on Rome?" Lazenby 1996 and Fronda 2010: 288-300 discuss how this debate fits into the larger traditions that develop around the Second Punic War. Hoyos 2000 discusses the historicity of the episode, concluding that it more likely occurred after Trasimene than after Cannae.

<sup>30</sup> Cornell 2014: 1.215-16 and Cato T1 *FRHist* = Nep. *Cato* 3.1-4. Cato F115 *FRHist* = T20 = Pliny Nat. Hist. 8.11 notes the absence of names in Cato's text and lists the name of Surus, one of Hannibal's elephants, as an exception (Cornell 2014: 3.143-44); cf. Ennius F540 Sk, perhaps on the elephant mentioned here. Cato F76 *FRHist* provides an extended narrative with several commanders listed by title only as an example in support of these testimonia.

**the cavalry** so that they will know that we have arrived before they know that we are coming.”

The imperative in Cato (*mitte*) is recalled through Livy’s *sequere*, as is the direct verbal parallel in *Capitolio*, which Livy retains despite Coelius’ *in Captiolium*. Livy does, however, recall Coelius’ *sequi* in his own imperative *sequere*. Maharbal is named as the master of horse by Livy, in contrast to his need to ask for permission to depart with the cavalry (*si vis mihi equitatum dare*) in Coelius. The designation of his position also recalls the title listed in Cato’s fragment: *magister equitum*. In comparison to Coelius’ version of the speech, where a conditional statement shows the officer asking for command, Livy’s narrative also shows that request fulfilled in that he is now listed as the *praefectus equitum*. Additionally, rather than asking for permission as he does in Cato and Coelius, Livy’s Maharbal declares with a vivid future that he will advance with the cavalry (*cum equite...praecedam*), which mirrors the self-assuredness of Coelius’ officer who asserted his role (*curabo*) in achieving these efforts. Livy mediates between the accounts of his two predecessors in Maharbal’s offer, which is made through the voice of an internal narrator and combines elements from both Cato’s and Coelius’ texts into one speech act.

In the aftermath of the fall of New Carthage, Scipio holds various meetings with groups of Spanish captives (Livy 26.49-50; cf. Polyb. 10.18-19). Among these prisoners is a woman of outstanding beauty. According to a citation in Gellius, Valerius Antias

engages in a well-known debate about Scipio's morality by describing the general's use of a Spanish captive for his sexual pleasure.<sup>31</sup>

credo... Valerium Antiatem aduersus ceteros omnis scriptores de Scipionis moribus sensisse et eam puellam captiuam non redditam patri scripsisse contra quam nos supra diximus, sed retentam a Scipione atque in deliciis amoribusque ab eo usurpatam. (F29 *FRHist* = Gell. 7.8.6)

I believe that Valerius Antias took a view on Scipio's character in opposition to all the other authors and wrote that he did not return the captive girl to her father, contrary to what we said above, but instead that she was retained by Scipio and that she was used by him for sexual dalliances.

While Livy makes no explicit mention of the variant tradition, Scipio's speech to the woman's fiancé in the *AUC* makes a subtle reference to the tradition of Scipio's interest in her:<sup>32</sup>

'**iuuenis**' inquit '**iuuenem** appello, quo minor sit inter nos huius sermonis **uerecundia**. ego cum sponsa tua capta a militibus nostris ad me ducta esset audiremque tibi eam cordi esse, et **forma** faceret fidem...' (26.50.4-5)

"**As a young man**," Scipio says, "I address **a fellow young man**, in order that there may be less **modesty** between us. When your fiancée had been captured by our soldiers and led to me, I heard that she was very dear to you, and **her beauty** makes that believable..."

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<sup>31</sup> On the larger tradition of Scipio's morality, cf. Polyb. 10.19.3, where Scipio's troops bring the captive girl before him because they know of his love for women (φιλογύνην ὄντα τὸν Πόπλιον). Chaplin 2010 discusses how this tradition fits into Livy's larger picture of Scipio. Kowalewski 2002: 211-18 and 219-39 on how Livy incorporates Allucius and Sophonisba, respectively, into this episode. de Romilly 1988 notes how this episode is one example of a larger tradition of how a beautiful captive girl falls into the hands of her enemy. Tretheway 2002: 110-13 compares the versions of this episode in Polybius and Livy.

<sup>32</sup> Chaplin 2010 discusses the episode at length. Chaplin is correct that Livy makes no explicit mention of the Antian version (p. 62) and removes the reference to Scipio's love of women entirely. While Chaplin's larger point about the political acumen that Scipio demonstrates in Livy's version of the episode is well made, I hope by showing how Livy does subtly reference this tradition that this further marks out Scipio's restraint and recognition of political expediency.



Scipio draws a parallel between his identity and status and that of his addressee by noting his youth, like the young fiancé he is addressing (*iuvenis...iuvenem*). As Gellius notes, Scipio's youth is a part of the larger tradition of his infidelity.<sup>33</sup> Livy's Scipio tries to remove any lingering sense of modesty from their interactions as he tells the young man to avoid letting *verecundia* interfere with their conversation.<sup>34</sup> Scipio then notes the girl's beauty (*forma*) as the legitimating factor for the fiancé's affection for her. Scipio's remark on her physical charms and the explicit removal of modesty highlight the possibility that the Antian tradition of infidelity lies behind Scipio's speech.

In his narrative of the aftermath of the fall of Carthago Nova, Livy twice notes Antias as a source for various numerical details and the personnel involved in the capture of the city (F28 *FRHist* = Livy 26.49.1-6). The citations to Antias in the section immediately preceding the narrative of the captive girl both demonstrate that he was aware of Antias' description of Scipio's indiscretion and call Antias' text to mind for Livy's audience, helping to mobilize the subtle references made to Scipio's indiscretion in the subsequent exchange with her fiancé. Livy thereby incorporates references to Antias' tradition within the speech of an internal narrator and focalizes the desire and its subsequent refusal from Scipio's perspective. Knowledge of the Antian account of Scipio's alleged impropriety enhances the interpretation that following a sense of civic

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<sup>33</sup> Gell. 7.8.5; *Scipionem istum, uerone an falso incertum, fama tamen, cum esset adulescens, haud sincera fuisse*: "Scipio, when he was a young man—and it is uncertain whether or not it is true—did not have an untarnished reputation."

<sup>34</sup> Kaster 1980 on the concept of *verecundia*. As the youth of the two figures in this discussion is of marked interest to Scipio, v., esp., pp. 242-43 of Kaster's article on the interplay of youthfulness and the development of *verecundia*.

duty is appropriate in this context, as it creates more of an expectation that Scipio would have fulfilled his desires had his duty not interfered.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to the narrative act itself, Livy incorporates elements from his source texts as he focalizes events from the perspectives of the internal audience. Among Cicero's discussion of the other omens that occurred to mark the disaster for the Romans at Lake Trasimene, he notes that Coelius includes an account of a widespread earthquake across much of the Mediterranean world:

**magnum** illud etiam, quod **addidit** Coelius, eo tempore ipso, cum hoc **calamitosum proelium** fieret, tantos terrae motus in Liguribus, Gallia compluribusque insulis totaque in Italia factos esse, ut multa oppida conruerint, multis locis labes factae sint terraeque desederint **fluminaque** in contrarias partes **fluxerint** atque **in amnes** mare **influxerit**. (Coelius F14b *FRHist* = Cic. *de Div.* 1.78)

There is also this **remarkable** fact Coelius **adds** that, at the very time when this **disastrous battle** was occurring, there were such great earthquakes in Liguria, Gaul, very many islands, and throughout all of Italy that many towns fell to ruin, in many places there was destruction, and land eroded away, and **streams flowed** in the opposite direction, and the sea **flowed into the rivers**.

As Coelius describes it, the earthquake turns the Roman world on its head. Cicero claims that Coelius adds (*addidit*) the detail about the earthquake, perhaps suggesting that the detail is found only in Coelius' monograph.<sup>36</sup> Livy discusses other prodigies in his narrative that leads up to the battle, but makes no mention of the earthquake in his initial

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<sup>35</sup> My analysis here bolsters the interpretive payoff advanced by Chaplin 2010: 62-64, even though we disagree on the presence or absence of the Antian tradition in Livy's text.

<sup>36</sup> *contra* Cornell comm. *ad loc.*, which claims that *addidit Coelius* simply means that Coelius includes both what precedes and what follows the phrase.

account of the omens (22.1.8-20 and 22.3.11-13). Only later in the midst of the chaos of the battle does Livy refer to the earthquake:<sup>37</sup>

tantusque fuit ardor animorum, adeo intentus pugnae animus, ut eum motum terrae qui multarum urbium Italiae magnas partes prostrauit **auertit**que cursu rapidos **amnes**, mare **fluminibus inuexit**, montes lapsu ingenti proruit, nemo pugnantium senserit. (22.5.8)

Such was the fervor of their courage, their attention so fixed on the battle, that the earthquake which destroyed great parts of many cities in Italy and **diverted** in course swift **streams**, **carried** the sea **up the rivers**, overturned mountains with a huge landslide, not one of the combatants noticed it.

Overall, the parallels between the two passages are clear. Each notes the toppling of cities, the unusual movement of water, and landslides. Livy, however, exchanges the verbal actions attributed to *amnes* and *flumina* when compared to the description of the watery motions found in the Coelius fragment.<sup>38</sup>

Each account also includes a result clause to describe what follows the earthquake. The result effected in each case, however, is markedly different. Coelius records that the earthquake was so great that it caused a vast level of destruction. Livy instead focalizes the earthquake from the soldiers' perspective by claiming that their fervor for battle was so great that not a single combatant notices an earthquake that shakes the entire Mediterranean world. While it is possible that Cicero removed the framing focalization of the soldiers' perspective from his description of Coelius' text, two

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<sup>37</sup> On Livy's rewriting of Coelius in his account of the other omens at Trasimene: Levene 2010 133-35. Levene argues that Livy reorders and reworks the narrative of these portents "to focus the events into a single dramatic moment" (135).

<sup>38</sup> Coelius: *flumina*que in contrarias partes *fluxerint* atque in *amnes* mare *influxerit*; Livy: *auertit*que cursu rapidos *amnes*, mare *fluminibus inuexit*.

things suggest that the change is Livy's.<sup>39</sup> First, the remaining portions of the fragment described by Cicero have acts of internal narration and notes of focalization from an audience's perspective. Second and more tellingly, Livy's narrative of the battle is marked by descriptions of confusion and failed perception on the part of the Roman soldiers as they fail to hear the orders of their commander, are unable to see their standards through the fog, find their weapons and armor to prepare for the fight, and even to recognize to which side to turn to find friend or foe (22.5).<sup>40</sup>

The soldiers are not the only internal audience that takes no notice of the earthquake. Livy fairly consistently notes the measures taken by the Senate to expiate dangerous portents reported throughout Roman territory.<sup>41</sup> Earthquakes are among the prodigies that the Senate needs to redress—in fact, Livy reports (34.55.4) that in 193 BCE overly frequent earthquakes shut down the Senate, which had to limit the reports of seismic activity to resume business.<sup>42</sup> He makes no subsequent mention, however, of the earthquake that occurred during Trasimene or of any attempt by the Senate to ameliorate its effects.<sup>43</sup> Since Livy has neither the combatants nor the Senate recognize what was for Coelius a great (*magnum*) sign of a calamitous battle (*calamitosum proelium*), he undermines Coelius' entire narrative of the omens. Livy's focalization of the earthquake

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<sup>39</sup> For the potential that Cicero removes the note when paraphrasing Coelius, Levene 2010: 269, n. 20.

<sup>40</sup> On the potential confusion and its effect in Livy's narrative, Levene 2010: 268-70.

<sup>41</sup> On prodigy lists and the Senate's efforts to expiate divine omens in the narrative of Livy's Third Decade, Levene 1993: 38-77 and Satterfield 2012. On the procedural aspects of these prodigy lists for the Annalistic Tradition, Rawson 1971, Frier 1979: 270-4, and Levene 1993: 35-36.

<sup>42</sup> cf. Cic. *Har. Resp.* 28.62. Satterfield 2012: 74 and 78-80 discusses this report and how it relates to Livy's technique of reporting prodigy lists.

<sup>43</sup> As noted above, the prodigy list for the corresponding year (22.1.8-20) and the Senate's expiations for those omens does not include the earthquake.

through the soldiers' perspective allows him to highlight their lack of response. An internal focalizer thus provides Livy an opportunity to question his predecessor's account without citing his text. Coelius' notice of the omen, like the earthquake itself in the *AUC*, should be dismissed and ignored.

Similarly, Livy has an internal focalizer draw attention to a problem with Valerius Antias' text. After the deaths of the Scipio brothers in Spain, a Roman Knight, Lucius Marcius, steps in to rally the fractured troops and turn around Roman fortunes there (Livy 25.37-39). Pliny the Elder records an excerpt from Valerius Antias that notes a flame rising from Marcius:

L. Marcio in Hispania interemptis Scipionibus **contionanti** et milites **ad ultionem exhortanti arsisse simili modo** Valerius Antias narrat. (F27b *FRHist* = Pliny *NH* 2.241)

Valerius Antias narrates that **in a similar fashion a fire arose** on Lucius Marcius in Spain after the Scipios were killed **while he was giving a speech** and **encouraging** the troops **to vengeance**.

The cover text, the corresponding section of Pliny's *Natural History*, describes instances of spontaneous combustion that led to the ignition of actual fires. Antias, too, gives no reason to suspect anything less than an actual fire (*arsisse*) has arisen on Marcius. Pliny's claim that the flames on Marcius appear in a similar way (*simili modo*) connects the Marcian portent to two other fiery omens: Lake Trasimene burning across its entire surface and Servius Tullius having a flame shoot from his head while he was asleep as an infant.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Pliny *NH* 2.241: *Trasimenum lacum arsisse totum; Servio Tullio dormienti in pueritia ex capite flammam emicuisse*, "Lake Trasimene as a whole burned. A flame shot out from the head of Servius Tullius while he was sleeping as a child." On the Servian portent: Livy 1.39 and Val. Max. 1.6.2.

As Livy summarizes his account of the valor of Marcius in turning around the affairs in Spain, he includes a description of the phenomenon that alludes to Antias' account:

apud omnes magnum nomen Marcii ducis est; et **uerae** gloriae eius etiam **miracula** addunt flammam ei **contionanti** fusam e capite **sine ipsius sensu cum magno pauore** circumstantium **militum** (Livy 25.39.16 = Antias F27a *FRHist*)

Among all [the sources] the name of the leader Marcius is of great importance and they even add **miracles** on top of his **true** glory, claiming that a flame poured out of his head **while he was speaking, without his knowledge** but **eliciting great fear on the part of the soldiers** standing around him.

Livy makes a direct citation to Antias just above this passage (25.39.14 *Valerius Antias...tradiit*), which further mobilizes the reference beyond the general context, narrative situation, and basic details shared between the two accounts. Additionally, the participial action describing Marcius, *contionanti*, is repeated in both texts, further marking the Livian report as likely derived from Antias.

Livy focalizes the account from the perspective of the internal audience: he explicitly notes that Marcius, the speaker, was completely unaware of the fire (*sine ipsius sensu*) and remarks on the effect that the appearance of the flame has on the soldiers (*cum magno pavore...militum*). Since Livy focalizes the fiery omen from the perspective of the internal audience, he highlights the potential effects that the flame has on the soldiers. Although Livy claims that the account is the *opinio communis* of his sources, he questions its veracity by separating the marvel (*miracula*) from Marcius' true (*verae*) glory. While Livy does not avoid including variant traditions that he claims are

inaccurate, his focalization of the Antian flame through the soldiers' perspective hints that the internal audience may provide further explanation for his mention of this variant tradition.

In Livy's preceding narrative, Marcius gives two speeches that could provide the setting for the fiery portent. The second of these speeches (25.38.2-22) comprises a lengthy set speech related through *oratio recta* and receives a fuller treatment in Livy's narrative. Livy's introduction to the speech even recalls the phrasing of Valerius Antias, with the gerundive phrase *adhortandos...milites* and *contione* recalling the participles *contionanti* and *exhortanti* from the fragment from Antias.<sup>45</sup> The soldiers' reaction to the speech, however, is far from the terror that Livy notes Marcius' fiery appearance inspired. Instead, the soldiers are overjoyed (*laeti*) and pleased (*placebat*) by the speech (25.38.23). Although Marcius' second speech is introduced with language that recalls Antias' report of the fiery omen, the reaction of the internal audience makes this speech unlikely for the appearance of the flames.

Marcius' first speech (25.37.10), however, a battlefield exhortation, better indicates a setting appropriate for the fiery omen. News reaches the Romans that Hasdrubal is approaching to attack the struggling camp and the soldiers are struck with grief over their current misfortunes:

neque sedari lamentatio poterat...ipso mulcente et increpante  
Marcio...ne **inultos imperatores** suos iacere sinerent (Livy  
25.37.10)

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<sup>45</sup> 25.38.1: *adloquendos adhortandosque sibi milites ratus, contione aduocata ita disseruit*; cf. Antias F 27b *FRHist* = Pliny *NH* 2.241: *contionanti et milites ad ultionem exhortanti*.

The weeping was not able to be assuaged...even though Marcius himself was soothing them and rebuking them...not to allow their **commanders** to lie there **unavenged**.

In his battlefield speech, Marcius calls for the soldiers to avoid leaving their former leaders unavenged (*inultos imperatores*), recalling the phrase *ad ultionem* from the Antian fragment. The soldiers' reaction to the speech, however, makes the connection to the reference to Antias more explicit:

inde uerso repente in iram luctu discurrunt ad arma ac uelut **accensi** rabie discurrunt ad portas et in hostem neglegenter atque incomposite uenientem incurrunt. extemplo improuisa res **pauorem** incutit Poenis (25.37.11-12).

Then, with their grief suddenly turned to anger, they run to their arms and, as though **they were inflamed** by rage, they run to the gates and attack the enemy who is approaching recklessly and without order. Immediately this unexpected event strikes **fear** upon the Carthaginians.

The combination of fire and dread (*pavor*) that Livy includes in his report of the fiery omen here appears through the reactions of two internal audiences: the Roman troops and their Carthaginian opponents. Marcius' soldiers have become inflamed (*accensi*) by his speech and they pass the dread (*pavorem*) to their opponents. As discussed above, Livy focalizes his account of the flames appearing during Marcius' speech from the perspective of the troops, calling to his external audience's attention the reaction of Marcius' internal audience. The speech that provokes the fiery and dreadful response in Livy's narrative is the battlefield speech, not the formal *contio* held later where Antias and the others claim the marvelous flames appeared (*contionanti*). Livy integrates the soldier's reactions to his account of Marcius' fiery appearance into his narrative of the



earlier speech and thereby questions the context for the omen claimed by Antias.

*Miracula* such as these belong to battlefield speeches, not the formal *contio*.

The methodological patterns evident in Livy's integration of these fragmentary authors as source texts into acts of internal narration allow him to question and supersede his predecessors. Furthermore, his incorporation of his predecessors through internal speech acts suggests two larger points: First, for our interpretation of the *AUC*, this integration suggests that Livy's internal narrators speak with the voices of the Roman historiographic tradition. Second, the pattern that emerges from Livy's interaction through speech acts with the fragments examined here suggests a model for further studies of the *AUC* and its relation to fragmentary texts.

## Concluding Remarks

I have analyzed how Livy's internal narrators mediate between his and his predecessors' texts. In Chapter One I survey the theoretical frameworks that I use throughout the project to show how Livy uses narrators as part of his intertextual approach to writing history. Chapters Two through Four explore the relationship between *opsis*, exemplarity, and the authority of the historiographic methods of Livy and Polybius as they appear in the voices of the internal narrators Hannibal and Scipio. In Chapter Two I argue that for Livy's Hannibal the sustained practice of integrating comments made by the Polybian external narrator into Hannibal's speeches allows the Carthaginian general to speak with a Polybian voice throughout the Third Decade. In so doing, Livy incorporates a conflation of character that was already present in Polybius' text and increases it to a greater degree. While Hannibal in the *Histories* uses language modelled on Polybius' methods of *opsis* and autopsy, Livy's Hannibal actually speaks with Polybius' own words. Without direct references made to Polybius, Hannibal's referential speeches in the *AUC* create an intertextual relationship that identifies Hannibal as a *modello-esemplare* to Polybius' *Histories*. In Chapter Three I turn to the character of Scipio in both Polybius and Livy. For Polybius, Scipio continues the trend of speaking with a focus on Polybian language and methodology. In Livy's Third Decade, however, Scipio uses language in his speeches that mirrors Livy's own historiographic techniques. In his role as an internal narrator Scipio becomes an analogue for Livy's methodology. Scipio uses exemplarity to guide the actions of his internal audience and presents a more

compelling interpretation of the Regulus *exemplum* in his debate with Fabius about the proposed invasion of Africa.

In Chapter Four I combine the analyses from the previous two chapters to argue how Livy creates a payoff from these parallel narratorial identities that allows the two internal narrators to stage a competition on behalf of the authors whose approaches each represents. As Hannibal and Scipio face off at Zama, their speeches and interactions set the stage for a battle of authorial reference as they stand as analogues for the methodologies of Polybius and Livy, respectively. As Scipio triumphs over Hannibal in the battle, the Roman victory there represents a victory for Livy's exemplary method of historiography over Polybius' own reliance on pragmatic decision-making based on *opsis* and autopsy. By establishing a competitive relationship with one of his predecessors through sustained intertextual reference, Livy takes part in larger literary traditions common in the Augustan age.

In Chapter Five I briefly survey how additional internal narrators, too, display elements drawn from some of Livy's other predecessors. In particular, acts of internal narration integrate aspects of the texts of Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias. Although the fragmentary remains of these authors makes it impossible to establish a sustained intertextual relationship between a predecessor text and a single internal narrator—as became clear with Polybius and Hannibal—the consistency of Livy's integration of his sources into acts of internal narration suggests a more complicated interaction with his source material than just mining their texts for historical data. This type of engagement with his predecessors is also obviously a far cry from the image of

Livy as a slavish copyist imagined by the *Quellenforscher*. The integration of source texts into acts of internal narration shows Livy giving a voice to the Greco-Roman historiographic tradition throughout the Third Decade.

To conclude, I would like to suggest a few possible avenues that this research opens for future studies. While Livy has been shown to have undertaken different methodological processes at various points in the construction of his narrative and his use of sources,<sup>1</sup> this type of internal narrator-based integration of his source texts is not limited to the Third Decade. For example, in the Fourth Decade, a notice of the dramatic performances at the *Ludi Megalenses* in 194 BCE (34.54.3-8) has provoked the interest of scholars for Livy's apparent mishandling of the discrepancy over the timing and origin of the innovations introduced at these games.<sup>2</sup>

The discrepancy revolves around the correct identification of the games at which the first dramatic festivals were performed, the first time the Senators were given separate seating from the rest of the audience, and on whose authority or suggestion that separation was made.<sup>3</sup> In his first reference to the partitioning of the seating, Livy notes

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<sup>1</sup> Luce 1977 demonstrates this throughout, but esp.: 185-229. Levene 2010: 131-35 demonstrates a small number of examples in which Livy's methods are markedly different between the Third and Fourth Decades as part of his response to Tränkle 1977, whose work centers on the assumption that Livy's methods—pertaining to his use of Polybius as source material—did not alter drastically between sections of the *AUC*.

<sup>2</sup> Other notices related to the innovations: 34.44.5 and 36.36.4. cf. Val. Max. 2.4.3 and 4.5.1, Cicero's *Pro Cornelio* (= F27 Crawford) and *Har. Resp.* 24, Ascon. *Corn.* 55St, and Val. F41 and 44 *FRHist*. Scholarly discussions of the full range of issues behind these notices includes: Klotz 1964: 45-46, 78, and 84, Ungern-Sternberg 1975, Briscoe 1981: 118, 134, and 274-76, Bernstein 1988: 193-95, and Fleck 1993: 209-13. On the fragments specifically and Livy's handling of them: Chassignet 2004: 3.230-1 and Cornell 2014: 3.348-50. On Livy's supposed misrepresentation of Antias at 36.36.4: Tränkle 1977: 67 n. 46, Briscoe 1981: 276, and Cornell 2014: 3.350, among the other works just noted.

<sup>3</sup> The first celebration of the Megalesia was in 204 BCE when the statue of Magna Mater arrived in Rome (Livy 29.14.14), but the dedication of the temple in her honor occurred in 191, at which point Livy notes that Antias claims the first *Ludi Megalenses* were held (36.36.4).

that the censors receive the appreciation of the Senate for making the proposal of the separation to take place at the *Ludi Romani* of that year (194 BCE).<sup>4</sup> Valerius, too, seems to have given the credit to the Censors (F 41 *FRHist*).<sup>5</sup> The cover text for the Valerian fragment is Asconius' commentary on Cicero's *Pro Cornelio*. Cicero twice notes Scipio as the originator of the idea.<sup>6</sup> In his speech on the *Responses of Haruspices*, Cicero claims Scipio gave the concession for separating the Senate from the people at the *Ludi Megalenses*.<sup>7</sup>

Livy gives a second notice to the separation of seating as he records the *Ludi Megalenses* of 194 BCE (34.54.3-8). Livy's notice, however, makes it clear that the partitioning was still done at the *Ludi Romani*, not the Megalesia:

Megalesia ludos scaenicos A. Atilius Serranus L. Scribonius Libo aediles curules primi fecerunt. horum aedilium ludos Romanos primum senatus a populo secretus spectauit praebuitque sermones, sicut omnis nouitas solet, **aliis tandem** quod **multo ante** debuerit tributum **existimantibus** amplissimo ordini, **aliis** demptum ex dignitate populi quidquid maiestati patrum adiectum esset **interpretantibus**...nouam, superbam libidinem, ab nullius ante gentis senatu neque desideratam neque **institutam**. (34.54.3-5, 7)

At the Megalesia, the curule aediles A. Atilius Serranus and L. Scribonius Libo put on dramatic festivities for the first time. At the *Ludi Romani* of

<sup>4</sup> 34.44.5: *gratiam quoque ingentem apud eum ordinem pepererunt, quod ludis Romanis aedilibus curulibus imperarunt ut loca senatoria secernerent a populo; nam antea in promiscuo spectarant*. "They gained a great deal of gratitude from this order [the Senate] because they gave orders to the curule aediles to separate the Senatorial seating from the people, for before this they had watched without distinction."

<sup>5</sup> F 41 *FRHist* = Ascon. *Corn.* 55st: *factum id esse autem Antias tradidit ludis Romanis quos fecerunt aediles curules <A> Atilius Serranus L. Scribonius Libo, et id eos fecisse iussu censorum Sex. Aeli Paeti C. Corneli Cethegi*. "Antias records, however, that this was done at the *Ludi Romani* which the curule aediles A. Atilius Serranus and L. Scribonius Libo held and that that they did so by the order of the censors, Sex. Aelius Paetus and G. Cornelius Cethegus."

<sup>6</sup> In this fragment for the *Pro Cornelio*, F27 Crawford, and, again, at *Har.. Resp.* 24.

<sup>7</sup> Cic. *Har. Resp.* 24.10: *quibus ludis primum ante populi consessum senatui locum P. Africanus iterum consul ille maior dedit*, "at which *Ludi* [the *Megalenses*] P. Africanus the Elder, consul for the second time, granted the Senate first position before the people had gathered."

these same aediles the senate for the first time watched the shows apart from the people and this produced gossip, as happens with every new custom. **Some were considering** that this was an honor given **at long last** to a most deserving order which ought to have been granted **much earlier**. **Others concluded** that anything that added to the grandeur of the senators was subsequently taken away from the dignity of the people...this is a strange and arrogant new inclination, neither hoped for nor **established** by the senate in any previous generation.

Livy combines here references to both the *Ludi Megalenses* and *Romani* for 194. He also continues in this notice to describe how Scipio comes to regret being the author (*auctor*) of the idea of separating the seating according to rank.<sup>8</sup> The combination of these notices alludes to the variant tradition that Cicero describes in his two speeches, namely, that Scipio is responsible for the separation and that it began at the *Ludi Megalenses*. Livy's description of the people's responses to this event (*aliis...existimantibus...aliis...interpretantibus*) integrates the response to the separation into the voice of a body of internal narrators. He even makes his reference to Scipio's feeling of grief through the indirect statement of the report of the populace (*Africanum... paenituisse ferunt*; 34.54.8). The concerns raised by the people mirror the very problems raised by the variant traditions: the timing of the change to the seating arrangement (*tandem...multo ante*) and the inception of the idea (*institutam*). Livy later makes a third reference (36.36.4) to the issues linked to the dramatic festivals at the *Ludi Megalenses*, noting how Antias places them in the year 191, to coincide with the completion and dedication of the temple to

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<sup>8</sup> 34.54.8: *postremo ipsum quoque Africanum quod consul auctor eius rei fuisset paenituisse ferunt*. "They say that in the end even Africanus himself came to regret the fact that he was the author of this idea while he was consul." Cornell 2014: 3.348 notes that Quadrigarius or Piso could be the source of Livy's note here.

Magna Mater.<sup>9</sup> Livy's attribution of this information to Antias contradicts Asconius' notice of Antias' dating of the games (F41 *FRHist*). While scholars have made various proposals to explain the various attributions—often resulting in Livy being a clumsy or unfaithful reporter<sup>10</sup>—Livy's multiple references to these events highlight the very confusion borne out by the sources. Livy's use of the people's reaction as an internal narrator calls to mind the variant traditions and represents the issues raised by the discrepancies through the rumors he reports.

The methodology I use in this project easily transfers to work on other historians. Beyond the speeches that frequent ancient historiography, other types of internal narrators appear in historical texts. A fragment of Sallust's *Histories* (F98 Reynolds), for example, contains a report of a letter by Pompey to the Senate reporting his current progress in his campaign in Spain.<sup>11</sup> As part of this letter Pompey discusses his zeal for the campaign and the path he has taken so far:

Equidem fateor me ad hoc bellum maiore studio quam consilio profectum, quippe qui nomine modo imperi a vobis accepto, diebus quadraginta exercitum paravi hostisque in cervicibus iam Italiae agentis ab Alpibus in Hispaniam submovi; per eas iter aliud atque Hannibal, **nobis opportunius, patefecit**. Recepi Galliam, Pyrenaeum, Lacetaniam, Indigetis. (F 98.4-5 Reynolds)

Indeed, I admit that I set out for this war with more eagerness than planning, in as much as I gathered an army within forty days of when I

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<sup>9</sup> 36.36.4: *ludique ob dedicationem eius facti, quos primos scenicos fuisse Antias Ualerius est auctor, Megalesia appellatos*. “Ludi were held for the dedication of this [temple] and Valerius Antias is the author that these were the first dramatic festivals at the *Ludi*, called the Megalesia.” On issues with Livy's chronology for the dating of the temple's dedication to 191 BCE, Briscoe 1981: 274-75.

<sup>10</sup> Tränkle 1977: 67 n. 46, Briscoe 1981: 276, and Cornell 2014: 3.350, e.g.

<sup>11</sup> F98 Reynolds = F82 McGushin = Codex Vaticanus Lat. 3864 (V). McGushin 1992: 242-47 discusses the letter at length. Badian 1962 discusses the position of Sallust's *Histories* within the context of other historical accounts of the age of Sulla.

accepted from you a command in name only and I drew away an enemy that was already operating in the neck of Italy from the Alps to Spain. **I opened up** a path through the Alps, one that is different than what Hannibal used and **more advantageous for us**. I recovered Gaul, the Pyrenees, Lacetania, and the Indigites.

Although Pompey's letter relates the opening of his campaign against Sertorius, it bears striking parallels to the traditional accounts of the Hannibalic War. Pompey's claim to pursue the war with great zeal recalls Hannibal's eagerness to undertake a war with Rome (Polyb. 3.8, Livy 21.5.1-3, e.g.). Pompey raises an army in a short amount of time, as Hannibal does before invading Italy (Polyb. 3.33.5-18, Livy 21.21-22, Nep. *Hann.* 3.2-3). As Pompey claims to have recovered various territories along his march, he reverses the path taken by Hannibal from Spain to Italy. Just as some narratives of Hannibal's crossing note how he cuts open a new path along his journey (Nep. *Hann.* 3.4, Livy 21.36-37), Pompey, too, describes how he himself has opened (*patefecit*) a road.<sup>12</sup> While Livy's and Nepos' accounts postdate Sallust's *Histories*,<sup>13</sup> the facets of the narrative of the crossing of the Alps alluded to here exist within the traditional accounts of Hannibal's transalpine expedition. Pompey therefore makes reference to the larger tradition surrounding Hannibal with his letter here. When he opens a new path, one more opportune for the Romans (*nobis opportunus*), he is directly outdoing even Hannibal, who had surpassed all those before him during his crossing.

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<sup>12</sup> On Livy's account of Hannibal's new pathway, cf. Chapter 2, Part 4, above.

<sup>13</sup> McGushin 1992: 3-4: Sallust's *Histories* have a *terminus ante quem* of 35 BCE, the date of Sallust's death. Stem 2012: 12-14 and 29-30 dates Nepos' *On Foreign Generals* to 35-32 BCE; cf. Chapter 1, Part 1, above, on this date and its relation to Livy's Third Decade.



Pompey closes his letter with a plea for the Senate to send reinforcements (F 98.6-10 Reynolds). His final thought, which warns the Senate of what is to come if they ignore him, draws upon his reference to Hannibal made above:

nisi subvenitis, invito et praedicente me **exercitus hinc** et cum eo omne **bellum Hispaniae in Italiam** transgredientur. (F 98.10 Reynolds)

If you do not come to my aid, **the army** and, with it, the entire **war for Spain** will cross over **from here into Italy** even though I do not want this and am giving you forewarning.

Pompey speaks in general tones about the war (*exercitus, bellum*). The only specific details he notes are the origin (*hinc, Hispaniae*) and destination (*in Italiam*) for the war. He does not bring up Sertorius' name nor the identity of Sertorius' troops as Roman, Pompey allows the generalities to recall Hannibal's crossing of the Alps into Italy. Above, Pompey claims in his efforts so far to have surpassed Hannibal's deeds. Here, however, he warns that failure will result in what amounts to a renewal of the Second Punic War. With Pompey having already outdone Hannibal, any invasion of Italy that results from his defeat is likely to surpass the danger that Rome experienced in the Second Punic War. Pompey's argument could not make the stakes higher for the Senate. Their response, however, gives Sallust the opportunity to contrast the take of an internal narrator with an audience and demonstrate his own ability to surpass one of his predecessors.

As I argued with internal narrators in Livy, above, Pompey's voice as a narrator in the *Histories* provides for Sallust an opportunity for Pompey to represent the author and his text. In fact, Pompey's role as an internal narrator in his letter also draws upon larger

themes for Sallust's *Histories* and, in fact, his entire *oeuvre*. Pompey looms large in the surviving fragments of Sallust's *Histories*, which suggests that he plays for Sallust a large part in the cause and outcome of the civil wars.<sup>14</sup> Sallust is well recognized by scholars both ancient and modern for his incorporation of themes, language, and allusions that draw upon Thucydides' work.<sup>15</sup> Even with the limitations of the fragmentary state of Sallust's *Histories*, Thucydidean parallels in the work have been noted, notably from the very preface of his *Histories* where Sallust alludes to Thucydides.<sup>16</sup> The themes and language of Pompey's letter, too, have been shown to create an allusive relationship to Thucydides' letter of Nicias (7.11-15).<sup>17</sup> Meyer argues that the narrative situations surrounding the letters, too, encourage Sallust's audience to compare the letters' recipients and their responses, thereby encouraging Sallust's readers to become better readers of Thucydides as well.<sup>18</sup>

The allusive relationship between Pompey's letter and Thucydides' text extends further when Pompey's role as an internal narrator is contrasted with the reaction of the

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<sup>14</sup> McGushin 1992: 17-18, Meyer 2010: 116. Scanlon 1980: 215 also notes that Sallust focuses on "crucial points in Rome's decline." Pompey's disagreement with the Senate in this letter likely plays a large role as one of these pivotal moments.

<sup>15</sup> Ancient references to Sallust's Thucydidean parallels include Vell. 2.36.2, Sen. *Suas.* 6.21, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.101 and 10.2.17. Modern work on the topic is vast: e.g. Scanlon 1980: 11-19 and 31-48, Woodman 1988: 126-28, Nicols 1999: 331-32, Renahan 2000, Schmal 2001: 148-53, and Grethlein 2006. Scanlon 1980 includes a helpful list of the references discussing the Thucydidean aspects of Sallust's work.

<sup>16</sup> On the Thucydidean preface to Sallust's *Histories*: Scanlon 1998 and Meyer 2010: 114-15. Meyer notes the presence of insistence on truth (*vero*; *Hist.* F1.6) and clarity (*satis clara*; *Hist.* F2.98.6) in the fragments as recalling the Thucydidean assertion of ἀλήθεια and invoking the historical situation clearly (σαφῶς). cf. Büchner 1963: 249-52.

<sup>17</sup> Renahan 2000 argues mainly for Sallust's use of context-to-context allusion, while Meyer 2010 argues for direct verbal references to Thucydides throughout the letter, *contra* Scanlon 1980: 203.

<sup>18</sup> Meyer 2010: 109-17. Meyer also discusses the differences between the authors of the two letters, Pompey and Nicias, and draws on the striking parallels between Pompey and Alcibiades and how these comparisons highlight larger issues that lead to civil discord.

Senate. Pompey follows his narrative of his own Alpine crossing with a rhetorical question: “Why, then, should I list out battles or winter campaigns, towns either destroyed or recaptured when actions are more powerful than words?” (*Quid deinde proelia aut expeditiones hibernas, oppida excisa aut recepta enumerem, quando res plus valet quam verba?*; F98.6 Reynolds). He follows the claim with a list of his deeds, meant to prompt the Senate to act. His question, however, contrasts words and deeds. A central and well-recognized feature of Thucydidean historiography is the interplay and dialogue formed between *logos* and *ergon* in his text.<sup>19</sup> Sallust’s Pompey as an internal narrator in his letter alludes to a central Thucydidean concept. Pompey, however, contends that actions override words, in opposition to Thucydides’ focus on how words lead to action.

The Senate receives Pompey’s letter and, after some initial delay spent allocating the proconsular provinces for the coming year, the consuls begin to secure the assistance that Pompey had requested (F98.11-12 Reynolds). Sallust then describes the rest of the nobility following suit: “the nobles, for the most part, were assisting and many of them now were exhibiting their ferocity in speech and were not following up their words with deeds” (*adnitente maxime nobilitate, quous plerique iam tum lingua ferociam suam <ostentabant n>ec dicta factis seque<bantur>*; F98.12 Reynolds). Unfortunately, textual problems cloud the exact force of the passage.<sup>20</sup> However, the portion of the line that

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<sup>19</sup> Parry 1957 remains a seminal study of the topic. Immerwahr 1960 followed shortly behind Parry’s work with a reevaluation of how Thucydides compares his task to Herodotus’ based on Parry’s work. More recently, Price 2001 has used the contrast and interplay between *logoi* and *erga* as an organizing principle for his analysis of Thucydides’ narratives of *stasis* (v. esp. pp. 1-5, 79-81, and 205-07). Greenwood 2006: 57-82 also explores how speech and truth define action for Thucydides.

<sup>20</sup> Here, I have followed Shackleton Bailey’s suggestion to *n>ec*. Diggle 1983 first suggested *aegue<bant* for *seque/*, which Reynolds 1991: 183 thinks likely.

contains the contrast between words and deeds (*dicta factis*) is clearly preserved.

Regardless of the suggested emendations to the final verb of the passage (*aequebant* or *sequebant*) the overall meaning of the Senate's reaction is clear: there is a discrepancy between their words and their deeds and only Pompey's letter is able to spur them to action.

As I argued with Livy's internal narrators above, Pompey's letter—a type of internal narration—creates for Sallust's *Histories*, too, an opportunity to assert his own methodological approach. As a central figure in the remaining fragments of the *Histories*, Pompey represents the power of deeds for his text. As Pompey's actions force the Senate to move beyond mere debate and respond with monetary and military support of the campaign against Sertorius. Where the failure of the Athenian assembly in Thucydides' narrative fails to respond to Nicias' letter, Pompey is successful in forcing response from the Roman Senate. Sallust's internal narrator succeeds where Thucydides' fails, demonstrating the superiority of his historiographic approach to that of a predecessor to whom he so often shows deference.

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